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ABSTRACT 
LABOUR'S TRANSFORMATION 1983-1989: 
A STUDY IN POLITICAL COMPLEXITY 
ADAM LENT 
This thesis attempts to answer the following question: why and how did the 
Labour Party change between 1983 and 1989? This question is approached from 
the theoretical perspective of 'complexity' which suggests that socio-political 
phenomena are either too complex ever to be fully understood or are too 
complex for the methodological tools we presently have at our disposal. These 
theoretical conclusions are arrived at following detailed analysis of how the 
dominant model of causality employed in social and political analysis has tended 
to obscure a large quantity of causal processes involved in the development of 
anyone social or political factor. As such, it is proposed that a methodology be 
employed which aims to subvert the prevalent tendency to simplification whilst 
simultaneously using the insights of complexity to develop a new approach to the 
Party. A variety of methodological approaches are proposed and applied in 
pursuit of these goals. 
Following the identification of simplifications and potential sources of further 
complexity in existing analyses of Labour's transformation between 1983 and 
1989, the thesis makes a large number of empirical observations about the nature 
of that transformation. These empirical observations cannot be easily summarised 
v 
in the form of a limited number of over-arching findings for the reason that such 
simplification is avoided within the thesis itself. However, it can be stated that 
these observations cover the full range of personal, contingent political, 
institutional, ideological and rational factors which were causes, aspects and 
effects of the transformation. 
vi 
A NOTE ON REFERENCES 
The following sources are cited using the Harvard system of referencing: books, 
contributions to edited collections, pamphlets, journal articles, feature articles in 
newspapers and periodicals, published reports and official documents, and 
unpublished discussion papers and proposals which are clearly marked as 
authored by an individual, a committee or an organisation. 
New reports and editorials in newspapers and periodicals are cited in brackets 
within the body of the text, the title and date of the newspaper being given. 
Minutes of bodies such as executive committees, and unpublished reports of 
those bodies that have no clear author are cited in brackets within the body of 
the text, with title, date and any serial or archive number being given where 
available. 
Original interviews carried out by the author are cited using the Harvard system. 
However, it has also been made clear within the body of the text that the 
reference is to an original interview. The vast majority of original interview 
material used in this thesis was conducted 'on the record' and as such most 
interview references contain the name of the interviewee. However, the whole of 
one interview and parts of a small number of others were conducted 'off the 
record' at the request of the interviewees - in these few cases reference is made 
only by a broad description of the interviewee's position in the Labour Party 
such as 'party activist' or 'party official'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The basic premise of this thesis is that politics is highly complex. The simplicity of this 
premise, however, is deceptive. As analysts we often have a strong sense of the complexity of 
the subject we study but to argue explicitly for that sense (i.e. to tum that sense into concepts 
and categories) is difficult. Furthermore, once one acknowledges openly the complexity of 
politics, one cannot avoid the troublesome question of whether politics is in fact too complex 
to be fully understood. Troublesome because if, as in the case of this thesis, one answers with 
a tentative ''yes'', an ambiguity still remains about whether politics will always be too complex 
or whether it is merely too complex for the methodological tools we use at present. 
In dealing with this topic, the following pages can conveniently be perceived as operating on 
three levels. The first is that of the pure theory of complexity. Chapter two and chapter three 
concern themselves mainly with this issue. It is argued in chapter two that a brief study of the 
predominant notions about cause and effect in political analysis indicate that we employ a 
paradigm of linear causality. This paradigm conceals the actual complexity of causal processes 
for the sake of being able to exert power over our environment and actions. Chapter three 
displays more specifically how such simplification has permeated one particular area of 
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political study - the transformation of the Labour Party in the 1980s. In response to this, the 
chapter goes on to present alternative methods for the analysis of this particular area of study 
which take more account of complexity. However, it is acknowledged here that a fully 
complex understanding cannot be achieved in this study either because the analytical methods 
demanded by the structure of a thesis are inadequate to the task or because complexity, by 
virtue of its extent, can never be fully understood. As such, the chapter presents methods of 
analysis which while they may enhance complexity to a small degree, have their main utility in 
the fact that they communicate a sense of an evaded complexity and thus subvert existing 
tendencies towards simplification. In this context, this thesis can be seen as a tactical response 
to the dominance of simplification on behalf of complexity. 
The second level is that of the theoretical approach to the Labour Party adapted in the light of 
the methodological imperatives created by an appreciation of complexity. This mainly centres 
on the use of non-doctrinal beliefs in the Party. Drucker's work (1979) on such non-doctrinal 
beliefs in the form of ethos is well-known and esteemed and yet it has made very little impact 
on the way the Party has been analysed. Despite his criticism that studies of Labour have 
seriously over-emphasised doctrine, it has been the transformation of paper policy which has 
most interested analysts of Labour in the 1980s. However, this thesis asserts that while 
Drucker had his own valid reasons for espousing the non-doctrinal beliefs as an analytical 
category, it also serves the analyst well as an enhancer of complexity and a subverter of 
. 
simplification. This is primarily because its very vagueness as a concept and the ethereal 
nature of the broad phenomena to which it refers effectively provide that sense of an evaded 
complexity which this thesis is trying to create. In this context the analysis shifts its focus from 
Drucker's concept of ethos to a broader notion of 'values' . 
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In addition to the employment of non-doctrinal beliefs, the thesis also attempts to multiply the 
categories traditionally employed to understand Labour. This is designed to display the 
simplification inherent in much analysis and to augment the number of causes and effects we 
can involve in our understanding of the Party. In particular, this method is employed in 
relation to the traditional left-right spectrum. It is argued that this spectrum fails to 
communicate the large number of other dichotomies of opinion not congruent with the left-
right distinction but which still played a major role in the Party's transformation. 
This adapted theory of the Labour Party, centring largely on values and multiplication, is 
introduced in chapter two but developed throughout the thesis. 
The third and final level is that of the empirical study of the Party's transformation itself. The 
empirical study, aptly for a thesis that rejects linear causality, is both a cause and an effect of 
the theoretical considerations asserted in chapters two and three and applied throughout. It is 
a cause in the sense that in attempting to answer the central empirical research question of the 
thesis - why and how did the Labour Party change between 1983 and 1989' 1 - I found myself 
confronted by an overwhelming quantity of causes, effects and interactions to which I felt I 
was doing violence through an apparently necessary process of simplification. It was this 
confrontation which maybe is normally suppressed by analysts but which ultimately I was 
unable to ignore. However, the empirical research is also an effect of the theoretical 
1 1983 is chosen as a starting-point being the year in which Michael Foot resigned and Neil Kinnock took over 
as leader. While 1989 is chosen as an end-point being the year in which the Policy Review was accepted by the 
Labour Party Annual Conference. These seem adequate parentheses for an era of transformation. However, as 
the thesis points out. while such chronological limits are demanded by the structure of a thesis and most forms 
of existing analysis, they are themselves processes of simplification. A fully complex analysis, if such a thing 
could exist, would not admit of start-points or end-points. 
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considerations, in that only by exploring this sense of complexity further could I develop the 
methods necessary to highlight that complexity and communicate it in an effective if 
somewhat initially unexpected 'tactical' fashion. 
Within this context, the empirical findings of this thesis uphold the theoretical assertions but 
also, with the help of that theoretical approach, are of interest in themselves. However, it is 
traditional in empirical studies for an author to ultimately identify a prime set of causes or 
processes (often maybe only one cause or process) which allows us to 'understand' the 
subject under study. However, this thesis represents a radical rejection of such epiphenomenal 
explanations. There is no identification of one cause or process or even one significant point 
of transformation. The very singularity of the notion of transformation is itself questioned. 
The empirical findings stand on their own indicating nothing but themselves. By doing this 
they merely augment - rather than negate - causes and effects discovered by other analysts and 
as such, by adding to the quantity of such causes and effects, enhance our appreciation of the 
complexity of the transformation. This, of course, makes for a less immediately satisfying 
empirical analysis. Literary critics may say that it lacks the 'closure' associated with a 
traditional novel. But like contemporary novels which avoid closure, the same lack here 
hopefully also says something interesting and unacknowledged about the world. Namely that 
complexity denies us a satisfyingly complete picture within the structure of one thesis. 
The empirical study begins in chapter four. This chapter deals with the contest for leader after 
Michael Foot's announcement of resignation and the very earliest days of Kinnock's 
leadership prior to the outbreak of the national miners' strike in March 1984. This brief 
period, which is almost totally ignored by analysts of the Party in the 1980s, is identified as an 
.. 
important focus for analysis. Study of these early days indicatt:s that desire for major reform 
, 
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on the part of a 'core leadership' was much greater from much earlier than previously 
acknowledged, that various changes in the values of the Party had already begun, and that 
reforms of structure and policy were underway from the very first day of Kinnock's 
leadership. The identification of these earlier causes, effects and aspects of the transformation 
is itself an enhancer of complexity. 
Chapter five also displays the existence of earlier factors of change. The chapter concentrates 
upon the troubled disputes that dominated the Party in 1984 and 1985: the Miners' Strike, the 
rates rebellion and the Militant debacle. Rejecting the common view that this was a 'wasted 
year' which distracted the leadership from its reform project, it is argued that great changes in 
values, structure, identity and factional relations occurred without which further aspects of the 
transformation would have been extremely unlikely. The chapter also argues that the cathartic 
and sudden shift of 'realignment' usually identified as the culmination of this period was in 
fact the result of far more diverse, long-term and, of course, complex features. 
Chapter six concentrates on the changes brought about in Party structures and organisation. 
Once again rejecting the mono-causal explanation which emphasises conscious plans for such 
reorganisation on the part of the core leadership, the chapter argues that these changes were 
the result of a complex confluence of causal processes including ad hoc responses to specific 
events, the personality of the Party leader, contingent political circumstances, the less tangible 
effects of other developments and conscious decision-making by the core leadership 
themselves. 
Chapter seven focuses on the growth and influence of new agenda issues in the Labour Party 
during the 1980s paying particular attention to the disputes over black sections and the radical 
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policies of Labour local authorities. Once again, areas that have been barely explored by 
existing analyses. It is argued that these new agenda disputes, while not having any major 
effect on the doctrine of the Party by 1989, by their very existence indicate a major aspect of 
transformation. It is shown how these new agenda issues and style of politics constituted 
values which could not and would not be accommodated by the values of the core leadership 
or more surprisingly by the doyens of the soft left despite their initial enthusiasm for the new 
agenda issues developed since the 1960s. Furthermore, the disputes over these issues and the 
growth in their significance indicate a decline in the importance of the traditional left-right 
split based as it was upon distinct ideological positions. For example, the emphasis on 
ethnicity, which was the key feature of the black sections dispute, began to supplant these 
more established dichotomies. This inevitably provides an indication of greater complexity 
based upon the multiplication mentioned above. 
The election defeat of 1987 and its aftermath is explored in chapter eight. A simple empirical 
study of this period highlights the fact that the factional alliance, usually identified as being the 
key to Kinnock's success in transforming the Party, was more complex and unsettled than is 
presently accepted. The events of this period are also a case study in the complexity of causal 
processes in that the traumatic and overwhelming defeat in the 1987 election lead 
unexpectedly to the strengthening of the leader and his approach due to the 'intervention' of 
non-linear causal processes. 
And finally, chapter nine focuses upon the area most studied by other analysts: policy reform. 
However, rather than treat policy reform as the outstanding effect of other factors (as in the 
accepted epiphenomenal analyses), it explores such reform as merely one other factor in a 
wider transformation which itself acted as a cause as well as an effect. In particular, it is 
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shown how policy was not based solely on rational calculations by the core leadership but was 
transformed by, and itself transformed, the values of the Party. Study of policy reform, 
especially the Policy Review, once again multiplies categories by showing how disputes within 
the reform-supporting Party establishment were not rare and how, by 1989, opposition to the 
policy preferences of the core leadership were localised more usually within that establishment 
rather than the broader Party. This development - illustrated strongly by the lack of popular 
opposition to the Review - displays how significant transformation must have already 
occurred outside the realms of policy thus multiplying the number of identified causes of 
change and challenging epiphenomenal approaches. Both factors which contribute to the 
construction of a complex approach. 
Before starting the thesis proper, it is worthwhile presenting a very brief survey of 
developments in the Labour Party in the fifteen years before 1983 to provide a historical 
context for the transformation that was to come. This survey may also in itself serve the cause 
of complexity by displaying, however briefly, that even more causes of the changes in the 
1980s can be found earlier in the Party's history. 
The great popularity of Harold Wilson's first government which swept him to a second term 
in 1966 soon evaporated in the turmoil of the sterling crisis, growing unemployment and a 
backbench rebellion over the In Place of Strife legislation which aimed to legally limit trade 
union powers (pimlott 1992: 404-431; 510-546). However, the consequent victory of the 
Conservative Party under Heath in 1970 led to the passing of far more draconian union 
legislation but did little to quell the worsening economic situation. In this context a period of 
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union militancy began leading to a u-turn by Heath on his monetarist policies, the failure of his 
attempts to curb union power and ultimately an election in February 1974 (Gamble 1974: 
220-228). 
Wilson returned to office although at the head of a minority government. He called another 
election in October to remedy this situation but only succeeded in winning a majority of three 
(Laybourn 1988: 164). Despite having produced a radical programme in 1973 (The Labour 
Party 1973), such a precarious hold on power meant the Government had to embark on a 
period of ad hoc economic management based around tripartite collaboration with business 
interests and the unions (Warde 1982: 125-162~ Pimlott 1992: 617-618). In addition, 
Wilson's Government had to endure a series of scandals (Pimlott 1992: 625-632). Following 
Wilson's sudden resignation in 1976, the Government, under Jim Callaghan's premiership 
shifted towards a "quasi-monetarist" policy designed to bring inflation under control, cut the 
PSBR and secure an IMP loan (Whiteley 1983: 151-154). The ensuing incomes policy 
coupled with cuts in the public sector led to a resurgence of union militancy over the winter of 
1978/1979 (Shaw 1994: 7). Having lost a vote of confidence in Parliament, when the pact 
which had kept his Government afloat since 1977 collapsed, Callaghan called an election 
which he lost to Margaret Thatcher. 
It was in this historical context that the Labour left reached its highest level of influence within 
the Party spurred on by union militancy and the intellectual and political bankruptcy of the 
revisionists and pragmatists who had led the Party since the 1950s and formed the troubled 
Governments of Wilson and Callaghan. In addition the growth of student radicalism, new 
agenda issues and the general rebellious sense of the times provided the Labour left with a 
level of grassroots support it did not have before (Seyd 1987: 37-75~ Shaw 1994: 20). On this 
· , 
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basis, the left gained a tentative control on the NEC in 1973 and were able to elect Tony Benn 
to the chairmanship of the Home Policy Committee and Ian Mikardo to the chairmanship of 
the International Affairs Committee (Seyd 1987: 101). 
This optimistic and growing left coalesced around the Alternative Economic Strategy which 
advocated an extension of public ownership, increased public expenditure, and the imposition 
of import controls which would of necessity lead to withdrawal from the EEC (Seyd 1987: 
25-31~ Shaw 1994: 7-15). There was also growing support for unilateral nuclear disarmament 
and withdrawal from NATO. New agenda issues of anti-racism and feminism also began to 
influence the left's thinking (Interviews with the following: Haworth 1995; Hulme 1994; 
Stanley 1994). 
A further issue, which was to be of particular importance in the 1980s, was the left's 
developing commitment to direct action as an effective way to challenge the power of a 
capitalist ruling class. The success of the unions in defeating Heath's right-wing legislation 
inspired a belief in the need to break unjust laws and call strikes for political ends (Seyd 1987: 
33-35). 
The left also aimed to counter the institutional and conservative power of the state by winning 
changes to the Party's constitution which would make :MPs and Party leaders more 
accountable to the grassroots (Interview with Stanley 1994). To achieve this, left groups -
such as the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy and the Labour Co-ordinating Committee 
- campaigned for mandatory reselection of MPs by their constituency parties once every 
Parliament, the establishment of a Party-wide electoral college to elect the leader and deputy 
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leader, and the right of the NEC to write the election manifesto (Seyd 1987: 33-35; 103-124; 
Shaw 1994: 21-22). 
The greatest victories for the resurgent left came between 1979 and 1981 when the 1979 
annual conference accepted mandatory reselection, the 1981 special conference established 
the electoral college, and the 1981 annual conference adopted a unilateralist defence policy 
(Seyd 1987: 103-124). In addition, a left-leaning group was elected to victory on the powerful 
Greater London Council in 1981 (Seyd 1987: 142). 
A less clear-cut victory for the left was the election of Michael Foot as leader in 1980. 
Although Foot had always been a member of the left, in government he had given strong 
support to Callaghan - as such the direction in which he would take the Party was unclear. 
Nevertheless the conglomeration of these victories for the left encouraged four leading right-
wingers to leave Labour, set-up the Social Democratic Party and take a number of MPs and 
members with them. A factor which was to split the anti-Tory vote in 1983 and 1987 to the 
great detriment of both the SDP and Labour. 
However, to assert, as the SDP defectors did at the time, that the left now ran the Party 
would be a great exaggeration. Even at the height of its power, the left was subject to defeat. 
This was particularly the case when the proposal to allow the NEC to write the manifesto was 
voted down at the 1980 and 1981 conferences (Seyd 1987: 121-124) and when, in the first 
use of the electoral college, the staunch right-winger Denis Healey beat Tony Benn to the 
deputy leadership in 1981. The latter defeat was in part caused by the decision of some left-
wingers to abstain on the second round vote rather than vote for Benn. One of those who did 
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so was Neil Kinnock, a move which meant he was viewed with great suspicion from that day 
on by the left (see chapter four). 
Against this background of faction-fighting, Foot presided over a disastrous three years for 
the Party. Labour was racked by a severe financial crisis which led to cuts. job losses. the 
decline in funds for regional and local activities and a consequent loss of morale amongst the 
Party's employees and activists (Interview with Mortimer 1994; Interview with Warburton 
1995). While the Militant tendency, with its apparently growing grassroots influence, 
trotskyite politics and entryist tactics caught the attention of the press and became a source of 
internal dispute (Seyd 1987: 161-166). A dispute to which Foot's responded with extreme 
uncertainty making him appear weak and indecisive. 
This impression was consolidated when Foot initially opposed the selection of the left-wing 
candidate Peter Tatchell for a by-election in Bermondsey and then backed him in the face of 
NEC resistance (Seyd 1987: 46; Shaw 1994: 18-19; Wainwright 1987: 86-89). Further 
embarrassment came when the leader had to withdraw his appointment of Kinnock to the post 
of employment spokesperson after right-wingers in the Shadow Cabinet threatened to resign 
(Shaw 1994: 19). Caught between left and right in a demoralised and threatened Party, Foot 
was unable to achieve the unity he hoped for (Shaw 1994: 1-28). 
However, the final humiliation came in the 1983 election. In the face of a Government buoyed 
enormously by the military victory in the Falklands and which had grasped the importance of a 
well-planned, emotive and disciplined election campaign, the Labour Party suffered enormous 
defeat surrendering a three-figure majority to Thatcher. Even more worrying was the fact that 
Labour only received 2% more of the vote than the SDP-Liberal Alliance (Shaw 1994: 26-
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28). Of course, the existence of this new third Party made the struggle between the 
Conservative and Labour Parties that much more uneven. 
The defeat was made even worse by the fact that Labour had run an appalling campaign with 
apparently no proper co-ordination and led by a man who could never compete with Thatcher 
for sheer television presence and simplicity of message. 
Soon after, Foot announced his resignation and the long contest for the post of leader and 
deputy leader began. 
Before continuing this historical study in considerably more detail, we must first turn to the 
theoretical considerations on the complexity of politics. However, it would serve the goal of 
greater complexity well, to keep this brief historical survey in mind throughout the thesis and 
question whether earlier causes of the transformation of the 1980s can be identified. This issue 
will be returned to in chapter ten which will attempt to identify the simplifications existing 
within the text of this thesis. 
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PART I 
COMPLEXITY AND POLITICS 
INTRODUCTION 
2 
TOWARDS COMPLEXITY 
IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
14 
At some point in their study of a particular issue, socio-political analysts often experience the 
sense that their subject matter is too complex to be fully understood. The sheer quantity of 
causes and effects involved in that subject matter suddenly appears too great, too intense to 
be adequately communicated to a reader. However, analysts rarely, if ever, allow such 
disturbing thoughts to impinge for long upon their task. The implications of the notion that 
the political world is too complex to understand are so radical that they would, if followed 
through to their logical limit, negate the value of accepted methods and structures of political 
analysis. 
This is so largely because the idea of a non-apprehendable complexity unites three subversions 
of three very fundamental assumptions without which the political analytical project could not 
operate as it does. These are the assumptions that: an event or phenomena has an identifiable 
and limited series of significant causes and effects; the analyst and the analysis can remain 
separate from the development and nature of the analysed; there is a political reality which can 
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be fully apprehended and understood 2. As a result, our sense of complexity is consigned to 
the margins of our perception for the sake of completing an analytical task in the manner 
universally accepted by the academic community. And, as this chapter argues, that universally 
accepted manner is based upon and reproduces the goal of simplification. 
Of course, not all social analysts have ignored these subversions. Most disciplines have well-
established streams of thought which acknowledge the validity of one or more of these three 
subversions if not necessarily within the context of complexity. But the discipline of politics in 
Britain has been more resistant than probably any other social science to these ideas. This is 
not to say that all individual political analysts unquestioningly accept the existence of an 
absolute truth, the feasibility of total analytical objectivity, or the narrow limitations of 
causality but as a discipline there has been far less thought given to the methodological 
modifications that might be required when one does question these notions. For example, the 
application of reflexivity to the analyst which has become so common in sociology and 
anthropology (Steier 1991) is practically unknown in politics. 
The powerful influence of these three assumptions remain within politics by virtue of an 
inertial commitment to the methods once associated with those assumptions. They almost 
certainly have their origin in the influence which classical scientific goals, methods and models 
once exerted over all social sciences. For example, the influential political theorist Michel 
Duverger held out a common hope for the future of political science when he wrote in the 
introduction to his work Political Parties: 
2Many thanks to Dr. Tim Jordan for pointing-out this significant implication of complexity. 
In fifty years time perhaps it will be possible to describe the real 
working of political parties. For the time being we are in the age of 
'cosmogonies'. Science judges them severely once it has arrived at 
maturity - without them, however, there would be no science, or at 
least it would take longer to develop (Duverger 1964: xvi). 
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While a similar hope is expressed in subtler terms in the more recent work of Heath et al. who 
comment that assertions of causal processes 
must necessarily have a tentative and provisional character. In the 
absence of real life experiments, survey data can never be conclusive of 
causality. At most we can say that the balance of the evidence favours 
one interpretation rather than another. To assess the impact of social or 
political change, moreover, we clearly have to make some causal 
assumptions. As our data and methods improve, we shall no doubt be 
able to make better causal assumptions. We hope that other scholars 
will be able in due course to improve upon the procedures used ... 
(Heath et a/1991: 201). 
Of course, the irony of this situation is that since the discoveries of figures such as Einstein, 
Bohr and Heisenberg, the natural and physical sciences themselves have been locked in to a 
century-long debate over just these three subversions which has placed classical scientific 
inquiry's focus upon causality and objective truth under question~ a questioning that has 
proved so severe that many have identified it as a paradigm shift (see, for example, Ploman 
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1985~ Hawking 1988). One stream of thought inspired by these discoveries IS actually 
concerned with notions of complexity itself (Aida et al. 1985) 
However, fascinating as the three subversions are, this chapter will concentrate, at least 
explicitly, only on that which undermines the assumption that an event or phenomena has an 
identifiable and limited series of significant causes and effects. This concentration occurs for 
three reasons: firstly, it is within the realm of causality that I believe, and hopefully this 
chapter will show, we can most clearly come to appreciate why analysts experience a sense of 
complexity; secondly, the challenge both to the assumption that the analyst can remain 
separate from the analysed and to the notion of a fully apprehendable reality have been made 
adequately elsewhere, particularly in the canon of literature now usually labelled 
'postmodern,3; and thirdly, while challenges to those two assumptions have lead to 
fascinating, ground-breaking theoretical research, I hope to show that it is the questioning of 
causality via complexity that presents the most practical way forward within the realm of more 
empirical work, . 
As such, this chapter begins by analysing the dominant model of causality used in socio-
political analysis. It then suggests three fundamental problems with this model which when 
acknowledged show why we may experience a sense of complexity. The chapter then 
proceeds to draw out some of the repercussions for socio-political analysis resulting from the 
acknowledgement of complexity. 
31t may be the case that the central tenets of postmodcrnism can be re-thought in the light of complexity, as the 
third point made here in fact suggests, but this is clearly a project for a later work. 
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CAUSALITY IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
Causality has been a central concern of the analytical endeavour ever since Aristotle identified 
the concept of the "efficient cause" which he described as "the source of motion" (Bunge 
1979: p.3l). In essence Aristotle had isolated in his Metaphysics, the goal of much human 
analysis - the discovery of why things happen, the active origin of phenomena. Since Aristotle, 
discussion of causality in most disciplines has shown an ever-growing appreciation of the 
artificiality of identifying single or over-arching causes for any occurrence and, consequently, 
a realisation of the complexity and subtlety of causal processes. This development has been 
particularly strong in social and political analysis - in all likelihood because human behaviour 
presents the most multi-faceted phenomena for analysts. However, the realisation has also 
occurred in science more recently with the growth of theories of chaos and complexity. 
Nevertheless, it should be stated that, especially in social science and maybe particularly in 
politics, the theoretical realisation of complex causal processes has not been translated into 
much methodological reform. Much of this thesis is concerned with this disjuncture - while 
acknowledging that at a more or less conscious level political analysts are aware of intense 
complexity, the thesis attempts to display how this awareness can be more fully translated into 
the actual analytic process. 
However, the following section will briefly explore other attempts to understand causality and 
in so doing display how an awareness of complexity has grown. 
Much of the formal thinking about causality since the Enlightenment has been concerned with 
the notion of efficient cause as being the necessary and sufficient condition for an event to 
occur. Galileo provided one of the most influential of definitions in these terms: 
that and no other is to be called cause, at the presence of which the 
effect always follows, and at whose removal the effect disappears 
(Bunge 1979: 33). 
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In other words, an event is 'necessary' for another event to occur if the second event never 
occurs without the first~ and an event is 'sufficient' for another event, if the second event 
always follows the first. Thus the passing of my forefinger across my thumbpad with 
considerable pressure is a necessary cause of a clicking sound and, although I may adapt the 
movement of my finger over my thumb, that movement is reasonably sufficient as it is very 
difficult to avoid any clicking sound. 
While this definition is undoubtedly rigorous and has played a significant role in formal logic, 
and to a lesser extent natural science, for the analysis of human behaviour, it is a far too rigid 
and deterministic definition. Social analysts have been required to develop an approach to 
causality which approaches analysis in an environment where there are multiple causes of each 
event, each of which mayor may not have multiple effects which themselves will, in turn, have 
multiple effects. And yet, simultaneously, social analysts have wanted to avoid ditching 
completely the satisfying explanatory power of a more rigid approach to causality as 
represented by Galileo and natural science. It is with an attempt to create models and 
approaches which straddle this thin line between the explanatory advantages of rigidity and 
realistic flexibility that much post-Enlightenment thinking about causality in human behaviour 
has been concerned. 
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It was with the development of the Enlightenment, that thinkers first began to break free of 
the rigidity exemplified by Galileo. Both David Hume and Immanuel Kant, in their different 
ways began to observe a more complex and sophisticated process as work behind the 
identification of cause. Hume argued that as analysts we only observe regular sequences of 
events, in effect nothing more than a series of occurrences following one another in time. 
Onto this sequence we impose a pattern which we believe constitutes an underlying series of 
causes but which, in reality, exists nowhere but inside our minds. Hume's arguments led, 
ultimately, to the approach of positivism where pure observation of patterns of events 
becomes the goal of analysis rather than the attempt to impose abstract and unobservable 
principles (Hume 1902: passim). By acknowledging that there was a disjuncture between 
what analysts describe or explain through causality and what may actually be the reality of 
that causality, Hume opened-up the space for the development of an approach which accepted 
that social reality may be more complex, or at least other, than we describe it. 
Kant also created a similar conceptual space. Kant was more comfortable with the notion that 
causality did actually exist in reality but, like Hume, he recognised that human analysis was 
heavily determined by its conceptual formations rather than being a pure abstraction from 
reality (of course, Kant, unlike Hume, believed these conceptual formations, including 
causality, to possess an a priori validity originating as they did in human rationality) (Kant 
1964: passim). Kant was, thus, to be the inspiration for the more detailed thought about the 
degree of complexity involved in the social which occurred with the flourishing of socio-
political analysis in the nineteenth century. As Max Weber stated, his approach was based 
upon, 
the basic principle of the modem theory of knowledge which goes back 
to Kant (that) concepts are primarily means of thought for the 
intellectual mastery of empirical data and can only be that (quoted in 
Outhwaite 1987:100). 
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For Weber, and many of his contemporaries such as Rickert, Menger, Tonnies and Simmel, 
empirical reality is massively complex and all analytical concepts, including notions of cause 
and effect, are merely ideal types. Weber wrote: 
If ... I wish to conceptualise 'sect' in a genetic fashion, e.g. in reference 
to certain important cultural significances which the 'sectarian spirit' 
has had for modem culture, certain characteristics of both become 
essential because they stand in an adequate causal relationship to those 
effects. However, the concepts thereupon become ideal-typical, i.e. in 
full conceptual purity these phenomena either do not exist at all or only 
in single instances. Here as elsewhere it is the case that every concept 
which is not purely classificatory diverges from reality (quoted in 
Outhwaite 1987:101). 
Weber's approach is reflected later in this chapter where his notion of ideal-types are 
analogous to my argument that social analysis provides useful simplifications which depart 
from the actual complexity of social phenomena. As Outhwaite puts it: 
The problem as Weber sees it is not, pace Hume, that there are no 
causal connections in reality, but that there are too many of them for us 
to handle. We therefore have to select some of them, and selection here 
involves both the focusing on a particular link or set of links in a causal 
chain and the simplification of the relations in that chain itself The 
establishment of one or more such simplified sequences provides us 
with approximation to the real causal relations, which are in a strict 
sense unknowable in virtue of their complexity (Outhwaite 1987: 102). 
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This sentiment also has its analog in the consideration given to 'focus' and 'simplification' in 
my analysis below. 
However, it was a less radical (philosophically) nineteenth century shift towards an 
appreciation of the complexity of social phenomena that had the deepest influence on analysis. 
Marx's notion of the dialectic at work in material phenomena clearly contained within it the 
assertion that social events which may appear as distinct are in fact closely implied one in the 
other by highly complex processes of causality. Unlike Weber however, Marx always assumed 
that this complexity could be fully apprehended by the analyst employing an adequately 
scientific mode of analysis. The complexity inherent in Marx's approach was drawn-out most 
rigorously by Althusser. 
Famously, Althusser asserts that social change results from overdetermination. This, he 
contrasts with more traditional notions of determination current at the time in Marxist 
analysis, where the contradictions inherent in the economic infrastructure are seen as 
determining (in essence, a process of causal necessity) the social, cultural and political 
superstructure. Overdeterrnination implies that the relation between economic contradiction 
and other forms of social contradiction is never one of simple one-way determination. Instead 
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contradiction is overlaid upon contradiction with each and all modifying one another. The 
most Althusser will concede is that economic contradiction may determine which elements are 
dominant in a social formation but then only, as his enigmatic phrase has it, "in the last 
instance" (Althusser 1969: passim~ 113). 
Most importantly for this thesis, Althusser argues that overdetermination cannot be 
understood in terms of accepted models of causality between social phenomena. Althusser 
identifies two dominant models of causality which he rejects as simplistic, partial or 
mystificatory. The first is the straightforward notion that there exists a 'transitive' relation 
between two distinct events or classes of events which are posited as cause and effect. This 
model can be best assigned in the treatment above to that proposed by Hume, Kant and those 
who come before them. Althusser sees this model as having heavily structured the more 
economist approaches to Marxism he specifically wants to reject. The second model he calls 
'expressive causality' and associates with Hegelian thinkers, and with historicist aspects of 
Marxist analysis. This model posits a specific causal relationship between a social whole and 
its parts (an analytical capacity which the first model does not possess) in which each element 
in a totality are expressions of the essence of the whole (Althusser & Balibar 1970: 186). 
In opposition to these models Althusser proposes the concept of 'structural' or 'metonymic 
causality' which he argued were truer to the dialectical method. In these models a social 
structure exists through its effects or, put another way, effects both constitute a structure and 
are modified by virtue of constituting such a structure: 
... effects are not outside the structure, are not a pre-existing object, 
element or space in which the structure arrives to imprint its mark: on 
the contrary, it implies that the structure is immanent in its effect, a 
cause immanent in its effects in the Spinozist sense of the term, that the 
whole existence of structure consists of its effects, in short that the 
structure, which is merely a specific combination of its particular 
elements, is nothing outside its effects (Althusser & Balibar 1970: 188-
9). 
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Althusser's approach is fascinating because it tries to maintain some notion of distinct social 
moments related causally whilst simultaneously overcoming the simple dualism of 'transitive' 
or 'expressive' causality as he styles the alternative models. For Althusser, it seems, social 
causality ceases to be a straightforward motion through time and/or space between two 
moments and instead becomes a highly complex relationship between structuring tendencies 
which work both at the level of the element and the totality. However, one cannot help feeling 
that Althusser is struggling against a level of complexity beyond his own, or possibly any 
human, understanding and, as such, is attempting to unite two irresolvable goals - an 
acknowledgement of full social complexity and the production of a closed analytical system 
fully conversant with that complexity. In this context, it would seem that a return to Weber's 
more resigned acceptance of a disjuncture between analytical imperatives and social reality 
may be more fruitful. Indeed, this thesis follows Weber's line although with the appended 
belief that the introduction of a tactical element to subvert the simplicity of the analysis may 
prove fruitful in starting analysis along a route that may lead to a fuller apprehension of social 
complexity. 
More recently the analysis of the social has been taken into further realms of complexity by 
Roberto Unger. He argues that there are three realms of existence: ideas, events and a third 
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realm constituted of ''the order of consciousness, mind, culture or social life" (Unger 1976: 
107). Causality, for Unger, is appropriate only as an analytical tool when approaching the 
limited category of events, while ideas are analysed by the method of logical analysis. The 
'third realm' requires another method which he calls 'appositeness' or 'symbolic 
interpretation'. Unger admits that the most demanding problem for the analyst is to 
understand the "precise relationship of social life to the realms of events and of ideas" (Unger 
1976: 117). However, in the face of the complexity that this problem presents, Unger retreats 
understandably, like this thesis to a temporary position: 
These are riddles to which I have no answer. Nevertheless, if we were to 
await their definitive solution, we might continue forever unable to think 
coherently about man and society. Therefore, one must look for partial 
and provisional solutions (Unger 1976: 117). 
However, this thesis, whilst accepting that in the face of some apparently insuperable 
analytical problems one must employ 'provisonal solutions', it is vital that one constructs such 
a solution which simultaneously undermines the need for that provisionality by pointing to a 
distant goal of more permanent methods for apprehending such complexity. 
Interestingly for this thesis, Unger's retreat results, in part, from his emphasis upon 'circular 
causality' which is a key starting-point for his development of 'appositeness' as an analytical 
approach to the 'third realm'. The idea lies on a trajectory begun by functionalist analysis, 
where the 'system' (a key concept in functionalism) is defined in part by the fact that elements 
within it are related to one another in a causal loop, i.e. a change in one element causes 
change in a series of others which, ultimately, causes a further change in the original element 
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(Demerath & Peterson 1967: passim). However, this functionalist approach is still essentially 
'transitive', to use Althusser's terminology. For Unger the relationship between the different 
elements in circular causality is that much closer, that much more linked in to the elements' 
very existence rather than anyone distinct change in their nature, that the concept comes 
much closer to Althusser's own struggle to suggest this relationship in describing the 
'structural causality' that exists between whole and part. And, of particular interest to this 
thesis, Unger contrasts this circular causality to the standard approach in most social analysis 
of 'simple causality' which is sequential and 'transitive': 
Simple causality seems inevitably to lead to reductionism in social theory, 
to the singling out of certain key factors as prior to others or as 
determinants of them. But circular causality, according to which all the 
elements of a system cause one another reciprocally, eviscerates 
sequence, a distinguishing attribute of causal explanation (Unger 1976: 
14). 
In fact, Unger sees the relationship between elements in circular causality as so close that he 
uses the metaphor of style in painting to express this relationship: 
The distinctive elements of style in painting do not cause one another, 
nor are they logically entailed by each other. They cannot be ordered 
serially, for there is no feature that comes first. Nevertheless, the idea of 
style describes a particular historical movement, placed in space and time 
(Unger 1976: 14). 
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Unger's analysis is also reflected in the ideas of Edgar Morin, the French anthropologist, who 
sees social forms as constituted by a staggeringly complex mix of circular causal processes 
each of which is involved in further circular causal processes with one another (Morin 1985: 
passim; Morin's ideas are studied further below). 
Unger's and Morin's observations are echoed very closely in the argument developed below 
with its emphasis both upon circular causality in the form of retroaction and inter-retroaction 
and also in the more tactical side of the approach in this thesis which asserts that the 
enormous complexity implied by circular causality will ultimately outstrip the limited 
methodologies available to us within the context of the Western tradition of social and 
political analysis. 
The final and most recent concern with the problems of complex causality have originated 
with thinkers such as Bhaskar and Sayer working in the realist tradition (Sayer 1992; Bhaskar 
1978). In particular, there has been a focus upon causal systems and the distinctions that 
exists for such systems within the natural scientific and social scientific disciplines. Realists 
have been critical of the assumption that the goal of analysis should be to discover highly 
regular patterns of causality. In natural science this is often achieved and it is often assumed, 
according to realists, that the social sciences are immature or less effective because they very 
rarely find such causal regularity. 
Realists have asserted that natural science is able to discover such regularity because it is 
dealing with 'closed systems' where two significant conditions exist. Firstly, there is no 
change in the object acting as cause. Secondly, there is no change in the external conditions of 
the cause relating to its operation as cause. The natural sciences often deal with systems 
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fulfilling such conditions either in nature or in the laboratory. In fact, experimental science 
involves ensuring that such conditions exists for the purposes of the experiment. Social 
systems, however, very rarely fulfil these conditions. Change, both in the intrinsic nature of a 
cause and in the extrinsic circumstances of a cause are often constant and thus social systems 
can be styled as 'open' rather than 'closed systems'. Thus the discovery of regular causal 
patterns in social science akin to natural science is an impossibility according to the realists. 
Sayer is very critical of some social scientists who are either unaware of the differences 
between closed and open systems or simply ignore the difference and assume that social 
systems can be treated as closed. Some economists, in particular, are guilty of such analysis 
(Sayer 1992: 124-125). As such, Sayer argues: 
... we must ... abandon the usual methodologists' quest for the holy grail 
ofa single model for all purposes (Sayer 1992: 152). 
Realists have identified with great clarity the greater complexity that exists in the subject of 
social analysis and the fact that this has significant implications for our assumptions about and 
methods of analysis. This thesis agrees deeply with this developing emphasis upon complexity 
both in the realist approach and all of the above approaches. As such many of the ideas 
outlined below have strong similarities to those outlined above. However there is one 
significant difference. This thesis is a direct consideration of the suggestion that social and 
political causality may not be just more complex than hitherto accepted but may, in fact, be 
too complex either for the accepted methodologies and structures of Western analysis or for 
human understanding itself In this context, the thesis does not propose, like the approaches 
outlined above, solutions in the form of new concepts, models or methodologies but instead 
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suggests that an approach is formulated to socio-political analysis which subverts our 
assumptions and thus poses questions which may lead to a wholly new approach. 
It should also be stated here that many of the above approaches deal with causality and social 
analysis within the context of philosophical and methodological debate, where views about 
causality and analysis are often explicit. This thesis directs itself far more to the concrete 
analysis of British political science in relation to study of the Labour Party. Theoretical and 
detailed methodological debate have not been a feature of this area of study, so what follows 
is an analysis of what implicitly underlies much of this area of study. It is also worth saying 
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that while many of the writers on the Labour Party discussed below may accept many aspects 
of my philosophical comments below, the thrust of this thesis is to argue that such acceptance 
does not seem to have had any significant impact on the bulk of the work on the Labour 
Party. In short, a disjuncture exists between the professed beliefs of Labour Party analysts 
with regards to notions of causality, complexity and truth and the actual methods and modes 
of their written work. 
The dominant model of cause and effect actually in use in political analysis, including that of 
the Labour Party, can be called 'linear'. It has three defining features: it functions through an 
implicit association with a spatial metaphor; it is usually unidirectional, i.e. causes impact as 
effects not vice versa~ and it focuses analytical attention upon very specific sets of causal 
processes. These features can be elucidated quite easily since this model is so widely used. 
In 'Political Change' by Heath et aI, the linear causal model is clear: 
Given our findings that nonreligious people are more likely to vote 
Labour, these changes (the decline in church attendance and in 
religious identity) suggest that Labour will have benefited from the 
decline of religion ... we estimate that, taken on its own, the decline in 
religion will have led to a 4.0 point decline in the Conservatives' share 
and a 4.1 point increase in Labour's (1991: 205). 
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The authors' implicitly assert here that a certain factor (the decline in church attendance and 
religious identity) will impact across space and time to have a perceivable effect (the decline in 
one Party's vote and the rise in another's). This assertion makes clear use of a model which 
inherently assumes that cause and effect are linked across a distance of space and time and 
that the interaction between that cause and effect can be adequately represented through the 
identification of one, unidirectional flow of action. A further example on a similar topic but 
employing a very different style of analysis can be found in Miliband: 
Nor would the Labour Party's integration into parliamentary politics 
have taken place ... had it not had its parallel in the growing integration 
of the trade unions into the framework of modem capitalism. This 
integration has not been smooth, but it has been continuous; and the 
crucial influence it has had on the political ways of the Labour Party 
explains why its various aspects occupy so large a place in the 
following pages (Miliband 1972: 14). 
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Despite Miliband's less positivistic approach, he still employs the same causal model based 
upon a unidirectional flow and an even clearer spatial metaphor which deliberately highlights 
the 'parallel' but causally linked relation between the integration of Party and unions. 
While Hughes and Wintour in a far more journalistic analysis of Labour reproduce the prime 
role given to linear cause and effect models in academic studies: 
The conduct, course and outcome of the 1987 election campaign 
moulded the policy review ... The main elements of the campaign 
became reference points for the review (Hughes & Wintour 1990: 35). 
Once again a spatially and temporally distinct pair of factors are causally linked in a 
unidirectional fashion. Continued quoting would be repetitive. A cursory study of any piece of 
socio-political analysis will reveal the use of the linear model in abundance. 
The other crucial feature of this model is its tendency to focus analytical attention upon a very 
specific set of causal processes. This 'focus' amounts to the technique of keeping the quantity 
of relevant causal processes to a minimum in any analytical process through a narrow 
definition of the spatial and temporal framework for the analysis. For example, it is clear that 
the decline in religious identity etc., in the Heath et al. extract, has a range of effects vastly 
greater than the sole effect of the changes in voting patterns for the two main parties. 
However, by limiting their spatial focus to the causal line of impact existing between religious 
identity and voting patterns, Heath et al. can rule out reference to other effects such as a drop 
in the sales of bibles or the growth of the evangelical wing in the Church of England. 
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It is also clear that the decline in religious identity etc. is itself an effect and hence other 
causes clearly exist further back along the line of causal impact which can thus also be said to 
have changed voting patterns. Such a cause may be the development of a rationalist-humanist 
critique of religion. This critique can be seen as a cause that is more temporally distant, i. e. as 
an influential movement of the 19th and 20th centuries; however, it can also be seen as a 
cause that is temporally simultaneous to the decline of religious identity but spatially more 
distant in that it may promote the changes in voting patterns but only once it has travelled via 
the closer effect-cum-cause of a decline in religious identity. Therefore, Heath et al. can rule 
out reference to other causes of their prime cause by limiting their focus spatially as above to 
the direct relationship between religious identity and voting patterns or by limiting their focus 
temporally to a specific time period - which in this case is the period since the early sixties, 
this being the span of time covered by their surveys. 
This process of spatial and temporal limitation is clearly at work in the other examples given 
above. The integration of the unions into modern capitalism does not have the sole effect of 
reconciling the Labour Party to parliamentary politics but through a limited spatial focus this 
is the effect 'foregrounded' by Miliband~ and clearly such integration of the unions has its own 
causes (e.g. the dominance of a labour aristocracy in the trade union movement or the 
historical influence of liberalism on the unions) which therefore also exist as causes for Labour 
Party reconciliation but being more spatially or temporally distant they are ruled less relevant 
and can escape reference. And similarly with Hughes and Wintour, the effects of the "conduct, 
course and campaign" of the 1987 election clearly have vast effects, too numerous to mention, 
besides the Policy Review but spatial limitation allows this particular effect to be 
foregrounded; while the "conduct, course and campaign" of the 1987 election were 
themselves effects of a wide variety of other causes (such as the existence of a first past the 
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post electoral system) but which can be ignored by the processes of spatial and temporal 
limitation. 
The symbiotic relationship between focus and the other features of the linear model can be 
gleaned from the above considerations. By utilising a model which is based upon a spatial 
metaphor and is simultaneously unidirectional, it is easy for an analyst to simply shrink or 
extend the analytical focus along the line of causal impact in a way which eases the analytical 
process. The model allows a very limited set of factors to be related causally by implicitly 
assuming that the relevance or significance of a cause to an effect is enhanced by proximity in 
space or time. In addition, focus itself, in being a universally accepted technique, 
simultaneously maintains the resonance of a model which is reliant on both the notion of space 
and of uni-directionality. These characteristics are themselves implied in 'focus', being a 
concept unthinkable without the ideas of space and a relatively simple notion of the direction 
of causal flow. 
However, despite the dominance the above features have come to have in socio-political 
analysis in the form of the linear cause and effect, three fundamental problems can be 
identified as aspects of this model. 
TilE PROBLEMS OF THE LINEAR MODEL 
The problems outlined below all share the characteristic that they reveal the linear model's 
. tendency to obscure large numbers of other causal processes involved in anyone socio-
political phenomena. In addition, they suggest that the linear model ignores the wealth of 
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interactions that occurs between causal processes. In this sense, it can be asserted that the 
linear model evades the full complexity of society and politics. 
The Mechanism of Linear Cause and Effect and Hidden Causality 
It is a well-established observation that the notion that the mechanism by which a cause has an 
effect is unexplainable. David Hume commented: 
When we look us towards external objects, and consider the operation 
of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power 
or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the 
cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. we 
only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other (Hume 
1902:63) 
Indeed, when we do investigate how one particular cause comes to have an effect, we only 
discover other causal processes demanding our attention rather than identify a process distinct 
from the causal (a distinction which is logically required by our investigation). Once again 
Hume was aware of this problem: 
... We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in 
voluntary motions, is not the member itself which is moved, but certain 
muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still 
more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is 
successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is 
the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof. 
that the power, by which this whole operation is performed, so far from 
being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or 
consciousness, is, to the last degree mysterious and unintelligible? 
(Hume 1902: 66) 
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We can see this problem in particularly powerful terms when we ask the question in a socio-
political context. Let us take a question about the assertion of Heath et al. mentioned above: 
why does the decline in religious identity cause a growth in the Labour vote? This is a 
question which demands an answer that should provide the mechanism by which a certain 
cause has an effect. (Heath et al. do not provide such an answer; they simply rely on their 
survey finding that non-religious people are more likely to vote Labour to assert a causal 
process.) 
We can hypothesise about some possible answers ourselves. Maybe those who have lost their 
religious identity are no longer influenced by the inherent conservatism of the personnel who 
run the church. Maybe a rejection of the myth of a reward in the afterlife encourages one to 
seek a better life on earth. Maybe the very process of rejecting one's religious roots 
encourages one to be more cynical about other establishment traditions and hierarchies. 
Maybe the Bible and other texts central to religious belief promote an ideology of deference 
and acceptance of the status quo and such deference and acceptance is no longer reproduced 
when the texts are rejected along with the religious belief Maybe acceptance into 
communities based around the church requires support for the Conservative Party and once 
this social acceptance is no longer sought there is no consequent obligation to support the 
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Conservatives. Maybe the Conservative Party was perceived as more friendly to the church 
t 
and hence church-goers naturally voted for those who shared their commitments and beliefs. 
And so on, a little thought could extend the list much further. 
But what is interesting about these hypotheses is that they all rely on the linear cause and 
effect model. Our investigation upholds Hume's view that when we ask why a particular 
cause has a particular effect - when we try to understand the actual mechanism that enables a 
cause to have an effect - we simply multiply the number of cause and effect processes we have 
to take into consideration. As such, we get no closer to understanding the actual mechanisms 
of cause and effect itself but instead reveal our original analysis to be a simplification ignoring 
vast numbers of other significant factors. 
However, there is a qualitative problem raised by this observation. It takes a form similar to 
Zeno's most famous paradox but applied specifically to cause and effect processes". 
As has been mentioned above in the linear model it is implicitly assumed that cause and effect 
are either spatially or temporally separate, this further implies that for a cause to have its 
effect, it must undergo some type of process metaphorically akin to travel between two points 
separated either by space or time. However if, as we have seen, any assertion of cause and 
effect implies a large number of other cause and effect processes occurring between the 
original cause and the original effect then those internal cause and effect processes must 
~s paradox can be briefly stated as follows. For a runner to complete a racecourse slhe must first reach the 
halfway point to the finish. However, once that halfway-point is reached, there is another halfway-point to be 
reached from the first halfway-point to the finish. The same applies once that second half-way-point has been 
reached. And so on indefinitely. Hence, it is logically impossible for a runner to complete a racecourse. 
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themselves imply even further cause and effect processes internal to them and so on ad 
infinitum. 
For example, if we accept for the sake of simplicity that the reason a decline in religious 
identity causes an increase in the Labour vote is because those who reject their religious roots 
are more likely to become cynical about other established traditions and hierarchies, we are 
still left with a further question which implies another cause and effect process, i. e. why does 
the rejection of religious roots cause one to be more cynical about other established traditions 
and hierarchies? If we attempt to answer this by arguing for example that when an individual 
rejects their religious roots they tend to face pressure from other established hierarchies such 
as the family, the workplace, the state, the school etc. to maintain their religion and this 
causes them to be cynical about those bodies as well, we are still left with the implication of a 
further cause and effect process and another question, i.e. why does pressure from other 
bodies to maintain a fading religious belief cause an additional cynical attitude towards them? 
Or equally we might ask, since there is another cause and effect process implied here, why 
does the decision of an individual to reject religion cause pressure to be brought upon that 
individual by other bodies? And so on. 
Answers can be given to these questions which appear at first glance to avoid the cause and 
effect model, such as: because the pressure brought to bear is often unfair or because 
established bodies have an interest in upholding other established bodies. But a brief thought 
about these should make clear that they still imply a number of cause and effect models. It can 
still be asked of the former answer: why does unfair pressure cause cynicism? And it can be 
asked of the latter: what causes one established body to have an interest in upholding another? 
The answer to each leads to yet more utilisations of the cause and effect model. 
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One can see how similar this is to the runner in Zeno's paradox: the cause can never logically 
reach its impact point as its travel is always subject to the completion of another cause and 
effect process which is itself subject to yet another and so on. Hence an attempt to fully 
understand one causal process not only multiplies the number of causal processes we must 
consider but actually endlessly multiplies the number of other causal processes we must take 
into account. Thus the complexity of causality obscured by the linear model appears mind-
boggling. 
However, just as many have objected to Zeno's paradox by stating that a runner clearly does 
reach an end point in the distance, so one might object that causes clearly do have effects 
despite the paradox. But this objection simply proves that motion occurs, it still does not 
logically refute Zeno. Such an objection suggests that it is not Zeno who is wrong but that his 
paradox has identified a flaw in our understanding of space, distance and motion. Similarly, 
just as the cause and effect paradox cannot be refuted logically despite the apparent truth of 
the cause and effect interaction, so this suggests a flaw in our model of the interaction. In 
short, the linear model in its convenient admission of focus into socio-political analysis -
through unidirectionality and the spatial metaphor - summons the multiple spectres of other 
linear causal processes which must be implicitly accepted to allow the causal process, which 
has been focused-upon, to operate. However, these same causal processes must 
simultaneously be ignored if the actual model itself is not to appear as sleight of hand and 
simplification. 
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The Problems ofUnidirectionality and More Hidden Causality 
Another feature of the linear model mentioned above is its unidirectionality. In all but a 
minority of cases, when a particular causal process is identified, its flow is limited to one 
direction. A factor, identified as a cause, is positioned in space or time as occurring prior to 
another factor upon which it has an impact in the form of an effect. The interaction of these 
two factors, in this unidirectional form, is usually presented as complete and finished; its 
constitution resides in the one movement of prior cause to secondary effect, no more work -
in the form of identifying effects back upon the initial cause or in the form of identifying 
oscillations of modification between the two factors as fractions of the causal process - is 
usually deemed to be necessary to understand or define the cause and effect interaction. 
However, this characteristic of unidirectionality is immediately questioned when we 
acknowledge the fact that a high level of undecidability has often existed in the identification 
of which factors are causes and which effects. 
For example, Heath et al. assert that the decline of religious identity has increased the Labour 
Party's vote. However, it is equally plausible that the increase in Labour's vote - which has 
inevitably enhanced the credibility of the Party and provided it with power - has caused a 
decline in religious identity. The same reversal applies to Miliband's assertions. It is quite 
conceivable that the parliamentarianism of the Labour Party has acted as the cause of the 
trade union's integration into capitalism rather than vice versa as Miliband asserts. 
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Such reversals can of course fuel great academic debates. One need think: only of certain 
aspects of the nature/nurture dispute: long arguments have raged, and continue to rage, over 
whether some inherent physiological factor causes our social structures and behaviour, or 
whether our social structures and behaviour cause us to construct a model of behaviour that 
posits a physiological cause. However, such disputes consistently display a stubborn 
undecidability. It seems unlikely that it could ever convincingly be proved that a decline in 
religious identity causes a growth in the Labour vote or vice versa. Or that the nature of trade 
unions determines the nature of the Party rather than the Party determining the unions. 
Conclusive evidence for proofs such as these is rarely, if ever, found. 
A more constructive, but less employed, response would be to accept that neither factor in a 
causal process can be fully identified simply as 'cause' or simply as 'effect'. Instead both may 
be interwoven in a complex process of retroactiol\ where each factor constantly affects the 
other to construct certain individual or multiple outcomes. 
If we take the example of Heath et al. once agail\ it is clear that the analysts have identified a 
simple linear process whereby the decline in religious identity increases the Labour vote. 
However, as has been mentioned above we can also see how a relatively simple retroactionS 
might also be underway whereby the increase in Labour's vote actually encourages the decline 
in religious identity as credibility and power is thus provided for the Party. 
Following from this, we could identity yet another retroaction: as the increase in the Labour 
vote is now the cause of the decline in religious identity, so that effect can affect the new 
1ne use of the term • retroaction' is itself problematic, although I can think of no better term, since it still 
implies that one cause is initially originary of the process, in this case the decline in religious identity. 
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cause in the sense that the decline in religious identity - caused by the growth in the Labour 
vote which was itself first postulated as an effect of the decline in religious identity - can itself 
cause an increase in the Labour vote. Hence, we have identified a circular rather than a linear 
relationship in which the decline in religious identity and the growth of the Labour vote act as 
both cause and effect for one another. 
This retroactive feature itself increases the number of causal processes to be taken into 
account when identifying and analysing any particular phenomena. A fact which, like the 
above augmentations hidden by the linear model, enhances the complexity of the subject 
matter under study. However, the number of relevant causal processes is further increased 
when we recognise that the existence, nature and intensity of one causal process cannot be 
operating in a vacuum. Retroactions are deeply affected themselves by other retroactions. 
For instance, if we consider the intensity of the retroaction between the two factors of 
religious identity and the Labour vote to be an effect itself, we might identify a cause, such as 
a tendency for church leaders to speak-out for progressive ideals, to weaken the extent to 
which a decline in religious identity increases the Labour vote and the increase in the Labour 
vote encourages decline in religious identity. However, we cannot assume that the causal 
interaction between such a cause and the retroaction is itself unidirectional, clearly the 
intensity of the retroaction will itself retroact upon the tendency of church leaders to speak-
out for progressive ideals, i.e. if the correspondence between the decline in religious identity 
and the rise in the Labour vote and vice versa is not that great then church leaders may not 
feel obliged to speak-out for progressive ideals which might itself retroact back by increasing 
the intensity of the original retroaction. Furthermore such a tendency on the part of church 
leaders may be affected by other causes with which they have a causal relationship, such as f 
ft.1\S\f{ a lJ~ ~ r:\t.~U ~wc.rn \.\~~f\~'i 
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strong social contacts and friendships between establishment politicians and church leaders, 
which will in turn logically have an effect back on the original interaction. Clearly the validity 
or the understanding of any mechanism of any cause and effect is subject to the complex web 
of inter-retroactions occurring throughout a socio-political system. Thus as one writer has 
observed, any attempt to identify or understand a causal process requires the identification 
and understanding of "the intertwining of myriads of processes of inter-retroactions" (Morin 
1985: 64). 
However, these considerations deal only with causes and effects separated, in the linear 
model, by space or by the relevance established by focus. It seems less likely that those 
separated by time, such as Hughes and Wintour's observations about the 1987 election and 
the Policy Review, are free of inter-retroactions. However, this is not the case - even here the 
linear model cannot be allowed to stand. Although inter-retroaction operates in temporal 
matters at the supposedly less concrete level of perception and the interpretative constructions 
associated with perception, there is still a wealth of complex interactions hidden from view by 
the linear model. 
For example, it can be observed that the nature of the Policy Review acts as a cause not only 
of how we view and make sense of the 1987 campaign in retrospect but also of how we come 
to view the campaign actually as a cause. Only once the Policy Review becomes fact do we 
regard the 1987 campaign as a cause of that fact. Thus the Policy Review - posited by Hughes 
and Wintour as an effect - is also its own type of retrospective cause affecting a certain 
interpretation of previous events. 
To return to Hume, we can identify such a view in the philosopher's work: 
... the mind wills a certain event: Immediately another event, unknown 
to ourselves, and totally different from the one intended, is produced: 
This event produces another, equally unknown: Till at last, through a 
long succession, the desired event is produced. But if the original 
power were felt, it must be known; since all power is relative to its 
effect. And vice versa, if the effect be not known, the power cannot be 
known nor felt (Hume 1902: 66-67). 
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This is similar to Nietzche's assertion that the effect is the cause of the cause. Without an 
effect such as the pain resulting from a pinprick, we would not identify the cause, in this case 
the pinprick, as a cause. Hence the linear, unidirectional relationship between cause and effect 
becomes less clear and the very linearity of the process appears as a mental construction itself 
caused by the apparent effect. Taking this observation a step further, Nietzsche writes in a 
way similar to the comments above about the Policy Review and the 1987 campaign, that: 
Before the effect one believes in different causes than one 
does afterward (Nietzsche 1974: 210). 
This, in itself, introduces extra unconsidered causal factors and interactions into our analysis 
of a particular event in the form of the causes which determine the nature of the analyst's 
identification of a causal process itself 
However, even more causal processes must be taken into account when we observe that 
further retroactions exist as the result of the same ability of humans to think retrospectively 
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albeit in a different, more varied, form. This is the way in which existing factors cause a 
reinterpretation of past events~ a reinterpretation which itself retroacts back upon the initial 
cause of the reinterpretation in the first place. For example, the relationship of religious 
identity to the growth of the Labour Party will be influenced by debates about the radical 
inheritance of Christianity in which, for example, the collective lifestyle of early Christians is 
re-interpreted as a particularly significant model to be imitated or taken as an ideal rather than 
ignored or denigrated~ a reinterpretation, the credibility of which will be enhanced as the 
Labour Party grows in credibility, a growth which will in part be enhanced by the growing 
credibility of that reinterpretation. 
Such retrospective analysis can also, of course, be applied to that which is barely history such 
as popular perceptions of very recent events in the Party or the church's development which 
may have a bearing on the intensity of the central retroaction focused upon here. For example, 
the effects of polls or the analyses carried out by the media are examples of how retrospective 
analysis of the very recent past can have powerful effects. 
Unlike the way retrospection allows an 'effect' to cause the construction or identification of a 
'cause', this retrospection, in the form ofre-interpreting the past introduces a ~hole new layer 
of inter-retroactive factors into our attempt to understand the causality of certain phenomena 
- a huge enhancement of the complexity of any subject matter. 
These three criticisms of the linear model all display the way in which that model hides or 
ignores vast numbers of causal processes which have a major bearing on any attempt to 
isolate, identify and understand the specific cause/s and effects relevant to a particular socio-
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political phenomena. Hence the complexity of the events and factors which we analyse appear 
to be far more complex than we have either admitted or appreciated. 
Such complexity suggests that it may be valuable to see anyone modification, any single 
effect as an abstracted point in a continuously active, complex mass of inter-retroactions 
rather than as the sole outcome of a single, or very limited set of, cause/so In this schema, one 
effect can never be linked only to one cause but is rather the composite result (held artificially 
in stasis by the analytical process) of a myriad of criss-crossing retroactions. 
We can provide this notion with greater clarity through the use of a metaphorical form. It can 
be said that while in the linear model, an effect is traced in a more or less straight line from the 
cause, in an inter-retroactive model, the effect can be regarded as a point on a sphere, the 
surface of which is densely covered with the traces of the interlaced lines of other cause and 
effect processes. The power of this metaphor resides in two features. It allows us to picture 
ourselves choosing any two points on the sphere (i.e. any two factors of socio-political 
change) and trace indirect lines of cause from one to the other by virtue of the interlacing of 
many lines. This clearly illustrates the notion that a multiplicity of causal interactions play a 
part in the production of anyone effect. Secondly, a causal line traversing the sphere as a 
circle has no beginning or end just as no causal link between two factors can be said to 
indicate that one of those factors is the originary point of the retroaction. 
The Unexplained Causality of 'Focus' 
A final critique of the linear model can be stated more briefly and deals with the question of 
'focus' and yet more hidden causal processes which must remain from if the linear model is to 
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operate effectively. When an analyst investigates a particular causal process there is an 
underlying assumption at work which allows certain causes to be deemed more relevant than 
others thus allowing focus. For example, Hughes and Wintour (quoted above) assert that the 
course of the 1987 campaign "moulded" the Policy Review. This is a clear example of a 
shrinking down the causal line of impact: although the course of the 1987 campaign was 
clearly affected by earlier factors such as Margaret Thatcher's trip to Eastern Europe, this 
factor can be ruled less significant in that it is temporally more distant. The causal significance 
of the trip appears not as intense for the Policy review as the election campaign itself Spatial 
factorss also playa part in establishing such focus. For example, a by-election in an obscure 
council ward will also immediately be regarded as less significant to the Policy Review than 
the course of the election campaign. 
The role of significance in the maintenance of focus relies heavily upon an unspoken 
assumption of a causal process. This assumption amounts to the claim that the closer the 
proximity, in space or time, of one factor to another, the more intense the causal interaction. 
However, this claim itself relies upon a causal process, namely that variations in distance 
cause variations in the intensity of causality. Thus, as in the preceding criticism, the efficacy of 
the linear model once again implies a causal process which is hidden from view and 
unexplained. Just as the identification of a linear causal process in a certain socio-political 
phenomena only appears to provide understanding by ignoring a mass of other causal factors 
operating as part of the 'mechanism' of that causal process, so the same appearance of 
understanding also relies upon another hidden and unexplained causal process relating to 
6.yne term 'spatial' is used loosely to refer both to geographical space and to what might be termed 
'organisational space', i.e. distance in terms of organisational hierarchies - for example, the notion that 
Parliament is closer to the centre of power than a small local branch of the Labour Party. 
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'focus'. This critique, like the previous, augments the number of causal processes (and the 
interactions between such processes) which must be taken into account. A fact which only 
again enhances the great complexity of the subject-matter under study. 
Of course, the real challenge for an analyst is how to reshape analytical methods to respond to 
the enormously enhanced complexity represented by this critique and by those presented 
above. 
However before this is attempted, there is still one question which must be answered: why is 
this high level of complexity ignored? Or put more specifically: why has the linear model of 
cause and effect become so all-pervasive? In answering this, we will. in fact. aid our attempt 
to reshape analytical methods in the light of complexity. 
TilE POWER OF THE LINEAR MODEL 
The linear model of cause and effect allows a structuring of analysis that is relatively simple 
compared to the complexity of the inter-retroactive model and it is this that provides the clue 
to understanding why the model is so powerful and popular. It is instructive to make a detour 
via the concept of power-knowledge in the work of Michel Foucault to understand why this 
provision of simplicity is important. 
For Foucault power was inseparably linked to knowledge. He usually attempted to display this 
through historical analyses which showed how knowledge and power continually produce one 
another (e.g. Foucault 1973,1977,1978). However on some occasions he wrote and spoke 
more explicitly and theoretically about the links between power and knowledge: 
... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations ... the subject who knows, 
the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be 
regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of 
power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not 
the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of 
knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the 
processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that 
determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge (Foucault 
1977: 27-28). 
48 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~k~~ 
Foucault worked at all times with two linked but distinct notions of what form power-
knowledge took. 
At certain points, particularly in his studies of the penal and psychiatric system, Foucault 
considered power-knowledge to refer to quite a rigid conception of technologies of control in 
modem society such as psychiatric medicine, law and imprisonment. These technologies of 
control clearly link the development of such fields of knowledge as medicine, criminology and 
ideas about punishment and surveillance with established institutional forms of power such as 
the medical establishment, the legal system and the prison system. Foucault has stated: 
... the fact that societies can become the object of scientific 
observation, that human behaviour became~om a certain point on, a 
problem to be analysed and resolved, all that is bound up, I believe, 
with mechanisms of power - which, at a given moment, indeed, 
analysed that object (society, man, etc.) and presented it as a problem 
to be resolved. So the birth of the human sciences goes hand in hand 
with the installation of new mechanisms of power (Foucault 1988: 
106). 
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However, Foucault never saw such ·operations of power-knowledge as homogenous and fully 
conscious - he has no '1984' vision of a Big Brother carefully manipulating knowledge to 
maintain a total grip over society. For Foucault power-knowledge was always a battle 
between competing interpretations of reality each of which has its own implications for the 
nature of technologies of control. In the foreword to a text he collaborated upon and which 
brings together and studies a variety of medico-legal texts relating to a parricide in the 
nineteenth century, he writes of those documents: 
... in their totality and their variety they form neither a composite work 
nor an exemplary text, but rather a strange contest, a confrontation, a 
power relation, a battle among discourses. And yet it cannot simply be 
described as a single battle; for several separate combats were being 
fought out at the same time and intersected each other (1982: x). 
He goes on to say as he says elsewhere, that his aim is to draw a map of the web of conflicting 
and intersecting strands of power-knowledge. 
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The 'Big Brother' model of control is further weakened by Foucault when he asserts that 
power~knowledge is not just a matter for rulers, the ruled also play a central role in their 
control, they adopt power~knowledge discourses that are part of the totality of strategic 
relations that construct a certain hegemony: 
Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-
encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of all 
power relations, and serving as a general matrix ... One must suppose 
rather that the manifold relationships of force that take shape and come 
into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, 
and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that 
run-through the social body as a whole (1978: 94). 
This comment leads to Foucault's other conception of powerlknowledge. In this other 
approach Foucault proposes that power-knowledge is an aspect of everyday life and human 
interaction. That when interacting with others we bring a specific quality to our relations 
which is inseparably made-up of understanding and control. He states: 
Power is exercised from innumerable points, m the interplay of 
nonegalitarian and mobile relations (Foucault 1978: 94). 
And more specifically when asked which subjects oppose one another, he replies: 
This is just a hypothesis, but I would say it's all against all. There aren't 
immediately given subjects of the struggle, one the proletariat, the 
other the bourgeoisie. Who fights against whom? We all fight each 
other. And there is always within each of us something that fights 
something else (Foucault 1980: 208). 
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However, one need not take Foucault's word alone for the presence of powerlknowledge. 
Complexity, as outlined above, contains within itself a notion of powerlknowledge. The 
notion that the analyst/analysis can be separated from the world they inhabit and from the 
power-effects of that world is a simplification for it ignores the processes of inter-retroaction 
outlined above. The analyst and his/her analysis will clearly have an effect on many of the 
factors that surround them while these factors' modification will have an effect back on the 
analyst and hence hislher analysis. Much of this process no doubt occurs at an almost 
imperceptible level where the most fundamental concepts and categories used by an analyst 
will be modified by the analyst's environment. For example, all analysts are aware of the 
phenomena whereby simply using certain concepts, discussing them with others, and seeing 
others using them we become more convinced of their rightness; our use of a certain category 
reinforces its use by the academic community we feel ourselves to be a part of, which in tum 
reinforces our use of it. 
However we can perceive, at a more blatant and simplified level, three ways in which the 
analyst and the analysis are part of a constantly remodifying inter-retroaction in relation to the 
subject matter under analysis. For example, let us take a work of analysis which asserts that an 
effect of the 1992 election was to encourage many more voters to consider, and maybe 
., . 
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actually accept, the need for electoral reform. We can identify three ways in which this act of 
analysis is closely and dynamically interwoven with the effects of such an act. 
i.) The analysis itself may encourage those who read it, and those who are affected by the 
views of those who read it, to consider the need for electoral reform~ and/or to encourage 
those who read it to regard electoral reform as an idea growing in popularity and therefore as 
one worthy of consideration; and/or to encourage those who read it to regard, or help to 
construct the impression that, the 1992 election was the turning-point for those campaigning 
for electoral reform (i.e. the 1992 election takes on a semi-mythical status in the battle for 
democratic extension in Britain) thus improving the prospects of growing support for 
electoral reform. Thus the effect of the 1992 election of encouraging support for electoral 
reform is enhanced through the medium of the analysis itself 
ii.) These effects of the analysis - enhancing support for electoral reform - then ensure that the 
analysis itself becomes apparently increasingly accurate as it has its effect, a modification itself 
which enhances the power of the analysis to convince people of the need for electoral reform. 
Hence the actual standing of the analysis is closely interwoven with the power it exerts within 
society - the analysis is involved in a retroactive relationship with the effect it has on its 
readers (which in this case works to reinforce the conclusions of the analysis) and is thus 
unavoidably drawn into a complex web of power-knowledge. 
iii.) However, the power-knowledge role of the analysis is not just observable in its direct 
relation to its effects, it is also involved in an inter-retroactive self-reinforcement with other 
processes in which power-knowledge is produced. In short it is, un surprisingly, a cause and an 
effect in inter-retroactive processes. For example, the 1992 election modified or constructed a 
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series of factors such as enhancing disillusion with traditional Labour Party principles and 
structures within Labour itself (witnessed by the enhanced power of the Party 'modernisers') 
which has encouraged, and made more popular, analysis about electoral reform (for example, 
the interest in the Plant Commission), since such analysis is less likely to be regarded as 
irrelevant or damaging to Party interests, a view prevalent in traditional Labour circles. The 
analyst's conclusions about electoral reform, which are now more likely to be read 
enthusiastically, then help to further encourage this interest in, and support for, electoral 
reform, in the ways indicated above, hence encouraging disillusion with the traditional Labour 
beliefs which oppose electoral reform, in tum encouraging interest in electoral reform and so 
on. 
All these processes seem more obviously to apply to pieces of widely-read analysis such as 
journalistic writings. However, one aspect of the inter-retroaction that is deducible from this 
chapter is that seemingly small processes of cause and effect, such as pieces written for the 
academic community or conclusions about a certain political situation reached by one 
individual, can have major and unpredictable consequences when fed in to the vast variety of 
interconnecting processes of causal processes underway at anyone time. A small modification 
in one apparently insignificant interaction can be magnified in its importance as that 
modification affects another retroaction and that modification affects another and so on. This 
is a socio-political version of the now famous 'butterfly effect' - probably the best known 
aspect of chaos theory - which asserts that the beat of a butterfly's wing in a South American 
rainforest might cause a tornado in China (Gleick 1988). Of course, for such an effect to 
occur a huge variety of other variables reacting and interacting with the beat of the butterfly'S 
wing must take place. In a socio-political version of complex inter-retroaction, we can state 
this in a similar although distinct fashion. One small event, such as the example given above of 
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a by-election in an obscure ward, may have effects beyond its apparent significance when it is 
viewed as one cause in the mass of causes that inter-retroact to produce any particular 
composite effect. This is a subtler and less sensational version of the butterfly effect: instead 
of stating that one apparently tiny factor can cause an apparently enormous event, it is arguing 
instead that no one factor, no matter how small or how large, can be understood as the cause 
of any effect without reference to its inter-retroaction with a vast number of other factors. 
Furthermore, since linear causal models are in use primarily because they are so applicable to 
power-knowledge, even the most obscure piece of academic analysis will be structured 
according to the rules of simplification associated with that model. Hence such a piece of 
analysis will still have been fundamentally influenced by power-knowledge. 
In addition to this, there is nothing to say that the consigning of a piece of work to obscurity 
is any less of a significant event than that which allows a work to achieve a wide readership. A 
relatively simple example that springs easily to mind in the context of this chapter is that of 
Nietzsche. His analysis came to playa major power-knowledge role in the context of Nazism. 
Is it not conceivable that this particular role would have been less likely had his work been 
subject to greater scrutiny and a more sensitive understanding prior to the rise of Hitler in that 
the ability of the fascists to misinterpret his work would have been less possible? Is it not 
similarly conceivable that the development of a sophisticated understanding of Nietzsche's 
works may have led the Nazis to regard the philosopher to be the enemy of their beliefs that 
he was rather than their supporter? Furthermore, the rejection of certain works has an inter-
retroactive role in upholding the beliefs of those who have rejected the work and hence the 
analysis also has an effect in this sense upon the world being analysed (for a further 
exploration of this see Nash 1994~ 1995) 
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These notions of power-knowledge are particularly useful as concepts for understanding why 
as analysts, and as actors in everyday life, we have a tendency to opt for a linear model of 
cause and effect that allows for a simpler understanding of the way our world is structured. 
Power-knowledge implies that without a simple understanding of our world we would be 
unable to act, to exert power over others and our surroundings in the broadest sense. The 
complex inter-retroactive model implies an image of the world that is utterly diffuse, where 
every factor and every modification is both a cause and an effect of itself and of other factors 
and modifications~ and where the effects of such causes are uncertain, unpredictable and in 
constant flux. We operate in this world but we cannot base our actions, our attempts to act as 
a cause, to exert power, on such a perception of the world - we would be paralysed. We must 
simplify to maintain sanity, to find some ground upon which we can base our actions - to be 
an actor with even the smallest part to play in a power-knowledge web, we must develop a 
model that allows us to understand our actions as originating in a certain set of fairly clear and 
limited causes and as resulting in a certain set of fairly clear and limited effects. If we were to 
account for all the complex and manifold causes and effects of our actions existing in an inter-
retroactive model we would be paralysed by the fact that we could never find relatively 
simple, self-justifying reasons for action as we could not predict the full effects of our actions 
nor know in full its causes. The irony, one might say, of this condition is that while we do 
adopt a simple linear model for the sake of action, the actual complexity of the world ensures 
that this base is constantly proved invalid~ because of complexity, we always get it wrong, at 
least in the long run. The issue raised for political analysis, and for that matter all other 
analysis, is that while such limited knowledge may be necessary in the everyday and 
instrumental world, it is not an adequate model if we wish to claim that we actually 
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understand or are on a road that ultimately leads to understanding. This is a view Nietzsche 
took and has written of with great clarity: 
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live -
with the postulation of bodies, lines, surfaces, causes and effects, 
motion and rest, form and content without these articles of faith 
nobody could now endure to live! But that does not yet mean they are 
something proved and demonstrated. Life is not argument; among the 
conditions of life could be error (Nietzsche 1974: 177, section 121) 
This is true not only of the grand technologies of control that are central to Foucault's first 
notion of power-knowledge but also to his second which implies that power-knowledge and 
hence simplicity and complexity are features of our everyday life and interactions with other 
humans. 
To a large extent this link between power and knowledge in the form of simple causal models 
is a question of manipulation. If one has a certain goal in mind, if one wishes to manipulate the 
world in a certain way (i.e. to exert power) for whatever purposes, then it can become simple. 
To quote George 1. Klir: 
... all would agree that the brain is complex and a bicycle simple (but) 
one also has to remember that to a butcher the brain of a sheep is 
simple while a bicycle, if studied exhaustively ... may present a very 
great quantity of significant material (Klir 1985: 83). 
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Morin makes a similar point asserting that complexity enters our analysis when we attempt to 
go beyond this manipulation and think more philosophically about the world: 
There is what can be termed as the interest or need for useful 
simplifications, where we require clarity to isolate objects, and in that 
context, this is obviously a microphone, that is a table, this is a room, 
and so on. In that sense, our universe appears to be extremely simple, 
decomposable, analysable. In other words, every time we need to 
remove all ambiguity from the environment, our view of the universe 
becomes simple. But if your interest is the phenomenal world, the 
world in which we live, existentially, politically, socially, and 
anthropologically, there is no doubt that this world is one of 
complexity, where everything is in interaction, inter-retroaction, and 
interrelation, and it is then that we are forced to see it in a complex way 
... (Morin 1985: 67). 
Thus we can now appreciate that power and knowledge are inseparably linked one to the 
other. That, as analysts, we evade complexity by simplifying through the use of the linear 
cause and effect model. By this technique we involve ourselves in the web of power and 
knowledge, so as to provide the grounds upon which we can manipulate our environment. 
For some political analysts such views are deeply disturbing. For many the maintenance of the 
principle of an absolute, discoverable truth which is simple enough to be fully comprehensible 
is a matter of the utmost importance. As was mentioned above, there are long-term trends 
that have encouraged the social sciences to regard themselves as imperfect natural sciences, 
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gradually working their way towards a near-total understanding. Ironically, it is in fact some 
scientists themselves who take a far more pragmatic view of truth and who would find the last 
few paragraphs totally unstartling. Applied scientists in particular usually recognise that they 
don't actually 'know' anything absolute or immutable about their subject and they don't 
particularly care, their simple goal is to· provide a workable model which allows them to 
predict, cause and prevent certain occurrences. P.C.W. Davies has summarised the debate 
perfectly~ he states that: 
As science progresses, so some regularities become systematised as 
laws, or deductions from them ... (t)wo points of view can be detected 
among practising scientists regarding the ontological status of these 
laws. The first is that there exist "real" laws, or "the correct set" of 
laws, to which our current theories are only an approximation. As 
science progresses so we converge upon the "true" laws of the 
universe, which are regarded as eternal, timeless, and transcendent of 
the physical states. By contrast, some scientists deny that there are any 
"true" laws "out there", existing independently of scientific enquiry. 
What we call laws, they maintain are simply our attempts to cope with 
the world by ordering our expe~ences in a systematic way. The only 
laws are our laws, and they are to be judged solely on utilitarian 
grounds, i.e., they are neither true nor false, but merely more or less 
useful to us. My impression is that many scientists who practice what 
one might loosely call applied science incline to the latter philosophy, 
while those engaged in "fundamental" research, for example, on 
quantum cosmology or the unification program, adopt the former 
position (1990: 62-63). 
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There is a strange inversion here. Applied scientists remain sceptical about notions of absolute 
truth, it is the grander theoretical scientists who cling to a belief in absolute reality but in 
social science the situation is somewhat reversed with those studying society in an applied, 
practical fashion through surveys and statistical analysis seeming convinced of their gradual 
apprehension of a true reality and those engaged in grander theoretical work who have 
become more circumspect about such a goal. 
Based upon the above analysis we can now draw an important distinction between 
understanding an event and providing a workable and useful explanation. Understanding 
implies a total insight into the significance, meaning and mechanism of any particular process, 
the arguments developed above suggest that a full understanding of cause and effect requires 
a degree of complexity that may be beyond the tools we have employed to carry-out analysis; 
even more fundamentally, it may suggest that a full understanding in that sense is beyond 
human capabilities. The notion that we use a linear model of cause and effect to construct 
simple models of events and thus to place ourselves in a world characterised by power-
knowledge suggests that we do not understand but, like the applied scientists in P.C.W. 
Davies' quote, provide· a useful explanation, the actual truth of which is less important than 
the power it provides us with to manipulate our environment. 
• '0 
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Such a distinction is far from new - Nietzsche made a similar observation7 although he (or at 
least his translators) chose to use the terms understanding and explanation as synonymous 
while using description in place of my explanation; while the first term is apt, the term 
'description' I feel underestimates the power implications of analysis and overestimates the 
extent to which simplification is based precisely on the failure to describe, in full, the complex 
occurrences of any process - in the context of this chapter therefore, the term explanation 
seems more appropriate. Nevertheless an extract from Nietzsche is worth quoting at length as 
these comments could stand in many ways as a summary to the preceding pages: 
We call it 'explanation' (understanding -AL), but it is 'description' 
(explanation - AL) which distinguishes us from earlier stages of 
knowledge and science. We describe better - we explain just as little as 
any who came before us. We have revealed a plural succession where 
the naive man and investigator of earlier cultures saw only two things, 
'cause' and 'effect' as they were called; we have perfected an image of 
how things become, but we have not got past an image or behind it, In 
every case the row of causes stands before us more completely; we 
conclude: this must first happen if this is to follow - but we have 
therewith understood nothing, Quality, in any chemical change for 
example, appears as it has always done as a 'miracle'; likewise all 
locomotion; no one has 'explained' thrust. How could we explain them! 
We operate with nothing but things which do not exist, with lines, 
planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time, divisible space - how should 
71t may also be noticed that this distinction between 'understanding' and 'explanation' bears a resemblance to 
certain aspects of Hcidegger's thoughts on art and technology; see, for example, Dreyfus 1993. 
explanation even be possible when we first make everything into an 
image, into our own image! It is sufficient to regard science as the 
most fruitful possible humanization of things, we learn to describe 
ourselves more and more exactly by describing things and the 
succession of things (Nietzsche 1984: 61-62, section 34; Nietzsche 
1974: 172, section 112 for alternative translation in full context). 
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This distinction between understanding and explanation will prove vital as we attempt to 
develop an analytical approach in response to the observations of this chapter. However, 
before we can undertake this development process we must first acknowledge the fact that 
both Nietzsche's comment above and the majority of the preceding paragraphs are replete 
with paradox. Such troubling features of any analysis should not go unmentioned especially as 
further investigation of such paradox can tell us something about the distinction between 
understanding and explanation itself. 
THE PARADOXES OF COMPLEX INTER-RETROACTION 
Three paradoxes can be identified as arising out of this chapter. The first two are really 
aspects of the third and it is this third that provides a further argument for complexity whilst 
simultaneously defeating that argument and challenging all other forms of analysis. 
The first paradox is the most straightforward: all the arguments used here in an attempt to 
prove the validity of a complex inter-retroactive model and disprove the validity of a linear 
model are themselves simplified linear models and hence flawed. To take just one example a 
linear cause and effect model is clearly being employed where I have stated above that the 
- , 
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ability of analysts to think retrospectively introduces an extra quantity of factors into the 
retroactive processes of cause and effect: retrospective thought acts as a cause which has the 
effect of introducing an extra quantity of factors. Like many paradoxes this one is self-
reflexive for if the arguments for complex inter-retroaction are based upon a simple linear 
model and hence flawed then we can dismiss the validity of complex inter-retroactions but as 
a result the arguments can no longer be dismissed as simplifications, thus they immediately 
regain a certain value as arguments for complexity and so on ad infinitum. 
The second paradox runs as follows: if the argument for a complex inter-retroactive model 
claims that all arguments are merely workable explanations rather than apprehensions or 
understandings of objective truth then the argument itself must logically be merely a workable 
explanation with no greater claim on truth than any other argument. This, of course, self-
reflexively implies that it is objective and absolute (if we are to accept its own claim that it is 
merely a workable explanation as true) and hence it is a mere explanation once again~ and, 
once again, so on ad infinitum. 
These paradoxes, which seem both disturbing and laughable simultaneously, are part of a 
more fundamental paradox similar to Godel's Theorem which was developed in the field of 
mathematics. Douglas Hofstadter has made an attempt to translate Godel's Theorem from 
mathematical terms as: 
This formula is unprovable within axiomatic system S 
(1985: 7) 
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where the formula refers to the sentence itself and it is assumed that the formula is based on 
the rules of the axiomatic system S. Hofstadter is understandably very wary of translating 
Godel's Theorem since such an act wrongly assumes that what holds in mathematical logic 
"should hold without modification in a completely different area" (Hofstadter 1979: 696). 
Furthermore, we can add that Godel's Theorem as translated here fails to communicate any of 
the paradox and self-reflexivity that is central to Godel's work. However, there is a way in 
which the study of complex causal processes throws up self-reflexive paradoxes that are very 
similar to Godel's theorem and seems to say something important about our study of politics. 
The earlier paradoxes show that the assertion of complexity in the 'real world' cannot be 
proven on its own terms. Or to put it another way the methodological implications of complex 
inter-retroaction deny the validity of alternative methods and yet the 'valid' methodology 
suggested by the study of complexity cannot prove the existence of complexity itself 
(infuriatingly another self-reflexive paradox, or as Hofstadter calls them, another 'strange loop' 
raises its head here~ for if complexity cannot be proven then the alternative methodologies are 
no longer invalid and can be used to prove complexity thus rendering them invalid once again 
and so on). 
This might be the end of this matter if the paradox was relevant only for a study of complex 
inter-retroaction but it is not. The strange loop can be seen in all analyses, if they are looked 
at closely enough, precisely because we cannot be convinced of a particular argument's 
validity if it argues for itself on its own terms (which is of course the only logical way for it to 
argue) since it assumes that we already are convinced of the validity of those terms. A few 
examples should clarify this point. 
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Marxist analysis, for example, cannot prove its validity by arguing for such validity on the 
grounds that it represents the interests of the proletariat since this assumes we accept that the 
proletariat exists and that being representative of that proletariat's interest ensures validity -
assertions we can only accept if convinced of the validity of the Marxist analysis, something 
which relies precisely on our acceptance of the existence etc. of the proletariat, an acceptance 
that can only be won if we are convinced of the validity of the Marxist analysis and so on. 
Many Marxists attempt to get around this dilemma by asserting that Marxism is correct 
because it is scientific (the best known modem proponent of this view being Louis Althusser 
1969 although the notion is present in Marx's and Engel's own writings); this utterly evades 
the issue because there is nothing inherent in Marxist analysis which proves the methods of 
scientific enquiry to be valid, unless one asserts that scientific rationalism is proletarian which 
once again returns us to the initial dilemma. Marxists can only assert the validity of their 
approach by appealing to criteria outside their schema which thus challenges the validity of 
their schema. 
But this particular paradox does not stop its destructive work there. Probably its most famous 
victim is the philosophical school of logical positivism which claimed that no assertion was 
meaningful unless it could be scientifically proven (presented famously by Ayer 1971). For 
example, it used this assertion to argue most stringently against any belief in God's existence. 
However it is clear that there can be no scientific proof (only philosophical) of the 
meaningfulness or validity of logical positivism and hence its particular assertions become 
meaningless and invalid. This returns us to the same strange loop applied to my own argument 
about complexity above that immediately allows logical positivism to become valid and invalid 
in turns. 
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Perhaps most destructively for Western culture there is the application of the theorem to 
science itself. Similar to logical positivism, there is a paradox at the heart of science for the 
validity of scientific method cannot be proven scientifically, no experiment can be constructed 
which can prove or even show that processes of observation and experimentation allow us to 
understand or access truth. Lyotard has paid particular attention to this aspect of paradox. In 
a sociological vein, he has argued that: 
When a denotative statement is declared true, there is a presupposition 
that the axiomatic system within which it is decidable and demonstrable 
has already been formulated, that it is known to the interlocutors, and 
that they have accepted that it is formally satisfactory as possible ... 
(The sciences) '" owe their status to the existence of a language whose 
rules of functioning cannot themselves be demonstrated but are the 
object ofa consensus among experts (Lyotard 1984: 43). 
This paradox also applies to less theoretically-driven methods of analysis. A seemingly 
straightforward, 'common sense' analysis of a particular event or process based upon a reading 
of broad historical, social and political factors (as one often finds in political biography and 
the work of British political analysts, e.g. Kavanagh 1987 and Hennessy 1990) still relies upon 
an implicit assertion that such a method is valid without being able to prove the validity of 
such a method using the same broad historical, social and political style of analysis for exactly 
the same reasons as those outlined above. 
The same is true also for the linear cause and effect model just as it is for the inter-retroactive 
model. One cannot use either model to prove themselves since this assumes that we accept the 
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validity of the model in the first place and yet, as with Marxism and the other ideas outlined 
above, the use of one model to prove another model, e.g. using linear processes to prove the 
validity of inter-retroactive processes, simply introduces a logically unsustainable 
contradiction into any analysis. The proof of one model by another implies that the model 
used to prove the other is more valid and hence the proof becomes an argument about the 
validity, not of the substantive model, but of the model used to prove that substantive model. 
Hence Godel's Theorem can be effectively translated into the sphere of socio-political analysis 
in the following form: 
The assertions about the world, or about the approach required to 
understand it, produced using a certain method cannot be logically 
employed to prove the validity of that method. 
An attempt to understand complex causal processes does, more than most other socio-
political analyses, seem to bring this paradox into view. This is probably because, unlike most 
other analyses, it asserts that the world is incomprehensible (at least, for the present) which of 
course contradicts its attempts to comprehend the world as complex; other analyses seem 
more consistent because they inherently assert that the world is comprehensible by proceeding 
to comprehend it. 
But these paradoxes, maybe coincidentally, also relate to complex processes on another level: 
such paradoxes are the very antithesis of simplicity and in that sense may be the very essence 
of complexity. If simplification is carried out for the sake of power-knowledge then these 
paradoxes defeat that goal every time. They appear to say nothing about our world that we 
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can use for the sake of manipulation or power and yet they are undeniably a form of 
knowledge. They use knowledge to dissolve the ground upon which we base our power-
knowledge without suggesting anything with which to replace that ground. Godel's Theorem 
when translated into our particular discipline seems to suggest that everything we take to be 
logical, rational and grounded is really nothing more than a leap of faith. 
My own feeling is that such observations have an exceptional, and as yet sadly ignored, power 
to challenge the way we think about our world and ourselves. In a limited way such paradox 
has run through Western thought although it often operates at its fringes - it clearly plays a 
role in Nietzsche and partly due to an interest in Nietzsche, it has appeared again in post-
structuralist thinkers (see Lawson 1985 for an overview of this). Although I would suggest 
that it is in non-western modes of thought, especially the great tradition of Zen Buddhism 
where paradox has played a fundamental role for many centuries - a fact of which Douglas 
Hofstadter is keenly aware (1979, 1985: passim). 
Maybe contemplation of paradox provides some way of appreciating complexity in all its 
fullness, maybe it presents the only way of obtaining knowledge without power: a type of 
closure that cannot be applied or communicated and hence cannot affect anyone but oneself, 
this at least seems to have certain parallels with Zen thought. Maybe, as a result, paradox 
provides a route to understanding rather than explanation. 
However, whatever the implications of paradox they clearly point to a mode of thought that is 
well-beyond the structures of Western styles of analysis and communication and hence they 
will have limited implications for this thesis. As the following section makes clear the greatest 
implications for this particular study will be drawn from a non-paradoxical appreciation of 
". -;-
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complexity, or more accurately an appreciation of complexity that deliberately ignores 
paradox. However, those paradoxes will maintain a presence by virtue of the fact that what 
follows will always keep a tactical eye on pushing the reader towards an acknowledgement of 
paradox and thus of the problems that the sense of complexity raises for us as analysts. 
TilE ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLEX INTER-
RETROACTION 
Any analyst on the brink of writing a thesis is now faced by a dilemma which arises out of the 
question: how can the analyst respond to the implications and observation of complexity? To 
opt for an analysis that accepts itself solely to be explanation - once the distinction between 
explanation and understanding has been recognised - may be one possibility but it brings with 
it two serious problems. 
Firstly, can the goal of explanation be considered motivation enough for the disciplines of the 
social sciences. As was mentioned above, a number of other disciplines have based much of 
their approach around 'explanation' and their ability to manipulate power-effects, specifically 
the applied sciences. However, while there clearly are power effects for the social sciences, 
they are rarely obvious or controllable. It seems highly unlikely that such uncertain outcomes 
could ever be adequate criteria for successful analysis . Despite the protestations of many 
contemporary theorists, the belief a higher understanding is constantly being achieved through 
academic analysis almost certainly still remains a powerful inspiration in the absence of any 
other more tangible criteria. 
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Secondly, the methods traditionally used by the social sciences have been designed specifically 
with the goal of 'understanding' in mind. A shift towards the acceptance of 'explanation', 
would mean a radical change in the methodology employed. Approaches based upon detached 
analysis and contemplation would no longer be appropriate. As in engineering, a very specific 
set of goals would have to be devised and methods of manipulation would have to be tested 
under a variety of conditions and variables until the most effective method was discovered. 
However, the value-oriented nature of the social sciences means that defining such goals in a 
narrow or acceptable manner is unlikely. While the enormous variety of human types, and the 
impressive complexity and unpredictability of human behaviour means that such a method is 
destined to failure. Of course, human history is replete with attempts at such social control 
and experimentation, the vast majority of which have failed whilst simultaneously causing 
intense misery. At the very least, a social science based purely upon 'explanation' risks 
becoming disingenuous~ its resonance as a piece of analysis resides precisely in the fact that it 
will still be read as understanding - such an option thus runs the risk of maintaining the facade 
of portraying power-knowledge simplifications as universal insight. 
Apart from these two problems, one might also acknowledge that opting for pure 
'explanation' would require an extinguishing of imagination and adventure; when the 
iconoclastic promise of paradox and complexity have been accepted as valid possibilities, then 
surely only the most instrumental mind should wish to remain in the suburban climate of 
'explanation' . 
Thus the other obvious option is to strike out uncompromisingly towards understanding, 
possibly with paradox as the starting-point. This seems the more valid, more honest, more 
exciting option. It may even constitute some form of progress, a genuine continuation of the 
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Enlightenment project, if such notions can remain intact once paradox and complexity are 
seriously contemplated. However, for this option to be pursued most fully would require 
ditching traditional structures and modes of Western analysis almost immediately which would 
leave the analyst without the various personal benefits obtained by remaining within those 
structures and modes. It would also mean the development of an analysis that would be 
unrecognisable by most as worthy analysis. If we observe the example of an analytical project 
that seems to have concentrated most fully on the appreciation of understanding as parad~x 
and complexity, Zen Buddhism, we immediately see that its traditions of meditation, oral 
instruction and learning through the adoption of various ways of behaving are completely 
anathema to the traditions of Western academic analysis. The option runs the risk of alienating 
before it even begins to encourage others to join such a project. 
Thus an analyst - who is either on the brink of writing or who still cares for convincing their 
fellow analyst - can opt wholeheartedly for neither explanation nor understanding. Instead 
s/he can only adopt a tactical approach: an approach that errs on the side of explanation and 
yet contains within it a subversive element that pushes both reader and analyst towards a 
recognition that this is not the whole story. The analyst must undertake an almost literary 
task. S/he must aim to provide not just arguments about a particular topic but also a sense of 
complexity, a feeling that there is more to the subject under analysis than can be 
communicated. This sense should ultimately provide the reader with a realisation that full 
complexity has been evaded and thus that another approach must ultimately be adopted if the 
subject under study is to be genuinely understood. This can in large part be done by 
attempting to communicate complexity through explanation - a project which if undertaken 
honestly will always fail and leave both analyst and reader searching for other routes, which 
would prove more radical but also more fruitful in the search for understanding. The 
• 
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following paragraphs thus show in the briefest and most abstract fashion how such an attempt 
can be launched although, as is also shown below, less subtle and elegant methods may be 
required to maintain the tactical integrity of the project. 
The first method we can use to explain complexity is that of identifying multi-causal and 
multi-effectual processes. Taking this chapter's analysis at face-value we can apply a simple 
rule of thumb: the analyst must emphatically indicate that every cause has a multiplicity of 
effects and that every effect has a multiplicity of causes. No prime cause, series of causes or 
process should be identified. 
In addition to this we can also identify processes of retroaction and inter-retroaction between 
these multi-causaVeffectual processes. Of course, it would be impossible, not to say tedious, 
to attempt to display all the inter-retroactive processes underway in any subject chosen for 
analysis. Thus we will have to settle for the identification of only a few, maybe only the 
'grandest', the most all-encompassing, of inter-retroactions in order to provide that 'sense' of 
complexity. 
However, we can adopt the method of 'implication' to deal with the conflict between the 
constraints of the thesis structure and the methodological demands of the complexities of 
inter-retroaction. In 'implication' we employ concepts which can imply the processes of inter-
retroaction without actually requiring an endlessly detailed, full appreciation of the process 
itself. Such concepts are, of course, simplifications and one must be wary of taking them at 
face-value. They should be read as shorthand for an enormously complex process~ they are 
insinuations of quantitively and qualitatively distinct events. In this sense concepts designed as 
'implications' are just one more tactic in the subversion of simplicity. Two such concepts are 
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those of 'articulation' and 'negative identity construction' as employed by the theorists 
Chantal Mouffe and Emesto Laclau (1985; 1990; 1994). 
At least initially, Laclau and Mouffe develop these notions in response to their rejection of the 
notion of socio-economic necessity as a determinant of identity as found in Marxism. Instead 
they argue that any particular identity results from a totally contingent combination of already-
existing identities or aspects of identities. This combination they describe as 'articulation' and 
define more specifically as: 
... any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: 105) 
However, in addition to this, Laclau and Mouffe believe that the construction of an identity 
based upon articulation is only possible when it is in 
confrontation with other articulatory practices of an 
antagonistic character (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 114). 
Because there can be no immanent logic of necessity to the process of articulation, then the 
motor of that process can only be that an existing identity is under threat from a 'constitutive 
outside' (Laclau 1990: 9; passim), an external antagonistic force. Laclau and Mouffe illustrate 
this point by quoting the French revolutionary leader Saint-Just: 
What constitutes the identity of the Republic is the total destruction of 
what is opposed to it (Saint-Just quoted in Laclau & Mouffe 1990: 21). 
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Ladau and Mouffe make much of theses relatively straightforward concepts. It is not difficult 
to grasp the idea that group's coalesce when challenged from without and form identities by 
splitting and combining existing beliefs and meanings within the context of such a challenge. 
Although the notion that what constitutes the outside of a group is itself a product of other 
articulations and identities forged by other outsides, is itself somewhat more challenging. 
However, while these observations present a particularly dynamic framework for the study of 
a period in Labour's history when there were many shifting factions and identities taking an 
active role in the Party's transformation, Laclau and Mouffe's ideas of articulation and 
negative identity construction are more particularly useful as concepts within a tactical 
approach to complexity because they both imply the constant process of symbiotic 
modification and remodification characteristic of inter-retroaction. Just as one factor in an 
inter-retroactive relationship is a constantly modified modifier of other factors, so the identity 
of any element in a process of articulation or negative construction with another can only be 
understood as part of that process of constant interaction with the other element. As the 
Saint-Just quote powerfully demonstrates above, for Ladau and Mouffe an identity is so 
closely bound-up in a causal process with its 'outside' that its very constitution is predicated 
on the destruction of that 'outside'. An act, of course, which if achieved - partially or fully -
would radically alter or even dissolve the initial identity. 
In this sense, by using the concepts of articulation and negative identity construction in our 
analysis we can imply the complexity that is occurring 'beneath the surface' of elements that 
may appear as static for the sake of our remaining within the structures of a thesis based upon 
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modes of Western analysis. As such notions of articulation and negative identity construction 
will be employed widely in the ensuing analysis of Labour's transformation. 
We can also apply the tactic of implication of vast numbers of unrecognised complex inter-
retroactions to the specific categories we use to describe aspects of the Labour Party. These 
'fuzzy categories' (to adapt a term popular in systems theory) are of use not because of their 
precision in pinpointing a specific feature (as one would expect of a traditional category) but 
because they hint at a wide breadth of unexplored causal processes across time and space. In 
the context of the Labour Party and this thesis, the 'fuzzy' category that is employed is that of 
'value' {as this word is commonly used in English in a number of different contexts and with 
many subtle meanings, it shall be italicised in this thesis when used to refer to the particular 
concept outlined in more detail in chapter three}. This is a term which incorporates a range of 
beliefs and principles stretching across the whole structure and membership of the Labour 
Party. By its very nature both the content and location of value is uncertain, insinuating 
processes we do not fully acknowledge. The full significance and 'meaning' of 'value' is dealt 
with in more detail in the next chapter. 
In the above methods alone we can observe the tactical at work, for any reader should be able 
to see that while such methods immediately do introduce a greater complexity into our 
analysis, they are clearly methods that cannot be applied in full and hence their use provides a 
sense to the reader of that evaded complexity~ it suggests a greater degree of multi-causality, 
multi-effectuality and inter-retroaction that, if it is to be appreciated, requires other tools, 
other structures. 
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A further method we might choose is that of ' multiplication'. This can best be characterised as 
an irrepressible wish, on the part of the analyst aiming for complexity, to multiply any 
category with which slhe works. The observation that any causal process only implies a 
multitude of other causes and effects when we attempt to understand the mechanism of the 
process itself, can in part be represented by questioning the categories which allow for 
temporal and spatial limitations. 
For example, this thesis will attempt to show that to explain the transformation of the Labour 
Party in the 1980s, one cannot work simply with one spectrum of belief, e.g. the traditional 
left-right spectrum. One must multiply the transections of the Party to incorporate such issues 
as ethnicity, age, individual policy disputes, different approaches to campaigning strategy, 
responses to specific events etc. 
The tactical aspect of all the above methods is implicit in their application: they do introduce a 
greater complexity into political explanation but by attempting to do so they fail because 
complexity and explanation are incommensurable, the latter is premised upon simplicity. But 
this failure is itself a step towards understanding for it introduces a dissatisfaction and, if 
placed in its context, can encourage both analyst and reader to search elsewhere, to look to 
those margins of his or her perception. However, there is one more method which is blatantly 
tactical and the least subtle of these approaches. It constitutes a 'belt and braces' approach for 
it is too easy to ignore the complex implications of the above methods and assume that we are 
simply working towards a fuller objective understanding by using those tactics. Hence we 
must also introduce the basic method of acknowledging simplicity where it occurs in the text. 
As such, this thesis includes a concluding chapter designed to do just this, to show some of 
the points where complexity has been evaded, to highlight the contradictions implicit in an 
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attempt to explain complexity rather than understand it, and to reiterate and explore further 
the paradoxes that lace this and all analyses. 
These are the bare bones of a response to complex causal processes. The following chapter 
attempts to place some practical muscle on the methods briefly identified above by applying 
them to a very specific area of political research, namely the transformation of the Labour 
Party between 1983 and 1989. 
3 
COMPLEXITY AND ANALYSIS 
OF LABOUR IN THE 1980s 
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This chapter serves three purposes. Firstly, it will provide an overview of the existing 
literature on Labour's transformation in the 1980s. Most specifically it will outline the main 
causes, identified by political analysts, of the changes in the Party. Alongside this, the chapter 
will also highlight those causes identified as responsible for the nature of that change, i.e. the 
factors which ensured that the transformation took the form that it did. There will also be a 
brief focus upon other broader explanations of change within the Labour Party which may not 
deal exclusively or at all with the 1980s. This will place analysis of that period in its academic 
context as well as drawing on a broader area of work thus informing the second aim of this 
chapter which is to develop some guides for a new approach to explaining change in the Party 
which will, of course, be based very heavily on the ideas outlined in the last chapter. Thirdly, 
the review below will also serve a critical function in that it will show how existing literature 
has tended to rely on a very limited set of causal processes to explain the transformation of 
the Party. This reliance, of course, places these works firmly within the context of the 
simplification in analysis with which this thesis, through its emphasis upon complexity, is 
trying to break. 
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LABOUR'S TRANSFORMATION OF THE 1980s: EXISTING 
EXPLANATIONS 
A Rational Response to Electoral Loss: Modernisation and Professionalisation 
A number of arguments have been developed about the causes of the changes of the 1980s 
and the reasons why the changes took the form they did. The first, and most common, is that 
the changes were a rational response to the electoral defeats of 1979 and 1983, with an extra 
boost to change coming with the defeat of 1987~ in essence the changes are portrayed as a 
rational calculation designed to win more votes. For example Shaw states that 
(t)he soft left was profoundly shaken by the electoral trauma of 1983. 
They drew the lesson that the Party 'needs unity and cannot afford 
another period of extreme polarisation'. Labour, the argument ran, 
could only survive as a credible electoral force if it remained a broad 
coalition encompassing right as well as left. This implied reaching a 
modus vivendi with the right, a willingness to debate and settle 
differences in a sober and restrained manner (Shaw 1988: 260). 
In a later work Shaw repeated the point that this "growing disposition to compromise and 
swallow unpalatable leadership decisions if this facilitated victory at the polls" was 
the most potent factor explaining the altered mood in the Party (1994: 
166). 
Marquand emphasises the rationalism of the change more bluntly, writing that 
a lot of people in the Labour Party very much wanted to be in power ... 
and most of them had the good sense to see that if they were to get 
into power the Party would have to say the sorts of things voters want 
to hear (1991: 193-194). 
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Similar or identical points are made by Hughes and Wintour (1990: 3; 40), Minkin (1991: 
624), Smith (1992a: 8; 12), Keohane (1993: 163), and Seyd (1993: 74). 
However, rational calculation for vote-winning alone is not enough to explain the actual 
content of the changes themselves: how one wins those votes is always far from clear and as 
the following chapters will show different strategies were on offer from the early eighties 
onwards. However, the inspiration for the new policies and the new 'mood' (as Shaw calls it) 
adopted by the Party has been identified as the result of one main process: Labour's attempt to 
win more votes by changing their policies and their image in line with the new demands of the 
electorate. As such the 'rational response' analysis forms the predicate of the notion that the 
changes in the Party were largely the result of a drive for a modernisation of the Party's 
policies and structures and a professionalisation of its campaigning techniques and 
organisation. 
The prime source for discovering what these new demands of the electorate were and how to 
respond to them - and thus also the prime source of the modernisation and professionalisation 
process - is often identified as the research and ideas of the new media-oriented officials of the 
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Party symbolised by Peter Mande1son and his close relationship to the Shadow 
Communications Agency. Hughes and Wintour (1990) highlight the influential role of these 
personnel more emphatically than any other analyst of this period. They are regarded as the 
origin of the new campaigning style including the red rose emblem (51-59), the testing ground 
for the proposals of the Policy Review (51), and the source of a report which, if Hughes and 
Wintour are to be believed, played the main role in convincing members of the Shadow 
Cabinet and the NEC that change had to occur. This report was Labour and Britain in the 
1990s. It was based on survey research and displayed that Labour had a poor image amongst 
the electorate although one might have thought that three disastrous election losses was 
evidence enough. Nevertheless, Hughes and Wintour state that the presentation of Labour and 
Britain in the 1990s 
exploded on some of those present like a grenade; in the minds of 
others it smouldered away on a slow-burning fuse (49). 
The authors go on to state that 
(t)hat session alone would make the influence of the shadow agency on 
the development of the (policy) review inestimably strong (49). 
Shaw (1994) also identifies the role of this personnel as an important cause of change and of 
the nature of that change but he takes a somewhat more sophisticated line arguing that this 
influence took the form ofa 'new strategic thinking', the influence of which lay in 
the clarity of its conceptions, its internal coherence, the experience and 
quality of its exponents and the proven commercial effectiveness of its 
methods (156). 
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These characteristics, which in essence amount to the rationalistic appeal of this new thinking, 
ensured that 
(i)t became the driving force behind Labour's transformation as it 
emerged as the yardstick against which all initiatives, strategic, 
programmatic and organisational, were judged (156). 
Shaw asserts that this new strategic thinking had five main components: a model of electoral 
behaviour that saw voting as the outcome of party and leadership image and policy 
preferences; an attempt to appeal to more affluent groups in Labour's natural constituency; an 
attempt to control the political agenda by shifting debate to issues that were seen as Labour's 
strengths; an attempt to secure as much TV exposure as possible; and the use of advertising 
techniques in campaigning (156-158). 
This rationalistic line of argument has undoubtedly been the most influential and readily 
accepted in analysis of Labour's transformation both in academic and journalistic circles. 
Ideological Influences: Revisionism, Thatcherism and English Political Culture 
However, alternative sources of inspiration for the changes have also been identified. Smith 
has portrayed Labour's ideological and policy direction in the 1980s as in part a return to the 
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Party's revisionist tradition following the radicalism of the early 1980s (1992b: 26; 1994: 711; 
713). Smith argues that in terms of principles, the Policy Review and revisionism are similar 
primarily because of their shared scepticism towards nationalisation and economic planning 
and their shared commitment to economic growth. However, he also makes clear that the 
Policy Review and other changes in the Party's doctrine and ideology also have their 
differences from the revisionist strand. In highlighting these differences Smith seems to 
suggest that Labour's transformation was as much a response to past governmental failures as 
the electoral defeats of the 1980s. He states: 
... the Policy Review was also an attempt to fill the vacuum which 
resulted from the failure of both the revisionist social democracy that 
dominated the Party from the 1950s through to the 1970s and left-wing 
socialism that became increasingly dominant between 1973 and 1983 
(1992b: 16). 
As a result of these failures, Labour's policy and ideology of the 1980s differs from 
revisionism in a number of ways: it is less committed to Keynesianism, it admits that full 
employment is less likely and it accepts limits to public spending. For Smith this means that 
Labour has developed a revisionism that recognises the reality of 
capitalism but that has little of the vision and radicalism of the 1950s 
revisionism. It has accepted one half of the revisionist equation -
capitalism - but not the second half - radicalism for social justice ... The 
Party has eliminated many policies of the left but failed, so far, to 
develop an alternative radicalism (1992b: 27). 
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Smith's analysis was in part a response (Smith 1992b: 23-26; 1994: passim) to the common 
suggestions from the left of the Party that Labour's changes in the 1980s were a capitulation 
or adaptation to Thatcherism. Hay, for example, has argued that Thatcherism altered the 
electorate's "predominant perceptions of the political context" towards its own principles 
which has encouraged the Labour Party simply to accommodate the electorate's new 
preferences rather than shape them (1994: 705). 
Smith's argument is certainly the subtler recognising as it does no single ideological source 
such as Thatcherism for the changes in the Party and asserting convincingly that such over-
simplifications provide 
a normative condemnation rather than a contextualised explanation 
(1994: 709). 
Rather strangely though Smith takes another Labour analyst, Gregory Elliott, to task for 
perpetrating an over-simplification about Thatcherism akin to Hay's. However, Elliott (1993) 
has an analysis of Labour's ideological development that bears more than a passing 
resemblance to Smith's although there are clearly no direct lines of influence. Elliott, like 
Smith, sees the changes of the 19805 as a continuation of Labour's historically non-radical 
ideological traditions, for the Party in his view 
is not now .. and never has been - a socialist party. Throughout its 
history it has comprised a coalition of social reformers and reformist 
socialists, the latter in a permanent minority (Elliott 1993: xi). 
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Also in common with Smith, Elliott sees Labour's ideology of the 1980s and since as a set of 
beliefs inspired by this non-radical past but not merely a repetition of it. Just as Smith portrays 
a type of post-revisionism for Labour in the 1980s, so Elliott - stretching the point somewhat 
further although still along the same lines - argues that the Labour Party is "in transition to a 
post-social-democratic posture" which he seems to say is a form of "social liberalism" 
favoured by continental leaders such as Mitterand, Palme, Kreisky and Brandt (xii~ 17). 
The difference between Smith and Elliott exists in the identification of the reasons for the 
potency of these ideological factors on the changes of the 1980s. Smith does not explain at 
any length why a limited version of revisionism should have come to have such a great 
influence although it seems to be suggested that such ideas matched-up to the demands of the 
electorate and the economic realities of the 1980s (see below). Elliott. on the other hand. 
inspired by Anderson (Elliott 1993: xvi) relies on the influence of England's uniquely 
deferential and compromise-driven socio-political culture to explain the potency of moderate 
beliefs. For Elliott, Labour's crisis and unimaginative adaptations of the 1980s were a result of 
its failure to challenge Britain's imperialist culture (125 -126). This weakness allowed 
Thatcherism to succeed at the expense of Labour by playing upon the same unchallenged 
imperialist themes. while the Party's political unitarianism inspired by the same imperialism 
"imprison(ed) two Labour nations - Scotland and Wales - in the one-party state of a United 
Kingdom dominated by the south-east" (125): 
Labour remained the captive of a political culture into whose governing 
assumptions it had socialised its own electorate - a hitherto captive 
audience many of whose English contingent now attended to other 
'tunes of glory' and grew dependent upon another variety of Nanny 
State (126). 
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Obviously, Elliott's views take us to some extent away from an argument that sees Labour's 
changes as primarily a rational calculation - in line with the writers who have clearly inspired 
him, such as Coates (1975), Nairn (1978) and Anderson (1992) there seem to be other, 
deeper institutional and ideological processes at work in Elliott (see below) but he does 
provide a possible process whereby the historical tradition of revisionism and the plausibly 
rational calculations of the 1980s may have been linked. 
The Realignment 
Another extremely common argument that explains the reasons for the changes, and more 
specifically explains why Kinnock was able to win these changes so successfully, asserts that a 
split occurred on the radical left of the Party which dominated the movement in the early 
1980s creating two distinct groups: the soft left and the hard left. This split is usually regarded 
as the result of the Benn deputy leadership challenge in 1981, the 1983 election, the defeat of 
the Miners' Strike, the collapse of the rates rebellion, and disagreement over how to respond 
to Kinnock's decision to attack Militant. This split led to an alliance on the NEe, in the PLP, 
and at conference between the soft left and the right of the Party which isolated the hard left 
and provided Kinnock with a power base for change. 
For example, Hughes and Wintour argue that the "primary achievement" of Kinnock's early 
leadership was to encourage that alliance which then isolated the hard left and created a new 
"centrist unity" in the party (1990: 9). Similarly Smith comments that 
The separation between the 'soft' left and 'hard' left enabled Kinnock to 
build support on both sides of the Party whilst isolating the hard left. 
With support of the centre left and centre right Kinnock secured 
control of the Party's three power centres - the PLP, the NEe and the 
conference ( ... ). This gave the leader the base to make the Party 
electable once again (1992a: 9). 
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Shaw (1988: xi~ 1994: 161-162) and Jeffrey (1993: 115-126) along with numerous 
contemporary journalistic analyses (see chapter five) make similar points. 
Other points have been made by analysts about the cause of change which can be seen as 
elucidations of specific aspects of this grand alliance. Smith argues that the left could only stay 
together while they had the right to battle against as in the early 1980s (1992a: 8), a factor, it 
is implied, that was removed after Kinnock's election. While Heffernan and Marqusee argue 
that Kinnock's strength resided, in part, in the fact that the hard left could not challenge him 
due to defeats and defections (1992: 93). Marquand also argues that one of Kinnock's central 
objectives was to defeat the left by splitting it (1991: 201). 
Seyd (1987) in particular has focused upon the hard left aspect of this argument asserting that 
splits and decline on the hard left were due to a variety of factors including the labour left's 
"social isolation" (172) from the mainstream of Party membership~ an over-reliance upon 
powerful personalities; an over-emphasis upon organising activists rather than convincing 
members and voters (172-179); and "ideological uncertainty, programmatic weaknesses, and 
strategic myopia" (175) . 
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Arguments such as these which analyse the trajectory of the Party in terms of contingent 
alliances and splits between various factions are not exclusive to the 1980s. At certain points 
it has even been elevated to the level of a general rule. Beer, for example, sees the Labour 
Party as little more than a collection of such groups, the existence of which even reduces the 
importance of socialism as a common goal: 
(T)he Labour Party (is) a coalition that includes various groups, such 
as trade unions and reformers with special concerns, each component 
group aiming at its particular goal. In this coalition, the "socialists" are 
nothing more than one member ... (T)here is some overlapping of 
goals, the miners, for instance, wanting the benefits that come to 
miners in a Socialist society, although perhaps less urgently than more 
immediate improvements in their conditions of life and work. Except 
for this overlapping, each group has different goals and it is ... denied 
that the party entertains a distinctive common purpose (Beer 1982: 
107). 
Samuel and Stedman-Jones have portrayed the Labour Party as similarly made-up of 
competing factions and groups although they condemn suggestions that such battles are 
specific to the internal politics of the Party. They are keen to show that the Party has always 
had multiple links to external groups and that these links have had a fundamental influence on 
the nature of the internal tensions. They state that 
... the history of Labour Party politics might be looked at, not as that of 
a self-sufficient organisational or ideological entity, but rather of a 
perpetually shifting fulcrum between contending and initially extra-
party pressures from left and right (Samuel & Stedman-lonesI982: 
327). 
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Analyses which concentrate on the Party in the 1970s and early 1980s unsurprisingly identify 
such factional causes as central. Seyd (1987: 37-75) identifies the increased power and 
numbers of the labour left-leaning rank and file as one of the prime causes behind Labour's 
radicalisation in this period; while Keohane sees the Party's defence policy in the early eighties 
as an attempt to reconcile the peace movement with right-wing groups in the Party that 
favoured nuclear and NATO reliance (1993: 161). Kogan and Kogan (1982: 11-16; passim) 
emphasise this cause more strongly than any other stating that 
(i)t is to the work of these groups (of the radical left) that we can credit 
many of the recent spectacular happenings ... comparatively small 
numbers of barely known, mostly young party activists have wrought 
changes that may have a momentous effect on the future of British 
politics, and may herald the end of the Labour Party as we know it 
(1982: 11). 
Centralisation and Authoritarianism 
Another important cause of change which has been identified is the growing centralisation and 
authoritarianism of the Party leadership. This is linked to the above emphasis on the soft left-
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right alliance and has been developed most fully by Heffernan and Marqusee (1992) who 
assert that Kinnock 
gradually concentrated all power in his own office, which by the end of 
his regime had supplanted the authority of virtually every other Party 
body, including the PLP itself (43). 
Clearly such a concentration of power would leave Kinnock free to implement whichever 
reforms he personally favoured. For Heffernan and Marqusee, the ability of Kinnock to 
concentrate power so effectively has a number of origins. Firstly, Kinnock's commitment to 
reform meant that he won the powerful backing of the media and the establishment (1992: 16~ 
25~ 56). Secondly, the weakness of the trades unions resulting from the Miners' Strike defeat 
and the attacks of the Government, meant that there was no alternative pole of power 
controlling the Party (61). And thirdly. the careerism of the soft left ensured that they backed 
whoever held the power of patronage in the Party. This careerism also weakened the hard left, 
the only pole of opposition to Kinnock's centralising tendencies, in the form of defections by 
the personally ambitious to Kinnock's camp (23; passim). 
Shaw also recognises the role of centralisation (1988: 254-302~ 1994: 108-117; see also 
Minkin 1991: 622-623) in making it easier for Kinnock to reform the Party in the way he 
wished. But, in a less polemical vein than Heffernan and Marqusee, he identifies the constant 
attempts by the media to portray Labour as split and/or as a Party in crisis as the main cause 
for the tendency towards centralisation (1994: 114; 117). He is also keen to argue, at least in 
his earlier book, that the process of enhancing central control was "a slow. halting and uneven 
one" (1988: 255). 
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Elsewhere analysts have recognised centralisation in more ad hoc forms. Hughes and Wintour 
state that various Party officials and members of Kinnock's office did "contrive to direct the 
(policy) review" (1990: 166) while Seyd proposes a view, shared by many of those active in 
the Party (see chapter nine), stating that 
(t)he ideas and proposals contained within the Policy Review came 
from the top ... there had been very little attempt to gauge opinion at 
the grassroots. A "Labour Listens" exercise ... was more of a public 
relations exercise than a serious attempt to sound out opinions (1993: 
82). 
Penonal Leadenhip 
Another central argument about the cause of change in the Party is one that links the nature 
and success of the reforms directly to the personal qualities or influence of the leading figures 
in the Party. The clearest use of this personal element occurs in Hughes and Wintour's (1990) 
analysis. For them part of the success of the Kinnockite project was due to the skill, foresight 
and will-power of those in leadership positions. Throughout their text they place various 
figures, their personalities, and their relationships with each other at the heart of the 
explanation for why and how the Party changed so radically in the 1980s. They state that 
For all his faults and shortcomings, Neil Kinnock created the new 
model party. The Policy Review was his construct. He believed 
profoundly that Labour had strayed too far from the people. For him, 
the review was a way of leading his party back to its proper place in 
British life (204). 
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As this quote suggests, Hughes and Wintour along with many contemporary analysts (of 
which they were two, writing respectively for The Independent and The Guardian in the 
1980s) often point to Kinnock's talent for Party management as one of the reasons for the 
success of his reforming project. They indicate, for example, how his failure to win the 1984 
conference vote for his proposals on One Member, One Vote taught him never to attempt any 
reform without having first won powerful backing from the most important sectors of the 
Party (1990: 7-8). In a similar vein, Minkin suggests that the Kinnock leadership had a 
prudent respect for the build-up of consistent Conference majorities 
(1991: 623). 
Hughes and Wintour also explain the origin and efficacy of the soft left-right alliance as being 
the result of the foresight and "understanding" that existed between Tom Sawyer, Michael 
Meacher, David Blunkett and Kinnock (9). And as has been mentioned above they argue that 
the outcome of the Policy Review was to a certain degree the result of co-ordination by a few 
leading individuals (166). 
Jeffrey also identifies the personal causes of change stating that Kinnock was "most 
determined of all to win" and that "few have moulded the Party so completely in their image" 
(1993: 127) and elsewhere that 
Kinnock's popularity was based on various factors: his working-class 
origins as the son of a Welsh miner, his forceful and outgoing 
personality, and above all his left-wing credentials (1993: 115). 
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Smith takes up Jeffrey's last point arguing, in common with many contemporary 
commentators, that the combination of Hattersley's right-wing and Kinnock's left-wing 
allegiances enhanced their power and encouraged the growth of the soft left-right alliance 
mentioned above (1992a: 8-9). 
Marquand (1991) has also identified the role of the leader's personality in the achievement of 
change. Applying Drucker's notion of 'ethos' (see below) Marquand argues that in the case of 
Kinnock, unlike many of the party's previous leaders, "Labour's ethos is also his ethos": 
He is unmistakably and unaffectedly a product of the working-class 
culture of the South Wales valleys, with all the strengths and 
weaknesses that that implies. The language of 'our people', which can 
so easily sound false or patronising, comes naturally to him because 
they really are his people (1991: 206). 
The Political and Economic Climate 
Two less pervasive arguments include the assertion that the changes were a rational response 
not directly to the demands of the electorate but to the changing political and economic 
climate of Britain during the 1980s. Shaw (1994: 154-156) asserts that Labour's attempts to 
win the confidence of the City through policy moderation and public relations exercises were 
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a response to the intemationalisation of capital and the recognition on the part of the Party's 
leaders that political power no longer gave national leaders inevitable control over a country's 
finances. 
Smith has made the same point but has also hinted at the role of an evolving political agenda 
in causing reform asserting that 
(p )erhaps the most substantial changes in policy have occurred in the 
area of what might be called the new agenda: the social quality of life 
issues that relate to post-material values ( ... ). Environmental policy, 
women's policy and constitutional reform have all changed markedly 
... (1992c: 219). 
The other less pervasive argument is that Thatcher's success in implementing her policies 
played a major role in enabling the dominance ofKinnock. Smith makes this point (1992b: 28) 
although it is asserted most strongly by Marquand: 
The union leaders, harassed by Thatcherite legislation and haunted by 
declining membership, now needed Kinnock more than he needed 
them. In a sense which had not been true since the mid-1950s, their 
block votes were once again the heavy artillery of the party leader. 
With this queen of the battlefield at his command, Kinnock was able to 
scatter his enemies on the far left, to jettison the last vestiges of the 
neo-socialism of the late 19705 and early 1980s and to dominate the 
conference ... It was a remarkable achievement ... (b )ut he could not 
have done it if Mrs. Thatcher had not given him the chance (1991: 196-
197). 
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Marquand also mentions here another possible cause of Kinnock's success, the consistent 
support he won from a majority of the trades unions' block votes, a feature that is only given a 
detailed attention by Minkin (1991). However, Minkin is particularly keen to explore the 
complexities of the relationship between the leadership and the unions rather than assert a 
simple causal process. 
It should be stated that the specific claims about Labour's transformation in the 1980s made 
by the works mentioned above all contain a degree of detail, integral to the grander 
arguments, but which could not possibly be covered in full here. These specifics will be 
subject to a more rigorous assessment at relevant points in the following chapters. At this 
point our main concern must be with drawing on the form and general ideas outlined above in 
order to develop the complex methods of explanation. 
COMPLEXITY AND THE EXISTING ANALYSES OF LABOUR'S 
TRANSFORMATION: A CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
This section will critically analyse the concepts and explanatory frameworks underpinning 
existing interpretations of Labour's transformation as outlined above. Five major criticisms 
can be identified based upon the exposition on complexity in the preceding chapter. 
The first thing that will strike an analyst committed to complexity about the above analyses is 
their simplicity and rigidity. Although each author has tended to draw upon a series of causes 
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to explain Labour's changes, the series is often limited in number. Furthermore, there is a very 
strong tendency to regard these causes either as part of one larger causal process or to 
emphasise one causal process over all others. These tendencies usually take the form of a 
limited narrative or argument. As such, in Hughes and Wintour, Marquand, Smith, and Hay, 
the rationalism of the decision to obtain more votes through reform and this rationalism's 
mediation through the 'realignment' is emphasised. While in Heffernan and Marqusee, the 
authoritarianism and centralisation ofKinnock's office mediated through the careerism of the 
soft left is placed in a primary position. And in Elliott, the transformation is understood as part 
of the larger story of 'English exceptionalism'. Only Shaw seems to avoid promoting one 
cause to a prime position - more about his approach below. 
Thus we see in the existing analyses a clear example of the will to simplification outlined in 
the previous chapter. Analysts of Labour's transformation have been keener to 'explain' 
rather than 'understand' that transformation. As such, a huge variety of causes involved in the 
changes of the 1980s are ordered into one predominant causal process, governed usually by 
one epiphenomenal factor such as rationalism, the drive to modernisation or authoritarian 
impulses on the part of the leadership. 
A second criticism follows on from the first. This is that the existing analyses fail to deal with, 
in any sustained fashion, the interaction of different causal processes, and almost totally ignore 
any notion that there may be a complex inter-retroaction between these causal processes. 
However, different causal processes must be combined because. as the last chapter suggests. 
any close inspection of them tends to imply infinite numbers of other causal processes; it only 
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seems fair therefore to suppose that the limited number of causal processes identified by 
analysts of the 1980s will be included in their number. For example, once one asks how a 
rational calculation creates the effect of adopting moderate policies, we are left with a series 
of answers - such as the assessment of the popularity of such policies, a belief that radical 
policies were no longer economically feasible, factional support for change etc. - which imply 
other causal processes based not on rationalism but on other factors such as electoralism, 
other ideological considerations and the internal balance of power. 
It is also far from clear that personal and rational causes such as careerism or vote-
maximisation can be completely excluded from analyses that emphasise 'deep' ideological and 
institutional origins. At first it might seem that the institutional and ideological involves the 
explanation of movement from cause to effect within itself A cause such as 
parliamentarianism affects the leadership in a certain way because it imposes institutional and 
ideological constraints on their behaviour. However this process can only be understood if we 
implicitly assume that certain personal and rational elements are playing a part in the 
transmission of this cause into an effect. For example, a Labour leader who decides to 
espouse a moderate policy to avoid upsetting the traditions of Parliament and to maintain 
Labour's electoral credibility is clearly making a rational calculation about what is good for 
Labour and about the centrality of Parliament. Similarly that leader may also be exhibiting 
certain personal traits such as a willingness to conform or an authoritarian attitude to hislher 
more radical detractors within the Party. It may also imply certain political elements such as 
the weakness or strength of certain coalitions or factions in the Party which might be ready to 
support or oppose the decisions of the leader. The latter is particularly true of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, clearly the more radical stance of many leadership figures in that period was 
in part the effect of changes in the strengths of certain groups in the Party. 
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Only Eric Shaw (1994) has attempted a combination of causal processes. He has criticised 
those analyses of Labour in the 1980s that see the prime cause of change as a rational 
response to environmental and social forces in order to win votes (Smith 1992abc; 1994; 
Hughes and Wintour 1990). He states that 
... the extent to which the implications of these (environmental and social) 
forces were self-evident and hence predetermined the Party's response, 
varied to a considerable degree, whilst the precise conclusions its 
leadership drew were always mediated by its frame of reference (1994: 
152-3). 
As such, Shaw develops an approach that attempts to understand Labour's changes as the 
interaction between external environmental factors, the leadership's frame of reference and 
internal party considerations. This response is instructive and useful. Instead of rejecting 
analyses based upon rational calculation out of hand, Shaw attempts to construct an approach 
that allows different, apparently contradictory approaches to interact and synthesise and thus 
provide a more complex and subtler analysis. 
It is clear from the above that the effective impact of institutional and ideological causes 
cannot be understood without reference to other causes just as those causes cannot be 
understood without reference to the institutional and ideological themselves. This suggests 
that one way of applying a multi-causal/effectual method to study of the Labour Party in the 
1980s is to always take account of rational, internal political, personal, institutional and 
ideological causes and effects when explaining any particular change. 
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A third criticism of the current literature is that it often presents policy as the ultimate effect 
and gauge of change within the Party. This is particularly the case with reference to analysis of 
the Policy Review. The Review plays a strange epiphenomenal role in analysis of Labour's 
transformation. Unlike most epiphenomenal explanations where the phenomena causing the 
epiphenomena is usually the prime focus of interest (e.g. economic contradictions in 
Marxism), in Labour Party analysis, policy reform and the Review are the focus despite clearly 
being regarded as the epiphenomena which has been 'caused' by other factors. In effect the 
Policy Review has become 'The Transformation' caused by factors of less interest or 
significance (see above)8. This is particularly the case in Smith (1994) and Hay (1994) who 
concentrate almost entirely upon doctrinal pronouncement in the form of policy reform to 
support their distinct arguments about the nature of the transformation. While Smith and 
Spear's edited collection, The Changing Labour Party (1992), is almost entirely concerned 
with the content of the policy moderation. 
This epiphenomenal schema limits complexity by reducing the transformation to one main 
effect of genuine change. This can be avoided by approaching the Policy Review and policy 
reform as just one constantly remodified modifier amongst numerous others. Also, by using 
the concept of value (see below), attention is shifted away from doctrine thus further 
dethroning the Policy Review as the prime factor within the transformation. 
s,ois is a good example of retrospective analysis as outlined in chapter two showing that effects can modify 
factors by positing them as causes through such analysis. This also shows that analyst and analysis are deeply 
involved in the construction of their subject matter and affect its development. 
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The fourth criticism is that the current approaches generally ignore the role of ideology. (The 
exceptions to this are Smith (1994) and Hay (1994) on revisionism and Thatcherism 
respectively but both deal with the influences of these on doctrinal matters rather than the role 
of deep ideological trends) . As was shown above, the existing analyses tend towards an 
emphasis upon the rational, personal and contingent political elements of Labour Party 
behaviour. Maybe it is a reflection of the changing political agenda but this emphasis 
represents something of a shift in Lab~ur Party analysis. With the sole exception of Elliott 
(1993) none of the contributors to the analysis of Labour in the 1980s have placed the 
concepts of electoralism, parliamentarianism and labourism at the heart of their studies. This is 
despite the fact that it was just such issues that played a central role in the causal processes 
identified by the chief analysts of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. Miliband (1972; first 
published 1961), Pelling (1972) Coates (1975) Nairn (1978, first published 1964), Howell 
(1980), Hinton (1983) and Anderson (1992, first published 1964) all either employed such 
concepts in a way that was fundamental to their approach or showed signs of being 
fundamentally influenced by those concepts. 
The ignorance of these approaches in analyses of Labour in the 1980s is a gap because, 
although these studies alone often employ very rigid and deterministic analyses, they are one 
other source for the identification of causes and effects that could be used to complexify our 
study, when taken alongside the more recent writings outlined above. In particular a wide 
range of differing explanations may prove useful when applying a multi-causal and multi-
effectual approach. As such, it is worth taking a brief look at these analyses and some other 
associated explanations. 
- .- .~- '--"-::::' .. - -
Coates summarises the approach as follows: 
... the Labour Party, in its gradualism, has neither created nor sustained 
the one social force, namely a radicalised working class, which alone 
could provide it with the power base on which to effect a socialist 
transformation ... Instead the Labour Party has chosen to define 
socialism, even in its most radical periods, as public ownership, state 
planning and welfare provision - as a set of social changes, that is, 
which could be implemented (and only implemented) by its own 
Parliamentarians, capturing and using the Parliamentary State and its 
bureaucracy in open electoral battle .... (A)s a corollary of that, the 
Labour Party has always relied, in its pursuit of its notion of socialism, 
on the voluntary co-operation of the very social forces ( ... ) whose 
powers and privileges would be undermined by any serious attempt 'to 
bring about a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power 
and wealth in favour of working people and their families' (1975: 219). 
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Here in this extract is the tension, often identified by observers of Labour in this period, 
between the goals and the methods adopted by the Labour Party in all its paradoxical and 
ironic detail: the goals of the Party, defined as they are by the various institutional and 
ideological traditions of the labour movement, are constantly confounded by the means it 
chooses to achieve those goals - means shaped by just the same institutional and ideological 
pressures. 
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For Nairn, as for most of the analysts who have developed this approach, the Labour Party 
has been profoundly influenced by the nature of the organisations out of which it was born. 
Prime amongst these being the profound moderation implicit in the Liberal Party, the trade 
union movement, the Church and the Fabian Society (Nairn 1975: 323-334~ Coates 1975: 5-
12~ Miliband 1972: 17-38~ Howell 1980: 17-18; 33-35). In Nairn, this moderation which 
expresses itself in the form of a commitment to the parliamentary system, its electoral 
procedures and the limited socio-political vision of a trade union movement obsessed with 
piecemeal gain is upheld by an internal Party structure that gives the trade union and the PLP 
leadership the greatest share of the power while consigning rank and file militants to the 
illusion of democratic participation at conference (Nairn 1975: 338-346). As with Coates, 
Nairn's analysis is shot through with a structural inevitability about the direction of the Party 
and movement. Nairn goes so far as to describe the Party's approach as an "ingenious vicious 
circle" 
designed to perpetually prOmIse advance towards socialism and 
perpetually move away from it in reality (1978: 345). 
For these young doyens of the Trotskyite and libertarian New Left which had a brief and 
limited flourishing in the 1970s, the argument that Labour was structurally condemned to 
moderation made particular political sense as they were keen to build a revolutionary 
movement outside the Party. As Nairn states: 
This is the whole tragedy of Labourism. British trade unionism could 
not avoid stifling British socialism within one unified body, given the 
immense strength of the former and the weakness and incoherence of 
the latter. The price paid by the British Left for 'unity', therefore, was 
high - half a century of frustration for the most vital and militant forces 
in the working class, the formation of the permanent Fabian dynasty as 
their leadership (351). 
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As such, it is not unusual to find these writers taking the Labour left to task for their cries of 
betrayal against Party and union leaders (cries reproduced by Heffernan and Marqusee 1992 
in the context of the 1980s). In the eyes of those writers influenced by the critical concepts of 
electoralism, parliamentarianism and labourism, these accusations evade the structural 
constraints on the Party by utilising contingent personal factors to explain Labour's moderate 
history. Nairn expresses this most clearly: 
... the angry denunciation of leaders in which sectarians and the Labour 
Left wing have always indulged has served only to conceal the 
underlying conditions of betrayal, the circumstances in the party, the 
movement, the class itself which have generated corrupt and half 
hearted leadership. Labourism is a system which cannot be led by 
revolutionaries (1978: 317). 
Coates (1975: 166-167) makes an identical point attacking what he describes as the "sell-out" 
thesis prevalent on the labour left. Of course the labour left, which seeks a radical change in 
British society through the organ of the Labour Party and movement cannot accept a view 
which sees that Party as irredeemably anti-radical, therefore contingent personal or political 
factors are the only alternative explanation. 
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However, not all analysts influenced by the same concepts as Coates and Nairn take quite 
such a rigid view. Miliband, for example, although pessimistic about the possibility of 
weakening the Labour Party's commitment to parliamentarianism, electoralism and labourism 
(1972: 372-376) sees the influence of these ideological causes on Labour's relationship to 
party and governmental institutions in far more contingent terms: 
Of political parties claiming socialism to be their aim, the Labour Party 
has always been one of the most dogmatic - not about socialism, but 
about the Parliamentary system. Empirical and flexible about all else, its 
leaders have always made devotion to that system their fixed point of 
reference and the conditioning factor of their political behaviour. This 
is not to say that the Labour Party has never been a party of revolution 
'" It is rather that the leaders of the Labour Party have always rejected 
any kind of political action (such as industrial action for political 
purposes) which fell, or which appeared to them to fall, outside the 
framework and conventions of the parliamentary system (1972: 13). 
As with much of Miliband's analysis which has always been wary of structural approaches, 
there is no irreversible, vicious circle that traps the Labour Party into a particular course of 
action, it is simply that the Party's leaders have a very strong ideological and political 
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commitment to certain approaches characteristic of "bourgeois politicians with ... a certain 
bias towards social reform" (1972: 373). 
Anderson's approach (1992: passim), on the other hand, oscillates between the rigid and 
flexible understanding of the Party's moderation but most interestingly he introduces further 
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institutional and ideological elements into the equation to explain Labour's traditional anti-
revolutionary stance. Anderson argues that England has a unique history of class compromise 
that began with the stunted bourgeois revolution of the seventeenth century and was 
consolidated by the era of imperialism. This, he argues, has created a non-revolutionary 
bourgeoisie socially, culturally and politically aligned with the aristocracy, a group more 
usually regarded, in continental history, as the enemy of the middle class. The result of this is 
a stifling socio-political culture in England that is constantly non-radical, nationalistic, and 
nostalgic. This legacy has influenced Labour in that, unlike its sister movements in Europe, it 
has no tradition of revolution to draw upon as on the continent and it has been bequeathed a 
political culture and a set of national institutions that are obsessively deferential to the 
established hierarchy. So, for example, Labour rails against class distinctions and the 
institutional and cultural snobbery that the feudal aristocracy has imprinted upon English 
society but pays little attention to the real basis of the economic system - relations of 
production (31). 
It should also be mentioned that Panitch (1971) writing at the same time as these analysts 
developed an understanding of Labour's history which also drew on the interaction of its 
institutional and ideological elements although his approach did not make the same use of the 
concepts of parliamentarianism, electoralism and labourism. Instead Panitch argues that the 
Labour Party has always been most deeply affected by the institutional and ideological 
tensions of its dual identity as a party representing the sectional interests of the organised 
working-class and as a party of government that must represent the interests of the whole 
nation acting as a force for integration of different groups (199-200; passim; this view is also 
present as a less-explicitly stated theme in Marquand 1991: 189-207; passim). Thus for 
Panitch the key point in Labour's development, that has set the tone for its behaviour ever 
105 
since, was not necessarily the development of its parliamentarianism, electoralism and 
labourism but the point at which the Party ceased to see socialism as the goal of a mature 
working class and instead regarded it as the integrative goal ofa mature society (1971: 189). 
As was mentioned above the influence of these ideas on analyses of Labour's transformation in 
the 1980s has been extremely small. Only Elliott (1993) makes use of the approach, drawing 
particularly on Anderson, but his work is a study of the Party's history as a whole providing 
only one section on Labour since 1983. Similarly, other places where this analytical tradition 
is utilised by authors writing in the 1980s is included in some very brief comments which 
relate to Labour's general history. For example, Cliff and Gluckstein argue that the Labour 
Party has combined the class consciousness of the working class and the popular commitment 
to the nation to produce parliamentarianism and an economistic trade unionism (1989:2). 
While Wainwright has argued that the Party and movement have ignored the truly radical 
implications of workers self-organisation out ofa commitment to Parliament (1987: 34-35). 
The broad thrust of these approaches would undoubtedly be critical of much of the analysis on 
Labour in the 1980s, focusing as it does on face-value doctrinal pronouncements or accepting, 
relatively uncritically, the rationalism of the modernisation process. It seems likely, if we take 
the little Elliott has written of this period as our source, that this analytical tradition would see 
the changes of the 1980s as a continuation of the Labour Party's drive to moderation justified 
with radical rhetoric resulting from a deeply ingrained labourist ideology combined with the 
Party's socio-political position as an electoralist organisation and the dead-weight of 
England's conservative political culture. 
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For the approach of complexity the above analyses are useful for the following reason. They 
have attempted to implement a dialectical approach to analysis of the Labour Party by 
explaining labourism, electoralism and parliamentarianism not just in terms of ideology but in 
terms of the interaction of ideological principles and the structural position of the Party. This 
dialectic (as was suggested in Chapter Two) has an element of greater complexity about it, in 
that it attempts to understand, or at least indicate, the complex and very close causal relations 
between areas that are treated as distinct elsewhere. In addition, the approach brings in the 
ignored element of ideology thus augmenting the causal factors we must take into account by 
one. In this thesis, the existence of this further causal factor, and the close relation between 
ideological principles and more 'concrete' factors is represented largely in the concept of 
value but is also a theme running throughout the analysis which aims to study the interaction 
and inter-retroaction of all causal processes, if not in as rigid and deterministic way as the 
likes of Nairn, Coates et al. 
A further analysis we may wish to consider for the critical light it can cast upon the existing 
analyses is that of Lewis Minkin who has addressed himself to the Party in the 1980s in his 
work The Contentious Alliance (1991). In particular Minkin deals with the relationship 
between the unions and the Party and, as was mentioned above, is keen to explore this 
relationship as one of great complexity. To this end Minkin's approach is to provide highly 
detailed descriptions of the Party-union relationship throughout its history whilst clearly 
taking care not to make broad generalisations about the nature or development of that 
relationship. 
If his analysis is informed by any single principle, it is the broad idea that the relationship 
between Party and unions is governed by rules and procedures, most of which were not 
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embodied in constitutional documents. For Minkin these rules and procedures ensure the 
differentiation of spheres and functions between the Party leadership and the union leadership 
and thus ''vitally affected the distribution of power in the relationship" (Minkin 1991: xiv). 
However, Minkin never applies this idea to the point where it simplifies or evades the 
complexity of actual events - it is largely used to augment the factors influencing change in the 
relationship. Furthermore, the notion of unwritten rules and procedures is flexible enough to 
allow it to change subtly over time and space and to suggest a depth of complexity in the 
Party and movement's transformation ignored by more rigid principles. 
In particular, this thesis shows how when Kinnock's reputation within the Party was at its 
lowest following the 1987 election defeat, it was the existence of such rules of propriety 
which ensured that the unions did not use their power to have him removed despite 
considerable dissatisfaction with his leadership (see chapter eight). However, as Minkin has 
dealt in enormous detail and with great understanding of the Party-union relationship in this 
period, this thesis will not repeat his study but will introduce the issue only where it is 
essential to the development of my analysis or where original material has been gleaned. 
Minkin's approach can be critical of the existing analyses because it represents an attempt to 
produce a truly complex account by avoiding the temptation of identifying overarching or 
limited sets of causes. Despite its 658 pages of intense and close analysis and description, one 
still gets the sense that Minkin feels that the work could be even more detailed and complex. 
While other analyses seem drawn to the need to simplify, Minkin seems powerfully drawn to 
the need to reflect complexity. Although the approaches are different, this thesis shares such a 
concern. 
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The above criticisms show that the existing analyses do not highlight the complexity of inter-
retroaction between causes and effects. There is no flow or play of different elements and 
processes in the existing analyses. As such, simplification rather than complexity is the 
characteristic goal of the current approaches. This is not to say that each argument does not 
contain strong explanatory elements, which in a non-paradoxical form might be regarded as 
constituting elements of the 'truth', but they clearly cannot alone, or even placed alongside 
each other in one text, provide a complex explanation as conceived in chapter two. And they 
most definitely cannot begin to provide that tactical approach demanded by the first chapter 
which nudges the reader a few millimetres towards 'understanding'. 
DEVELOPING A COMPLEX APPROACH TO LABOUR IN TIlE 1980s 
The previous chapter suggested a series of methods for achieving the tactical goals of a 
complex approach. These were the use and identification of: multi-causallmulti-effectual 
approaches; multiplication; fuzzy categories; and inter-retroactive processes. With the 
exception of the method of acknowledging simplicity in the text, a tactic which must of 
necessity be left until later, we can now begin to develop these approaches within the context 
of the Labour Party. 
The Multi-causallMulti-efTectual Approach 
The immediate implications of the multi-causal and multi-effectual approach is to take all of 
the arguments and approaches outlined above and combine them to provide a multiplicity of 
different origins and results. We can no doubt find further evidence backing arguments which 
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identify rational calculation and factional alliances and personality as causes of change. Such 
evidence may also help us to develop these arguments further. We may also wish to consider 
the notion that the changes of the 1980s were inspired both by the revisionist tradition and the 
ideas of Thatcherism even though, in the argument between Smith and Hay these different 
points of view are presented as incommensurable. 
In particular, we can introduce the approach based upon parliamentarianism and its associated 
concepts. It clearly provides another source for the identification of causes of the changes of 
the 1980s. It introduces structural and long-term ideological determinants of change in the 
Party, whereas the analyses developed during the 1980s have tended to concentrate on more 
contingent factors such as personality, rational calculation, medium and short-term ideological 
developments and political splits and alliances. Of course, as is suggested by Coates' and 
Nairn's hostility to the "sell-out" thesis, these various approaches do not traditionally always 
sit easily together, indeed some may see them as fundamentally contradictory. 
This contradiction does not necessarily present a problem for a multi-causaVeffectual 
approach. Part of the acknowledgement of complexity and inter-retroaction is the recognition 
that the relations between different causal processes is far from clear, what may seem 
contradictory when aligned to a particular political project or piece of analytical dogma, may 
in fact be a complex process of inter-retroaction. As such it may be fruitful to investigate the 
interaction between the structural and the contingent despite their apparent contradiction. 
It should be added here that as an analyst aiming at complexity, there is also virtue in 
extending the number of causal processes involved in explaining the changes in the Party. I 
am, of course, not tied to the existing approaches~ with new evidence and analysis I hope to 
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show that the existing approaches can be developed and extended. What must be avoided is 
an attempt to show how the discovery of new causal processes rules out completely other 
existing explanations - such an act would be to limit rather than increase complexity. 
Multiplication 
Another method of enhancing the complexity of our analysis mentioned in chapter two was 
that of 'multiplication'. It has already been shown how this applies with particular power to 
the issue of the left-right spectrum in the Party when it is transected by alternative distinctions 
of ethnicity and generation. There would be little purpose at this point to start highlighting 
others~ their tactical and suasive content can only exist when presented alongside empirical 
evidence. Suffice it to say that further areas of study will deal with how the idea of a Party 
'leadership' is multiplied into a 'core leadership', a leadership formed around the 'soft left' 
described here as the 'new establishment', and a leadership, largely formed around the 'right', 
which never took part in the value transformation and other aspects of the Party's changes in 
the 1980s. It will also be shown how notions of a singular 'alliance' acting as a power base for 
Kinnock's project must be multiplied in that such a power base can, in fact, be seen to have 
been constituted of two 'associations' which were in themselves transected by multiple 
differences over specific issues and around specific identities and values. Further areas of 
multiplication will be highlighted as the text progresses. 
Values 
The next method is that of the 'fuzzy category' as mentioned in the last chapter. In the 
context of the analysis of Labour's transformation of the 1980s this means an emphasis upon 
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what I shall simply call the Party's 'values'. However, before elaborating this concept further 
it is worth taking a detour by way of Henry Drucker's (1979) notion of ethos. Although my 
concept of values differs substantially from Drucker's ethos, they both possess a common 
focus and relevance by virtue of their emphasis upon the non-doctrinal beliefs of the Party. So 
a brief outline of Drucker's distinction between 'doctrine' and 'ethos' will be informative and 
provide a context for the elucidation of my own themes. 
The starting-point for Drucker is his argument that the Labour Party's ideology and behaviour 
cannot be understood purely in terms of doctrine~ a mistake he feels is made by most analysts 
of the Party (1979: 8). For Drucker, Labour's nature is equally, if not more so, a product of 
ethos. He draws the distinction as follows: 
Doctrines are what people usually have in mind when they talk of the 
ideology of the party. Doctrines can be coherent statements of a 
position. Doctrines can lead to policies: Labour's doctrines commonly 
do. These policies are recorded in the Reports of the Labour Party 
Conferences. They can be accepted, rejected, enacted into law, 
contemptuously ignored, but above all they are explicit. An ethos is not 
so hard and fast nor so easy to describe. By the ethos of the Party I 
have in mind what an earlier age might have called the spirit of the 
Party; its traditions and habits, its feel. The ethos is not explicit, it is not 
laid down in the rules ... (1991: 244). 
Drucker has also said that ethos can be distinguished from doctrine because 
the former is not open to recruitment by agreement. It is one thing for 
the intellectual members of the Labour movement to seek to 
understand, and to be sympathetic to, the ethos of the workers. Their 
understanding, however sympathetic, cannot have the same meaning to 
them that it has to those for whom it arises naturally out of experience 
(1979: 10). 
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Marquand has acknowledged the role that Drucker's version of ethos plays in the Labour 
Party's development claiming that the 
nebulous, impalpable dimension of 'ethos' - of mood, symbol and 
tradition - the subtleties of which are extraordinarily hard to catch on 
paper '" nevertheless provides the better guide to the party's behaviour 
(Marquand 1991: 197). 
Clear1y within an analysis dealing solely with the Labour Party, Drucker's distinction is valid. 
However, it is also the assertion of this thesis that an emphasis upon non-doctrinal beliefs 
provide us with a 'fuzzy category' which aids complexity. But before dealing with this aspect, 
I will explain my notion of values and how they differ from Drucker's ethos. 
Drucker is right to assert that there is more to the Labour party's beliefs than simply its 
doctrinal pronouncements. The very fact that many Party members, who are quite possibly 
unaware of the various doctrinal pronouncements on various issues at any point in time, 
would not avoid espousing their own view on certain issues indicates that there is far more to 
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the Party's beliefs than doctrine. And, more importantly, it is clear that these non-doctrinal 
beliefs do have a powerful influence over the development of the Party and the actions of its 
members from the grassroots to the leadership. However, Drucker tends to narrow his notion 
of ethos to include only rather static and limited notions about Party organisation. The 
examples he gives of ethos are illustrative of this: the unwillingness on the part of Labour's 
members to sack its leaders~ the Party's expectation of sacrifice from its leaders and 
employees; the Party's tendency to save its money~ and its belief in formal explicit rules (1979: 
12-18). The concept of values as I use it here has a wider application meaning the broad, 
deep-seated, non-doctrinal beliefs about the very aims of the Party. This is significant because 
while Drucker is clearly correct to focus upon non-doctrinal matters, it seems narrow to limit 
this non-doctrinal principle merely to organisational rules. It is evident (and this thesis hopes 
to provide the evidence) that individuals in the Party are motivated by non-doctrinal beliefs 
broader than simple organisational rules and procedures. 
In this thesis I argue that three such values dominated the transformation of the 1980s. I shall 
briefly mention these here, a more detailed analysis and description of them is provided 
throughout chapters four to nine~ in addition, there is a sense, which shall come through from 
those chapters, that the actual content of these values cannot be described too deeply in 
abstract as they gain their meaning largely from their context and the complex and multiple 
articulations in which they are involved. 
The first of these values I shall call the 'defend the people' value. This is the deeply-held 
belief on the part of many in the Party that a prime aim of Labour must be to ensure the 
welfare of the vulnerable or subjected throughout society. The second shall be called the 
'basic principles value'. This amounts to the belief that Labour's aim must be to implement a 
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series of basic principles. This may sound vague and broad but the thesis will show that vague 
values of this sort - which represent a type of blank sheet - structured the conflict of the 
1980s and as is shown immediately below, it was their very blankness which made them so 
important and such sources of dispute. The final value is labelled 'the vote maximisation 
value'. This is the belief that Labour's aim must be to win votes and gain power. Much of the 
existing literature on Labour's transformation and commentaries of the time tended to portray 
this as a value belonging only to Kinnock and his supporters but this is, I hope to show, a 
distortion. All sectors of the Party, including the radical wing, felt Labour must win votes -
the differences existed in how to this was to be achieved. The reasons why these particular 
values are chosen for analysis are given below. 
It will be shown how these values provided the battleground for much of the conflict that 
occurred in the 1980s and thus formed the foundation of the Party's transformation. 
However, the conflict of the 1980s was nothing so basic as a battle between these differing 
values, rather it can be shown that each faction and stream within the Party during the 1980s 
held all these values dear. These values played a role in the disputes and developments of the 
1980s because different groups and individuals in the Party disagreed about the strategies that 
were appropriate for the achievement of these values. Much of the arguments and events of 
the 1980s can be read, in part, as battles by one group or figure to persuade others that their 
favoured strategy was the best way to achieve one or more of these three values and that 
strategies favoured by others were wrong-headed. These strategies were manifold relating 
either to grand strategy or strategy relating to specific events - the New Strategic Thinking, 
direct action, the 'dented shield', the Policy Review, the mass party approach to name a few. 
In this context, these disputes of the 1980s are struggles for the articulation and the 
disarticulation of a series of values and the strategies for their fulfilment. 
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However, before this analysis sounds too schematic, it must be restated that processes of 
articulation and disarticulation are never simple. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, 
articulation and disarticulation are inter-retroactive. When one element is articulated to 
another, the meaning of both those elements is often altered one by the other. Furthermore, 
we will also see that articulation does not just occur neatly between one value and one 
strategy. In an attempt to persuade others of the validity of their view, individuals and groups 
sometimes brought more than one value to bear. In addition, it must be acknowledged that 
the debates about values and strategies did not occur in a vacuum, the articulations and 
disarticulations occurred, and were influenced in their form, by the events going on around 
them. As such, it should be clear from this rather abstract account, of the complexity that this 
analysis allows for whilst providing an insight into the changes of the 1980s. 
It should also be said that while the thesis will concentrate on these three values, there are 
times when even vaguer values (almost akin to feelings or emotional attachments) had a 
bearing on the transformation. These may be factors such as a commitment to tradition, or a 
sense of youth and modernity. It will be shown that these very vague, non-doctrinal values did 
playa lesser role at specific times and they will be introduced as is necessary. 
Now we must tum to the question of what a notion like 'values' brings to the search for 
complexity. The attraction of this focus on a non-doctrinal concepts such as values for a 
complex approach is that it exhibits the vital characteristics of a fuzzy category required by 
the analyst. It has no absolutely firm boundaries. When involved in the identification of a 
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causal process it stretches the implications of that process across space and time since values 
envelop the whole Party. 
These values, as features of the Party, are remarkably viscous, they are not fixed or absolutely 
explicit at anyone point in space or time, they blend, in a complex and multiple way, with 
other features of the Party such as institutional structures, rational calculation and doctrine. 
Furthermore, they are features that, by definition and due to the viscosity of value, affect all 
members, stretch across the whole of the Party undergoing development as they imply wide 
areas of space and time. In essence, the fact that value is everywhere and nowhere in 
particular ensures that when it plays a part in analysis it can effectively communicate an 
underlying sense of complexity by implying that inter-retroaction incorporates an enormous 
variety of factors active across the whole Party. 
This can be compared with doctrine which tends, as a concept. to simplify rather than 
complexify. This simplification occurs because analysts have taken doctrine to be the belief of 
the Party as a whole whereas it in fact represents only what a certain part of the leadership 
may believe. This has not only meant that analysts, who concentrate on doctrine. have failed 
to explain the actual nature of the Party (if such a thing can be pinpointed) but will also 
misrepresent the full range of the causes that go into the development of the Party or the full 
range of the effects that any change may have. Values, in this sense, are also useful for an 
analyst attempting a complex understanding, it broadens the range of originary points within 
the Party available to explain any change and it widens the significant effects of a change. By 
recognising that the Party is more than doctrine and more than its leadership clique, the 
ideological causes and effects can no longer be limited to a few 'seminal' or exemplary texts 
such as the Statement of Democratic Socialist Aims and Values or Crosland's The Future of 
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Socialism; nor can personal causes and effects be limited to the virtues and vices of a few 
leading figures; nor can rational causes and effects be regarded as self-evident matters relating 
simply to electoral strategy. Rather these are all factors which have complex Party-wide 
effects by virtue of their relationship to value. As such, a non-doctrinal approach suggests 
persuasively that the significant aspects of the Labour Party and its internal interactions are 
broader than have been previously explored; the Party is the Party, it cannot be reduced to 
one or other group no matter how powerful that group may appear to be within Labour's 
structures. In this sense, Drucker does a great service to complex analysis: in broadening 
significance, he has widened the temporal and spatial focus available to an analyst and thus 
made an appreciation of complexity that much more possible. 
Values will also be used as the prime way by which we can bring notions of 
parliamentarianism, labourism and electoralism back into analysis but without a reliance upon 
the simplified and rigid historical generalisations of Anderson et al. When I identify the 
existence of the value that Labour must maximise its vote (see chapter four and passim), this 
clearly draws on the recognition of electoralism and parliamentarianism as a feature of Labour 
Party members' outlook. And similarly where the value of defending the vulnerable is 
identified (see chapter five and passim), this clearly, in some of its forms, has links to the non-
ideological streams of parliamentarianism and labourism. Similar echoes of Anderson et al. 
will be found wherever the concept of value is mentioned. 
Thus we can see how effective the use of a non-doctrinal concept like values can be in aiding 
our search for complexity. 
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The question of why these three particular values have been chosen must now be addressed. 
The first point is that even a relatively cursory observation of Labour in the 1980s will allow 
one to realise that the Party's transformation in this era could not be explained without 
reference to disputes about the mission of the Party and that these disputes were clearly 
formulated around questions of vote-maximisation, defence of the subjected, and the Party as 
an embodiment and bearer of a series of basic principles. Drucker argues that, despite the 
'speculative' nature of identifying elements of ethos to analyse, he chooses those he does 
because the Party's behaviour cannot be understood without reference to them (Drucker 
1979: 12). Like Drucker I have chosen conceptions without which the Party's behaviour in 
the 1980s could not be understood. 
Secondly, these three values are the ones which are most commonly used by Kinnock, his 
supporters and his enemies to persuade others of their approach and explain their beliefs in 
speeches, writings and interviews with the author. They are the values which keep re-
occurring in debate throughout the period covered by this thesis. In this sense the evidence for 
this claim can only be presented within the main body of the thesis and the verisimilitude 
which characterises it. 
The last point can also apply to the third reason for choosing these particular features: they 
are clearly observable in the weave of the Party's transformation at the time. The very 
direction and detail of the history of the Party between 1983 and 1989 as presented here 
attests to their primary significance. Drucker, himself, has made an apposite comment in 
relation to this which applies just as well to any non-doctrinal belief in the Party as to ethos: 
When describing the ethos of a group we are forced to make hypotheses 
on the basis of the footprints which the group has left behind. All this 
makes the ethos more difficult than the doctrine to investigate - but not 
for that reason any less real or less important (Drucker 1979: 12). 
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Thus in the concept of non-doctrinal values, we have a notion which deepens our analysis of 
Labour in the 1980s and aids our search for complexity by bringing in new causal processes 
beyond that of doctrine, by containing within itself complex processes of articulation and thus 
inter-retroaction, and by allowing us to focus upon the beliefs of the whole Party rather than 
just the leadership. 
Inter-retroaction 
Of course, once we have begun to make such observations within the context of complexity, 
we cannot avoid involving the next method suggested by the first chapter: identifying 
processes of inter-retroaction. It is difficult at this level of abstraction to show exactly how 
such processes of inter-retroaction can be identified, that will have to be left to the following 
chapters, but we can develop the most recent points by asserting that the various causal 
processes identified above do not simply imply one another, they actually modify one another 
through a process of complex inter-retroaction, and it is examples of this relationship that we 
must highlight. And, as is indicated in the last chapter, it can only be examples that are given 
since an identification of all inter-retroactions is impossible. 
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For example, we may wish to show how closely interwoven in a dynamic inter-retroactive 
form were the rational vote-maximisation calculation of the leadership and its supporters, the 
alliance between soft left and right, and the centralisation of power in Kinnock's office. While 
in the existing literature these three central arguments are usually presented in a limited linear 
form, it is far from inconceivable that we can find inter-retroactive relationships between all 
three, each process modifying the others in a complex fashion. For example, the centralisation 
of power in the leader's office gave the leader more control over sources of information within 
Labour, over who became leading figures in the Party, and over what was said by those 
leading figures. This would almost certainly have enhanced the ability of the leadership to 
have their particular rational vote-maximisation strategy accepted as common sense, as well as 
making it far more difficult for the soft left and the right to find anywhere else but the 
leadership as a source of power and legitimation thus enhancing their alliance with each other 
and Kinnock. These two developments would then have further enhanced the power of the 
leadership to centralise which would have in tum reinforced the alliance and the rational vote-
maximisation strategy. Of course, this process is portrayed here as beginning with the 
centralisation of the leadership but as the first chapter pointed out there is no clear starting-
point in inter-retroactive causal processes. And this introduces further complexity, for not 
only does centralisation, the alliance and rational vote-maximisation retroact in this way, it is 
also clear that one of the causes of the centralisation process itself was the aim of gaining a 
greater hold over the Party in order to win more votes while the development of the soft left 
and its apparent alliance with the right was caused by a commitment to such a rational 
strategy. 
Further complexity can also be observed in the fact that inter-retroactive processes of this sort 
are not necessarily self-reinforcing, they may also lead to change rather than enhancement of 
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their integral parts. This, it could be conceived, is precisely what happened in early 1986, 
when the centralisation of the leader's office lead to a weakening of the alliance: figures on the 
soft left were critical of Kinnock's by-passing of the NEe during the launch of the Freedom 
and Fairness campaign which itself was a campaign very much inspired by the rational vote-
maximisation strategy. So we can also see how this modification retro-acted upon the 
centralisation by limiting it (at least for a short period) since Kinnock had to consult the NEe 
following the protests, which thus saw a subtle shift in the vote-maximisation strategy, since 
centralisation was part of this. Paradoxically though, and in true complex fashion, this may 
have briefly re-enhanced the alliance since the soft left now felt they had been consulted and 
thus felt more at ease with Kinnock again. The permutations and interpretations are manifold. 
It should be pointed out that this is merely an example, as my own analysis will show, some of 
these arguments that constitute part of this inter-retroactive process need further development 
and sophistication, sometimes along an inter-retroactive line itself 
However, we can observe that these two examples of inter-retroaction processes are 
somewhat distinct. The first deals with inter-retroactions between the analytical spheres of 
Labour politics outlined in the first sections of this chapter. While the second deals with the 
inter-retroaction between particular factors, associations or individuals linked specifically to 
the major changes that occurred in the Party over the 1980s. We can add a third to this in the 
form of the identification of inter-retroaction between the main 'issues' or events which I 
have chosen as the focus for the chapters of part two in this thesis. For example, we could 
study how the new agenda inter-retroacted with policy reform' '. 
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This thesis will attempt to actually identify and detail some of these inter-retroactions but 
more commonly it will rely upon the implication concepts of articulation and negative identity 
construction as outlined in chapter two. However, we can also use a more directly practical 
method by employing far more regularly than normal the technique of inserting in parentheses 
"see chapter x" next to a particular comment. This will be done to try and communicate what 
may be called the 'dictionary effect' of complexity where because of inter-retroaction one 
factor will always be causally linked to a huge number of others which themselves will 
ultimately feed modifications back to the original cause/effect. This bears a strong 
metaphorical resemblance to the process of looking up a definition in a dictionary whereby the 
given definition will include words which can themselves be sought and so on until the point 
where one will ultimately reach a definition which will include the original word one looked-
up. 
Descriptive Detail 
It was mentioned above how Lewis Minkin presents a sense of complexity to the reader 
through highly detailed description of events and processes of change. Akin to this there are a 
few sections of the thesis which provide detailed descriptions of events and processes of 
change within the Party during the 1980s. On their own terms these sections serve the 
purpose of providing important historical accounts of areas not covered in the existing 
literature and of providing a firm context for more analytical points. At certain points, these 
sections serve their own purpose in illustrating an analytical point. Of course, in this sense 
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they also provide the source for the discovery of further causes and effects of the 
transformation not recognised in the existing literature. 
However, they are also akin, in a more limited way, to Minkin's attention to detail and the 
sense of the complexity of actual day-to-day change that this can inspire in the reader. 
Although, one could not claim that this approach is unique to a work specifically searching for 
complexity (in the way that multiplication is, for example), it is worth mentioning that in a 
broader theoretical and analytical context, these sections do aid this search for complexity. 
By using these methods we nudge ourselves and the reader towards a realisation that the 
distinction between the above three categories are themselves problematic simplifications. As 
it becomes clear that anyone factor is a constantly remodified modifier, its integrity, both as a 
useful aggregate of many other interactions and factors and as a factor itself distinct from 
others, breaks down. It becomes clear that any set of distinctions or categories is one flux, a 
permanent change within one larger complex inter-retroactive context. If this thesis can begin 
to get across the sense of that context then it will have achieved its tactical aim 11. 
However, I have still had to undertake a massive simplification in order to provide this 
explanation; in order to remain within the boundaries of the model of analysis preferred by this 
time and space. Each sifting of events and issues, each distinction, each interpretation of 
occurrences does violence to the complexity of our world. It leaves one feeling that those 
1'Once again Zen appears apposite here, since one of the prime goals of the Zen approach is the rejection of all 
dualities· the recognition that all categories and distinctions fail understanding. Zen has, for example. been 
described as thinking without concepts. 
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physicists who suspect that there can be no better model of the universe than the universe 
itself (poundstone 1987) have understood something profound. Maybe, in a similar vein, there 
can be no better model of our political world than that world itself. But these are 
considerations for the final chapter of this thesis: first, the explanation, then we can 
acknowledge its simplicity. 
PART II 
LABOUR'S TRANSFORMATION 
1983 -1989 
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THE EARLY DAYS OF THE LEADERSHIP 
This chapter begins the analysis which is inspired by, and will aid, the search for complexity. 
The chapter's main contribution to this search is the effecting of a growth in the quantity of 
perceived causes and effects involved in the transformation of the Labour Party. This is done 
by stretching the temporal and spatial lines of the causal process as defined in chapter two. 
This is relatively easily achieved because, in their attempt to explain the changes in the Party, 
Hughes and Wintour (1990), Smith and Spear (1992), and Heffernan and Marqusee (1992) 
devote the largest portion of their studies to the Party since 1987 - five years after the actual 
election of Neil Kinnock as leader. This may be, in part, the result of the phenomenon, that 
Drucker noted, of analytical interest being primarily directed towards the doctrine of Labour. 
Since the greatest overhaul of paper policy was undertaken after 1987, in the form of the 
Policy Review, an observer taking doctrine as their guide to the nature of the Labour Party 
could be forgiven for thinking that this was the most crucial and profound period of Neil 
Kinnock's leadership and thus the key to explaining the transformation. 
A detraction from the concentration upon this period is Eric Shaw's observation of the need to 
draw 
attention to the largely unnoticed significance of the shift in gear from 
late 1985 ... (n)ot only was much of the 1983 programme cast aside, 
but several of the themes of the Policy Review ... were clearly 
prefigured (1994: xiii). 
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However, the point of the greatest turmoil for Kinnock's leadership, the 1984-1985 period, is 
barely analysed by all analysts. As will be shown in the next chapter, this is a flaw since it is 
this period, probably more than any other, in which the very values of the Party undergo a 
radical metamorphosis. (Values being those non-doctrinal, deeply-felt beliefs about the 
mission of the Party which inform much debate in the 1980s and are held by a very large part, 
possibly all, of the membership.) However, if the 1985-1987 period is only just 
acknowledged, and the 1984-1985 period is hardly noticed, then the eight and a half months 
between the 1983 election defeat and the start of the Miner's Strike have been almost totally 
ignored. 
This is a serious omission, for a close study of this brief space of time shows that it provided 
its own significant contribution to the transformation of the Party. This contribution included 
the following factors. Debates and developments during the leadership contest of 1983 
prefigured and inspired many of the changes that came later especially in the realms of Party 
democracy, Party unity and policy reform. The election of the 'dream ticket' placed in power 
two figures committed to reform and established a 'core leadership' that became one of the 
main agents of transformation. This contrasts with existing literature which has not 
appreciated the commitment to reform on the part of the new leadership as early as 1983. It is 
shown how an introspective reforming zeal was already gripping the rue prior to Kinnock's 
leadership and how this coincided with the election of a new group of trade union leaders who 
were to prove central to the success of the transformation process. Changes to the 
campaigning style of Labour from the first day of Kinnock's election show a much earlier and 
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multiple origin for the development of a new electoral strategy than has generally been 
accepted. Various values underwent important processes of change and articulation - the 
latter being the process by which two or more features are modified by the act of being linked 
one to the other by means of argument or action; as was outlined above, articulation plays a 
specific role in the search for complexity. And finally a series of reforming policy initiatives 
were launched in the areas of defence, the EEC, home ownership, unemployment, 
moderating budgetary commitments, accepting aspects of Thatcherite legislation and even 
launching the idea of a policy review. These policy developments have long been ignored by 
existing literature. 
This chapter also makes a number of other points which either differ from or build upon 
existing literature. 
The "mass party approach" to reform of the Party is identified and analysed as an alternative 
to the ultimate form that reform took under Kinnock. This "mass party approach" was highly 
influential on the soft left in the early to mid-eighties and had a complex relationship to 
Kinnock's own agenda involving both aspects of conflict, some commonality and, 
importantly, increasing articulation of the two approaches. This mass party approach, its 
nature and its relationship to the soft left and to Kinnock's reforms is not identified or 
analysed anywhere else in the existing literature. 
The chapter also indicates and explores the importance of the non-doctrinal aspects of the 
new campaigning style of the Party - aspects which are based less upon the calculated 
response of the core leadership (a feature of key explanatory importance to the existing 
literature - see chapter three) and more upon values and their appeal. In particular, it is shown 
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how the hard-nosed professionalism and business-like approach of the new campaigning style 
appealed to younger members of the Party leadership who had been embarrassed by the 
amateurism of the 1983 campaign and were frustrated by the complacency of older figures. It 
is also shown, in this context, how the mass party approach held a similar non-doctrinal 
appeal to the soft left in its emphasis upon radical grass roots activity and single-issue 
campaigns. 
All of these empirical findings aid the search for complexity. By identifying an earlier starting-
point for the transformation, this chapter highlights a whole range of causes of that 
transformation which have previously been ignored, as can be seen above. Furthermore, these 
causes are dealt with on their own terms - they are not reduced to one other over-arching 
causal process. This chapter also makes a start in showing the complex, inter-retroaction 
between different elements in the transformation. (Inter-retroaction is the notion that causal 
processes are made up of a circular relationship between the posited cause and the posited 
effect - the retroaction - and that this process is itself modified, again in circular fashion, by 
other, apparently distinct, causal processes.) This is particularly the case with the relationship 
between the new campaigning approach, the overall reform process favoured by Kinnock, and 
the mass party approach influential on the soft. In this context, the concepts of articulation 
and negative identity construction are introduced. (To recap - negative identity construction is 
the notion that identities are developed through opposition to other identities - as was 
outlined in chapter three, this has certain connotations within the context of the search for 
complexity) We also see the introduction of values in the form of vote maximisation and in 
some other more minor aspects such as Kinnock's personal appeal to the Party - as was 
pointed-out in previous chapters these values indicate a level of complexity and fluidity in the 
, 
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beliefs of Party members and the interaction of those beliefs throughout the Party not 
indicated by the simpler, more doctrinal methods used in existing literature. 
Overall, what is presented here is a transformation process that has earlier, more diverse and 
more convoluted roots than is presented in some of the existing literature with its emphasis 
upon rational response by the Party leadership to electoral and/or internal Party problems in 
the mid-eighties. 
TilE LEADERSHIP CONTEST: EARLY ORIGINS OF TIlE TRANSFORMATION 
AGENDA 
The leadership contest, which ultimately brought Neil Kinnock to power, established a series 
of debates within the Party - specifically about unity, party democracy and policy reform - that 
would make a major contribution to the transformation. The contest, being a period in which 
differences and internal debate are accepted as appropriate, provided a space within which 
issues could be raised which set the tone for future changes in the Party. It would also begin 
the development of new values, particularly the vaguer notions about being modem and 
forward-looking, that were to be an important feature of the transformation to come. 
Furthermore, study of the contest displays that support for some aspects of the coming 
transformation already existed. This in itself suggests multi-causality for if existing analysts 
are right in locating some causes of change in the 1985 - 1987 period, then earlier signs of 
support for reform suggest further causes which have been unaccounted for. These further 
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causes will be analysed more fully in chapter five when the early existence of support for 
reform has been established. 
Party Democracy 
The battle for the leader's post was never, in reality, about the post of leader itself. It was 
clear from the earliest days that Neil Kinnock was a practical certainty (Curran 1983a~ Minkin 
1991: 344-5). The most obvious reason for this was the fact that Kinnock had received the 
personal backing of a group of union leaders, whose combined block vote made up over 40% 
of the trade unions' section of the electoral college. These unions included the TGWU, the 
NUR, NUPE, the NUM, the uew, the POEU, Sogat '82 and the ASTMS (Curran 1983a~ 
The Times, 13 July 1983). 
From the earliest days, therefore, the issue of democracy in the Labour Party was to be a 
central theme of the leadership contest. The fact that a candidate could so dominate the 
contest generated a great deal of concern. Unsurprisingly, it was Neil Kinnock's deflated 
opponents - Roy Hattersley, Peter Shore and Eric Heffer - who displayed this concern most 
emphatically. The echoes of this debate, particularly in the disputes over OMOV and 
Kinnock's authoritarianism (see chapter six), continued throughout Kinnock's leadership and 
clearly became an important feature of the transformation. 
However, it was the question of the union's vote in the electoral college that really exercised 
the passions over democracy in the Party during the contest. As far back as mid-February 
Shore and Hattersley had announced they were planning to launch a campaign for greater 
direct democracy in the election of leader and deputy leader and for selection of parliamentary 
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candidates (The Guardian, 11 February 1983; The Times, 11 February 1983). Shore and 
Hattersley did their best to keep up the pressure throughout the contest itself by publicly 
calling for unions to use either a full ballot of union members or the widest possible 
consultation process (Labour Weeldy, 24 June 1983). This pressure also included a motion to 
the PLP from Austin Mitchell, a close supporter of Hattersley, calling on the CLPs and trade 
unions to follow the good practice of the parliamentary party by using a full ballot. The 
motion caused a bitter row between Foot and Hattersley at the PLP meeting where it was 
discussed - the leader refused to support Mitchell's proposal despite the fact that it already 
had the backing of the Shadow Cabinet (Labour Weekly, 29 July 1983; The Guardian, 23 July 
1983). 
In most cases the pleas for more direct democracy had no effect. The only major union to 
hold a ballot of its members was NUPE, while a union that might have been expected to 
support Hatterstey with a block vote of over 200,000, the EETPU, took the unhelpful 
decision (from Hattersley's point of view) to boycott the contest altogether on the grounds 
that it was undemocratic (The Times, 14 July 1983). Following this gesture an EETPU 
motion at the 1983 Conference that called for use of one member, one vote in Leadership 
elections was easily defeated (The Labour Party 1983a: 272). 
However, demands for a democratisation of the Party were also coming from other quarters 
and in different forms. The high-profile Labour MP for Birmingham-Perry Barr, Jeff Rooker, 
had proposed an amendment to the Government's Trade Union Bill which was working its 
way through Parliament. Rooker demanded that union consultation of levy-payers and the 
breaking-up of the block vote to enhance proportionality should be enshrined in law (The 
Guardian, 1 September 1983; The Times, 1 September 1983). Heifer, contrary to much of the 
133 
radical wing who were giving him their support in the contest, backed Rooker's bill and 
actually went further, demanding that CLPs should ballot members, that the CLP block vote 
be replaced by a proportional system and that constituency parties be given more weight in 
the electoral college at the expense of the unions (Heifer 1983a). 
In addition to this, there was growing support for the use of OMOV in candidate selection at 
a grassroots level during 1983. Especially in the Labour Co-ordinating Committee, many of 
whose members were increasingly influenced by the mass party ideal (see below), there was 
an active debate about the benefits or otherwise of an OMOV-type reform. The origins of the 
LCC in the radical democratic ideals of the left of the 1960s and 1970s inspired a number of 
the group's executive members to feel that OMOV was a logical extension of the campaign 
for mandatory reselection and the use of the electoral college for leadership elections 
(Interview with Stanley 1994). However, in 1983 the LCC still had close although faltering 
links to the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy - which had led the demands for the 
above constitutional reforms. The CLPD had an increasingly Bennite tinge and were opposed 
to OMOV on the grounds that it could reduce the influence of the unions, lessen debate in 
CLPs and allow the media to influence internal Party matters. Many active in the LCe and on 
the group's executive agreed with the CLPD's viewpoint (Interview with Gilby 1994~ 
Interview with Stanley 1994). Thus, even though there was a developing body of support for 
OMOV at the grassroots, it was largely tacit at this stage for fear that an open debate would 
cause division - a consideration that was to cause problems for the new leader a year later at 
the 1984 conference (see chapter six). 
These developments display that debate about Party democratisation was well-underway even 
before Kinnock was elected. It also shows that some early demands were considerably more 
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radical than anything Neil Kinnock attempted to achieve. The debate about internal 
democracy brought the issue out into the open. The electoral college, which had been 
regarded by the radical wing as such a major democratic step forward, seemed to have made 
little difference with regards to the influence of backroom deals. As a result, the role of the 
union leaders and their block vote at all levels of the Party was brought to popular attention 
and sparked-off a dispute that was to last throughout Kinnock's leadership and lead to both 
failed and partially successful attempts at reform in 1984 and in the late 1980s which 
themselves had effects upon other aspects of the transformation (see chapter six and chapter 
nine). 
While the leadership contest is dealt with by the existing literature - Heffernan & Marqusee 
(1992: 36-43) provide the most detail - none have displayed the role of this important debate 
Over internal democracy both for the contest itself and as an early cause of further change in 
later years. 
Party Unity 
A common occurrence between 1983 and 1989 were the appeals for unity from many 
different figures within the Party. In particular, it became an accepted principle of the drive for 
electoral support and one of its associated strategies (outlined in more detail below as the 
"active vote maximisation value" and the "New Strategic Thinking") that a Party which was 
perceived to be disunited lost votes. Furthermore, it has been observed by analysts (Hughes & 
Wmtour 1990; Smith 1992a; Shaw 1994) that many radicals in the Party accepted a "self-
denying ordinance" (Smith 1992a: 12) on opposing Kinnock in order to fulfil this value of 
unity. Although, the following chapters will attempt to show that this was only one cause of 
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the transformation, over-emphasised by existing analyses, discovery of similar, earlier calls for 
unity during the leadership contest stretch the temporal line of cause for this aspect of the 
transformation and thus, once again, complexify our understanding. 
Much of the leadership contest was punctuated with demands for greater Party solidarity. In 
particular, David Basnett, General Secretary of the GMBATU, called upon the candidates in 
the contest to stop attacking each other on the grounds that this was increasing division (The 
Guardian, 26 July; The Times, 26 July 1983). This was a comment directed specifically at 
Meacher and Hattersley who were conducting a particularly vituperative campaign against 
one another for the deputy leadership. Kinnock, himself, responded to Basnett's plea by 
asserting that the Labour Party must be unified in future (The Guardian, 25 July 1983; The 
Times, 27 July 1983). 
However, debate about how best to achieve Party unity centred most explicitly upon the idea 
of the "dream ticket". This was the notion that a "balanced" ticket of Roy Hattersley from the 
moderate wing, and Neil Kinnock from the radical wing, would bring the Party together 
behind a new leadership made-up of these two figures. 
Although neither partner in the "dream ticket" explicitly used the phrase to boost their 
campaign, they did consciously attempt to enhance the powerful appeal of the idea in public. 
During an interview on the BBC's World at One, Kinnock denied that there were any big 
differences between him and Roy Hattersley thus strengthening the bond of the "dream ticket" 
whilst also attempting to enhance his appeal to the moderate wing. Nevertheless, maybe with 
an eye on his radical support but apparently blind to the inherent contradictions, he went on to 
say on the same programme that there were no alternatives to the 1983 manifesto policy on 
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the economy and that he supported unilateral disarmament (The Guardian, 19 July 1983; The 
Times, 19 July 1983). This 'dream ticket' appeal was bolstered behind the scenes by co-
operation between Kinnock and Hattersley despite claims by the former that he was not 
engaged in such co-operation (See, for example, Tribune,S August 1983). Both agreed not to 
condemn each other in public and Kinnock secretly lobbied on Hattersley's behalf within the 
trades unions (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
However, the 'dream ticket' approach to unity was condemned most forcefully by Michael 
Meacher and his supporters. Meacher's campaign tried to present the Kinnock-Hattersley 
partnership as a re-run of the many previous attempts to unite the party around leaders from 
either ends of the Labour spectrum. The historical precedents, he argued, had all been failures: 
Harold Wilson and George Brown, Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins, James Callaghan and 
Michael Foot and, most disastrously, Michael Foot and Denis Healey. These "partnerships" 
that were designed to unite the party had, in fact, ended in rivalry and alternative points of 
leadership. For Meacher, unity was more likely if a "sensible" leadership of the left was 
constructed that reflected the real politics of Labour Party members and would not attempt to 
"steamroll" the right (The Guardian, 11 August 1983; The Times, 11 August 1983). Tribune, 
edited by Meacher-supporting Chris Mullin, took up this theme in an editorial headed "The 
Nightmare Ticket": 
... the dream ticket is a recipe for disaster. It would merely serve notice 
that the Labour Party is unable or unwilling to resolve the bitter 
ideological dispute that has rent it for the last five years ... It would 
mean that Labour went in to another election with one leader who 
favoured the retention of nuclear weapons and one who proposed to 
abolish them. To imagine that such a fundamental difference of opinion 
could somehow be negotiated away is a monumental slur on the 
integrity of both men (Tribune, 24 June 1983). 
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Through this debate during the leadership contest the issue of Party unity, which developed 
into a matter of prime concern, became a popular expectation of the new leadership. While, as 
Meacher's criticisms made clear, previous leaderships had faced similar expectations, this time 
the issue was all the more intense because of the 1983 defeat. Following that election, unity 
had become a question of survival and the leadership contest allowed expression of this. 
However, as this thesis aims to show it would take more than simply the will for unity to end 
internal division in practice. 
Policy Reform 
Study of the policy debate that occurred during the leadership contest indicates a surprising 
degree of fluidity in the positions of the main candidates and suggest that the contest, once 
again, provided a space within which issues and debates - that were to become key features of 
the transformation - began to develop. 
Defence policy was one area that came in for the attention of reformers. However, it was not 
Kinnock who was the origin of a softening on unilateralism but Meacher. While Kinnock 
consistently reasserted his commitment to an unrepentant unilateral policy (see for example, 
Hattersley et al. 1983), Meacher announced that he felt a Labour Government should carry-
out a referendum on disarmament before any government action was taken. Hattersley 
(Hattersley & Mullin 1983) and Shore (Hattersley et al. 1983; The Guardian, 2 August 1983) 
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remained hostile to any policy of unilateral disarmament whilst Heffer emphasised the need for 
a Pan-European policy against nuclear weapons with the UK remaining in NATO whilst 
working towards the dissolution of both the Western military bloc and the Warsaw Pact 
(HefTer 1983b). 
Similarly, a shift in policy on the EEe was already underway by the time of the General 
Election. The issue had been one of the "golden sentences" in the 1983 election manifesto that 
it was hoped would manage to unite Foot and Healey and their respective supporters. As 
such, the Party's policy on Europe during the campaign for the leadership was officially for 
withdrawal from the EEe but on "amicable" and negotiated terms (Labour Party 1983b: 33). 
So the scene was already set for the candidates to shift further on a policy that had become 
increasingly discredited both inside and outside the Party. Only Shore remained hostile to 
British membership and the political trajectory of the EEe (Hattersley et al. 1983). Whereas 
Kinnock (The Times, 1 August 1983) and Hattersley (Hattersley & Mullin 1983) admitted 
that the policy should be dropped - clearly more of a shift for Kinnock than for Hattersley. 
While Heffer took an ambiguous line arguing that: 
... whether we like it or not we have a Tory government which will 
keep us in the EEe, and unfortunately it is a government that is likely 
to last its full term. Whilst at the end of that time it may still be 
necessary to say that the only answer for Britain is to withdraw from 
the EEe, in the meantime we should now develop policies in agreement 
and association with the other socialist parties and trade unionists in the 
EEe - and go and fight for them (Hattersley et al. 1983: 13). 
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Meacher backed the 'Out of Crisis' proposal developed by Stuart Holland which had outlined 
an alternative, socialist form of pan-european unity (Labour Weekly, 16 September 1983). 
It was Hattersley, along with Shore, who made the running on the issue of Labour policy in 
general and prefigured the Policy Review by five years. From early in the campaign Shore 
called for a radical overhaul of policy, stating that: 
The Labour Party has become dangerously introverted; its message 
blurred and confused; its public face often unattractive; in many areas 
and on many issues out of touch with the electorate (Shore 1983). 
While Hattersley called for Labour to undertake a period of policy examination alongside a 
"careful reappraisal" of the policy-making process itself so that Labour could 
become again the party that represents the hopes and aspirations of our 
traditional supporters (Labour Weekly, 1 July 1983). 
Kinnock, Meacher and Heffer all tended to prescribe less radical solutions to Labour's 
programme but still suggested some type of reform usually in the form of clarifications and 
improved presentation for existing policy. As Kinnock himself said in the televised leadership 
debate: 
To those people who believe our policies should be discarded in large 
part or in whole, I offer the advice of Bernard Shaw - 'If your face is 
dirty, wash it. Don't cut your head off' (The Times, 1 August 1983). 
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Whatever, the different degrees of reform demanded by the candidates, it was clear that the 
necessity of some sort of reforming process was accepted by all before Kinnock and 
Hattersley were elected. As with the other issues covered here, the leadership contest 
provided the forum within which these notions could be aired and thus started the process of 
transformation itself. 
As with the issue of internal democracy, the existing literature fails to identify the role that 
detailed policy debate played in the leadership contest and thus fails to notice the important 
role the contest played in providing the space for less inhibited discussion of issues which 
were to become so central to the overall transformation. In this context, it is instructive that, 
as the rest of this chapter shows, that Kinnock followed the contests with a series of bold 
moves to expedite the process of policy reform. 
Kinnock's Appeal 
A further feature of the transformation that was presaged in the leadership contest was a 
complex articulation ofa value of Labour movement tradition with a value of modernity. This 
articulation was embodied, more than anywhere else at this time, in the person of Neil 
Kinnock himself. An embodiment which not only enhanced his appeal but set the tone for 
future change. 
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His youth provided a sense of a fresh start; the idea of a young leader appealed to a sense in 
the Party that it needed to be more forward-looking and yet his strong roots in the unions and 
his inheritance of the Bevanite mantle as a great orator meant he also had the aura of the 
proud traditions of working-class politics (Interview with Mortimer 1994; Interview with 
Davies 1994). As John Edmonds put it 
He combined the quality of youth with something of the timeless 
quality that Michael Foot had and, of course, he had Michael Foot's 
considerable endorsement. ... He was regarded also as exciting and of 
the modem age in a way that Michael obviously wasn't (Interview with 
Edmonds 1994). 
More concretely, his youth and his radical politics in the 1970s also meant that he had not 
been tainted by the failed Labour governments of 1974-1979 (Interview with Davies 1994; 
Interview with Edmonds 1994). He was also a very high profile figure having made regular 
television appearances, having attracted press attention as a young left-wing 'firebrand' and 
having campaigned hard within the Party to win a place on the NEC (Interview with Davies 
1994; Interview with Edmonds 1994). 
However, as was pointed out above it was the support of the union leaderships that gave 
Kinnock such an advantage in the contest. His popularity here resulted from all the above 
considerations but also from the fact that he was regarded within the union movement as 
SOmeone who would break away from the Wilson/Callaghan tradition of seeing the unions as 
bodies to be managed and fixed. It was also felt that he was committed to maintaining the 
historic link between union and party at constituency level. In effect he had let the unions 
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know that he would take them seriously and this alone commanded great respect and support. 
In particular because of this respect he won powerful backing and thus "substantial lobbying" 
on his behalf from Clive Jenkins (Interview with Edmonds 1994). 
In many senses, therefore, Kinnock's appeal during the contest and after resided in his ability 
to combine electoral appeal and radical reform, modernity and tradition, youth and timeless 
Labour values. Aware that he stood at this potent intersection of Labour's various value'S, he 
presented himself as the candidate with a vision that did not make the mistakes of old or new 
extremisms but instead offered a radical third way vision. The candidate commented in an 
article with the significant title 'Past Principles~ Future View': 
Democratic Socialism cannot be re-established on the basis of either 
the old social democracy or on the "new" ultra-leftism. Nor can it be 
constructed on an amalgam of the two, any more than a wit can be 
fashioned from two half-wits. A soft left is needed; separate and 
distinct from the stale vanguardism of the ultra-left and from the 
atavistic and timid premise of social democracy (Kinnock 1983a). 
Thus, the image and value embodied in Kinnock developed during the contest was an 
important feature of the transformation, communicating a willingness to carry-out the 
necessary modernisations for the sake of electoral success while simultaneously affirming the 
grand traditions and goals of the Labour movement. As will be explored in much greater 
detail below, an important cause, aspect and effect of the transformation was this articulation 
of traditional beliefs of Labourism to a new professional, reforming value characteristic of the 
core leadership. 
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The leadership contest of 1983 was the earliest indication that a major transformation of the 
Party was possible. This brief study of the contest indicates earlier origins of the 
transformation. It multiplies and complexities our explanation of that transformation. The 
contest launched debates, foregrounded a new emphasis on unity and started the construction 
of the unique articulation of old and new that became characteristic of Kinnock's leadership 
and provided it with a persuasive element which was to be a significant feature of the 
transformation. This stands in stark contrast to the existing literature where the leadership 
contest is either dealt with very sketchily or is approached largely from the angle of the 
political machinations which occurred to enable the final outcome (Heffernan & Marqusee 
1992: 36-43~ Hughes & Wintour 1990: 6-7~ Shaw 1994: 29~ Seyd 1987: 166). The contest 
was also the precursor to another factor that was similarly one of the multiple causes and 
effects of the transformation: the election of the 'dream ticket' itself. 
TilE ELECTION OF TilE 'DREAM TICKET' 
In the sense that the tacit partnership of Hattersley and Kinnock had come to symbolise a new 
spirit of unity, and largely through Hattersley initially, the goal of reform, the election of the 
'dream ticket' was itself a major aspect of the transformation. The victory symbolised a break 
with the past and this, in itself, encouraged a greater receptiveness to change. The New 
Statesman, for example, recognised a different atmosphere at conference, a strong sense of a 
fresh start which "positively radiated comradliness" (The New Statesman, 7th October 1983). 
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However, the election also became a cause of further transformation in a number of other 
ways. 
Firstly, the high level of support won by the 'dream ticket' in all sections of the electoral 
college surprised many and thus promoted the notion that the demand for change was greater 
than had been realised. Hattersley scored a massive victory over Meacher for the deputy 
leadership post, gaining just over 67% of the electoral college compared to the latter's 
27.886% (Labour Party 1983a: 29). Hattersley practically swept the board in the union and 
PLP section although the result was far closer in the CLPs (Labour Party 1983a: 29). But 
even in this final section the fact that Hattersley achieved the greatest number of votes was a 
surprise considering that the CLPs had shown themselves to be solidly behind Tony Benn's bid 
for the Deputy Leadership in 1981 and that some had expected Meacher to win 75% of the 
constituency section (Tribune, 5 August 1983). While in the leadership post itself, Kinnock 
won 71.272% of the electoral college against 19.288% for Hattersley, 6.303% for Heifer, and 
3.13 7% for Shore; Kinnock also gained a healthy majority in each section of the college 
(Labour Party 1983a; 29). Thus the extent of the victory only served to promote the notion 
that the time was ripe for change. 
Secondly, the election ofKinnock himself was a cause of transformation. This was so not only 
in the sense that he had come to represent the new approach of modernisation but also in the 
sense that he harboured, even at this early stage, plans of major reform. 
It has been generally accepted that Kinnock's personal role in the transformation of Labour 
was, in part, based upon his own gradual conversion to the cause of reform over the years 
following his election as leader. Hughes and Wintour (1990) see the 1987 defeat as the 
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personal turning-point for Kinnock, while Shaw (1994) identifies the 1985 conference as the 
point from which Kinnock went on the offensive over Party reform. Even Heffernan and 
Marqusee (1992) who portray Kinnock as a first-class betrayer of his radical roots suggest 
that his transformation into a reforming leader was a gradual evolution: 
Kinnock did not become leader with a comprehensive and conscious 
strategy for turning the Party to the right. What came to be known as 
"Kinnockism" emerged, haltingly, out of a confluence of pressures and 
counter-pressures (Heffernan and Marqusee 1992~ 43). 
However, while all these authors are right to indicate the gradual way in which Kinnockism 
developed, this was a result of the fact that the Party itself was undergoing a painful 
evolutionary development during the 1980s and that a huge variety of complex interactions 
were taking place as part of this slow process of transformation. Kinnock himself, on the 
othe~ hand, along with a handful of his closest associates, was clear from the beginning about 
the depth of the change he wished to undertake: 
... the purpose of running (for the leadership) ... was to secure changes 
in policy, in discipline but most basically in the mind-set in the 
character of the Party as it existed in 1983. Or perhaps it's more 
accurate to say as it appeared to exist - because the huge majority of 
the membership of the Party was as sane and related to reality as it ever 
was. But we'd been through the "cultural revolution" as it were and so 
a lot of that had to be changed (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
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However, the new leader was aware that he could not at that point announce a radical 
overhaul of the Party. He has stated: 
Without long preparation and a variety of actions to push and persuade 
people and organisations into changed positions, the status quo - or 
something worse than that - would have prevailed (Kinnock 1994b). 
Kinnock was constrained by the power of the Bennite wing which still had a number of 
adherents on the NEC, at conference and amongst union leaderships. Furthermore, even those 
who would ultimately come to support him still remained to be convinced that major reform 
was viable or necessary; individuals such as David Blunkett, Michael Meacher and Robin 
Cook, whose process of conversion to wholesale reform was to be halting and gradual. This 
was displayed clearly in the results of the leadership, NEC and Shadow Cabinet elections of 
1983. Splits and uncertain political balances remained. 
The leadership election showed that a split between the PLP and the CLPs still existed - with 
142 out of 209 MPs voting differently to their constituencies (The Times, 5 October 1983); 
support for Hattersley as Leader by the parliamentarians being the most common difference 
between the two blocs. It also became common knowledge, that the new Leader had achieved 
an incredibly low vote from the members of the outgoing Shadow Cabinet (The Guardian, 4 
October 1983; The Times, 4 October 1983). A clear sign that he had yet to win the backing of 
the most senior and powerful figures within the PLP. 
Indeed of the fifteen MPs elected to the new Shadow Cabinet in October, only five had voted 
for KiMOCk, while nine had voted for Shore or Hattersley (Eric Heifer having voted for 
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himself). Furthermore, none of the five who won the most votes in the Shadow Cabinet 
elections had voted for the eventual leadership contest victor. As such, Kinnock's hands were 
largely tied in relation to his front bench appointments: he did have the benefit of being able to 
choose well-established parliamentarians and front-bench figures for all the senior posts in the 
Shadow Cabinet (Interview with Kinnock 1994a) but none of these had voted for him as 
leader. So, although the younger and more radical figures of Robin Cook, John Prescott and 
Michael Meacher (all of whom had in fact voted for Kinnock) won a place on the front bench, 
the weighty portfolios of Shadow Chancellor, Trade and Industry, Home Affairs, Foreign 
Affairs, Employment and Defence went respectively to Roy Hattersley, Peter Shore, Gerald 
Kaufinan, Denis Healey, John Smith and Jon Silkin. Prescott had in fact won sixth place 
above Jon Silkin but he had to settle for the transport portfolio (Labour Party 1983a: 346-
350~ The Guardian, 1 November 1983~ The Times, 1 November 1983). 
The Shadow Cabinet elections also reaffirmed the split between the PLP and CLPs, which had 
been highlighted in the leadership contest. While Gerald Kaufinan, Giles Radice, John Smith, 
and Barry Jones were elected safely to the front bench, they all failed, by a wide margin, to 
win seats on the constituency section of the NEC. From the radical wing of the Party Jo 
Richardson, who gained great CLP backing in the NEC elections - 321,000 votes - achieved 
only 56 votes from the MPs in the Shadow Cabinet elections (The Labour Party 1983 a: 99-
100~ The Guardian, 1 November 1983~ The Times, 1 November 1983). Tribune dedicated an 
editorial to the topic and, while partly blaming the Campaign and 
Tribune Groups' failure to agree joint slates for the radicals' poor performance in the Shadow 
Cabinet elections, attacked the PLP as a whole, stating that: 
The overwhelming message of the elections ... is that as far as 
the Parliamentary Labour Party is concerned, it is business as 
usual. Neil Kinnock faces exactly the same problems as Michael 
Foot. The PLP will continue as it has done for the past four 
years of opposition to ignore the wishes of the party in the 
country (Tribune, 4 November 1983). 
Despite the differences between the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet elections, the former, 
which occur only three and a half weeks before the latter, did not produce a certain political 
balance. Neither the radical wing nor the revisionists could claim to have captured an 
outright majority on Kinnock's first NEC. Nigel Williamson, soon to replace Chris Mullin as 
Editor of Tribune, estimated that left and right had twelve votes each (Williamson 1983)12. 
12 However, such assessments were almost always immediately redundant as the definitions of left and 
right and the affiliations of various individuals were to become so much more complex over the next 
few years. The problems in making such assessments at this stage in the transformation is one of the 
first indications that understanding Labour's development as primarily the result of a battle between 
left and right is a simplified analysis. As was suggested in chapter three, the affiliations of different 
individuals and groups within the Party is better characterised as individual examples of positions on a 
variety of spectra which constantly transect one another. To put it another way labelling various 
individuals or groups as 'left' 'hard left', 'soft left' and 'right' does not adequately indicate the diversity 
of opinions held by such individuals or groups who may fall under the same label. However, the 
problem for any analyst of this period is that the cogency of the left and the right was actually in the 
process of collapse and as such the notion of a simple left-right spectrum gradually becomes less valid 
and as such cannot be rejected completely especially for the earlier years under consideration. As a 
result, as the reader may have noticed, I have opted for a terminological halfway-house having 
employed the less than perfect alternatives of "moderate' and 'Bennite'fradical'. These labels must be 
understood as narrowly as possible to indicate broad attitudes to the most general policy direction of 
the Party with Bennites opting for a more ambitious, radical socialist agenda and moderates preferring 
instead a more limited, mixed economy approach. Those active within one of these wings certainly did 
not always agree with each other over matters such as internal reforms, race, Militant, women's rights, 
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Thus, despite Kinnock's plans he clearly saw that the uncertain political balance on the NEC 
and the broader "mind-set" of the Party would mean his ambitious reform project would have 
to be incremental and strategic. 
As a result, Kinnock's grander plans were kept quiet, to be gradually unleashed as and when 
the opportunity presented itself. In the meantime he had to be happy with a small coterie of 
confidantes. Kinnock commented 
... some of the agenda could be announced, some of it couldn't be 
announced because it would have shattered everything. So I had my 
own private agenda (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
Kinnock was clearly a man with his own plans, who had learned to keep his own counsel until 
the time was right. He had become over the two years preceding his election a type of free-
floating figure, popular in the CLPs, clearly favoured by the unions, but with no factional 
alliances. Although he was seen as a figure of the radical wing by much of the media, he had 
not been on any slate when elected to the Shadow Cabinet and the NEC (Kinnock 1994a). His 
decision to abstain in the second round vote for Tony Benn's bid for deputy. leader and thus 
and a whole range of other issues which in many ways were just as, if not more important than the 
details of policy. Furthermore, I have used the term 'soft left' to refer broadly to the burgeoning group of 
members who began to search for an alternative policy and strategic approach to that broadly pursued by the 
Bennites/radicals and the moderates. This group's nature, development and identity is explored exhaustively in 
this thesis being one of the most significant causes, aspects and effects of the more general transformation of 
the Party. 
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scupper that candidate's chances had left him irreparably out of favour with that group. As 
James Curran wrote in 1983: 
Only a year ago, he was treated as a near-leper at a mass Tribune rally 
at Labour's annual conference because he was held responsible ... for 
the narrow defeat of Tony Benn (Curran 1983a). 
Similarly, many on the moderate wing of the PLP had little love for Kinnock (see chapter 
eight), regarding his previous associations with the radical wing with suspicion and feeling 
that he was simply not 'up to the job' (Interviews with following: Barron 1994; Edmonds 
1994; Gould 1994; Hain 1994; Haworth 1995). a hostility which had already forced Foot to 
withdraw his decision to appoint Kinnock as employment spokesman (see chapter one). While 
the new 'soft left', that was to become such an important source of support throughout the 
Party for Kinnock was still in the process of development. This free-floating leader never 
gained a firm mooring in any formal or informal organised group of activists or supporters; he 
trusted and admired his closest associates (Interview with Kinnock 1994a), especially those 
who worked in his office but apart from this his distance from any major grouping of the Party 
had begun in 1981 and was never seriously rectified. 
In this context, it is easier to understand how Kinnock could have developed his own views 
about the necessity of reform during the two years prior to his election and kept them largely 
to himself unable and maybe unwilling to share them in any detail with anybody but those he 
trusted most profoundly. 
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Of course, one cannot take Kinnock's own word as proof that he had grand plans of reform 
from the earliest days but within the context of the other evidence presented below of major 
initiatives on campaigning, organisation and policy occurring between October 1983 and 
March 1984 (see below), it would seem probable that he was committed to reform before his 
leadership election. 
The soft left in which the election of the 'dream ticket' promoted change related to the fact 
that the election of the two reform-minded figures to the leadership constructed a group 
within the Party that was to become a focus of change for Labour. This group was the 'core 
leadership' made up principally of Kinnock, Hattersley and Charles Clarke who was appointed 
head of Kinnock's own office. This 'core' was committed to a major overhaul of the Party 
from the earliest days of the leadership. As the leader himself commented, with reference to 
his own private agenda of reform: 
only one or two people knew about it, Charles Clarke pre-eminently 
because he was by far my closest confidante right throughout .... (N)ot 
surprisingly, there was a lot of coincidence there, I quickly discovered, 
with Roy Hattersley's view of affairs (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
As such this core leadership became a major cause of the transformation positioned as it was 
at the heart of contingent political, institutional and ideological developments within the Party. 
Therefore for these reasons, the election of Kinnock alone and the election of Kinnock jointly 
with Hattersley were clearly themselves key causes, aspects and effects of the transformation. 
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It is implicit in the existing literature that the election of the new leadership was significant for 
the transformation but only in the sense that these were the figures who ultimately carried-out 
the transformation. The above has shown, in contrast to this literature, that the election of 
Kinnock and his deputy was a far more significant cause of the transformation, both in 
symbolic and practical political terms, than much of the Party and movement may have 
realised at the time. This also has important implications for the complexity of the 
transformation. By showing that Kinnock had already set himself on the course of radical 
reform, the above places a stronger emphasis upon the more complex Party-wide causal 
processes of transformation rather than the simpler idea of personal move towards acceptance 
of a reform agenda during the 1980s as causes of change. Of course, a further and earlier 
causal factor has also been identified. 
We can also see here a relatively straightforward inter-retroaction. The wish for some sort of 
reform in the Party following the 1983 defeat clearly helped in the election of Kinnock and the 
'dream ticket'. However, it was that election which itself gave a more concrete potential to 
the wish for reform and an actuality to the reform process itself, thus enhancing desire for and 
moves towards reform in the Party. Of course, the growth in such a reforming approach 
strengthened and encouraged the core leadership to embark upon its incremental reform 
project. A move which in itself again enhanced the Party-wide support for reform (see 
conclusion). 
However, we must be aware of the further complexity implied by this inter-retroaction. The 
consistently remodified modifiers involved in this inter-retroactive processes are not solely 
those of reform enhancement. The election of the 'dream ticket' and the inter-retroactive 
boost this gave to reform also provided the context within which conflict and schism were to 
153 
occur between those who supported reform, those who opposed it and those who were 
forming a 'soft left'. This disturbance was to retroact back onto the core leadership and the 
nature of the reforming process itself. Complex interactions which are dealt with below 
especially in chapters five and six. 
TRADE UNION TRANS FORMA TION 
Another central feature of the early days of the new leadership that became a cause, aspect 
and effect of the transformation in the Party was the change and the dispute that occurred 
within the trade union movement over 1983 and into early 1984. 
The reforming project of 'new realism' was sweeping the trade union movement well-before 
the Labour Party began to undergo its own transformation. This was most clearly displayed at 
the ruc congress that met in early September of 1983. Changes to the rules which governed 
the election of ruc General Council enhanced a shift towards 'new realism' on the governing 
body and saw a series of prominent radicals lose their seats (The Guardian, 7 September 
1983; The Times, 7 September 1983). Although the 'new realist' victory was not quite as 
overwhelming as initially thought, the congress did alter policy in a number of areas. It voted 
to end the boycott of talks on industrial relations law with the government (The Guardian, 7 
September 1983; The Times, 7 September 1983), condemned political strikes (The Times, 7 
September 1983), agreed that Polaris should go in multi-lateral negotiations (The Times, 9 
September 1983) and, maybe most significantly, demanded a comprehensive review of ruc 
policy (The Guardian, 8 September 1983; The Times, 7 September 1983). 
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As with the disputes in the Labour Party during 1984 and 1985 (see chapter five), the 'new 
realism' movement developed into a conflict over whether trade unions should continue using 
the strategy of direct action to achieve its goals. 
In particular there was an intense battle at this early stage over whether the TUC should 
support unlawful action taken by the NGA against the Messenger Group of companies based 
in Warrington. Len Murray, the TUC General Secretary only just survived a close vote on the 
issue by the General Council (The Guardian, 15 December 1983), the TGWU ignored the 
decision and reaffirmed its support for the NGA, and the NGA itself split. (The Guardian, 15 
December 1983; The Times, 15 December 1983). 
Similar problems were causing division in Scargill's NUM itself The miners' union was 
already organising an overtime ban that would ultimately escalate into the year-long strike. 
However, support for the ban and for the general approach of the NUM leadership was far 
from unanimous. In the election for General Secretary of the Union, John Walsh, the 
candidate who stood on a ticket of "negotiation not confrontation" came within 3.5% of 
beating Scargill loyalist, Peter Heathfield (The Guardian, 25 January 1984; The Times, 23 
January 1984). 
'New realism' like Kinnockism was defined in opposition to the direct action strategy of 
figures such as Scargill and was seen by its supporters as a strategy of survival. Just as the 
Party was developing a response to the shock of the 1983 defeat, so the trades unions were 
responding to a longer series of shocks that had beset them ever since 1979. According to one 
senior union leader speaking on the causes of 'new realism' 
... it was the recessiol\ it was the attack on trade union values, the fact 
that we were really getting the wrong end of the argument. We were 
arguing in favour of democracy but against the government's particular 
flavour of democracy for the unions and that's not a very easy 
argument to win ... And we took a beating in 81, 82, 83 in terms of 
membership, redundancies everywhere, blue chip companies going 
down day by day - that does go to the soul a bit. So anybody who 
suggested that there had to be a better way than this ... was going to 
get a hearing (Interview with Edmonds 1994). 
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As a result, there was a growing sense of common cause between Kinnock and a new tranche 
of union leaders - figures who would take up their positions over the next two years. Of 
course there were major leaders in the trade unions who were either sceptical or downright 
hostile to the new direction the unions and the Party were taking - most notably Arthur 
Scargill of the NUM but there was a perceptible shift in the political complexion of union 
leaderships. "Opinion formers" (Interview with Mortimer 1994) on the TUC General Council 
who had been at least tolerant of and willing to work with the radical wing of the Party such 
as Jack Jones, Frank Cousins, Hugh Scanlol\ Ted Hurle in the GMBATU, Terry Parry of the 
fire brigades uniOl\ and Doug Grieve of the tobacco workers were coming to the end of their 
working lives in the early eighties and in many cases were being replaced by a new more 
aggressive type of reformer. These people felt they recognised a crisis in the Labour 
movement and saw reform as a matter of urgency if the movement was to be saved. Central to 
this group were Norman Willis of the TUC, 10hn Edmonds of the GMB, Sam McCluskie of 
the NUS, and Alex Kitson of the TGWU (Interviews with the following: Edmonds 1994~ 
Warburton 1995~ Mortimer 1994). It was this mood of crisis combined with a new reforming 
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zeal within the unions that was to provide Kinnock with a greater freedom to change policy 
and organisation than might otherwise have been the case for a leader of the Party in 
opposition. As David Warburton, a senior union officer, has stated: 
... we'd been knocked allover the place by Maggie; we wanted a 
Labour government and this was why Kinnock was given a much freer 
licence. Some trade unions were getting desperate, their membership 
was collapsing because they were one-industry unions. I don't mean 
just the NUM ... Jimmy Knapp could see it in the railway industry, the 
post office unions could see it happening, the civil service unions, the 
teachers. ... So Neil was given much more licence than Callaghan or 
even Wilson (Interview with Warburton 1995). 
This is a view confirmed by John Edmonds who observed that 
... there was avery, very strong feeling - very strong - that we had to 
give Kinnock in policy terms what he wanted ... (Interview with 
Edmonds 1994). 
Thus the shift towards 'new realism' in the trade union movement is not only significant in that 
it indicates the degree to which ideas of moderation and reform had permeated the labour 
movement prior to Kinnock's election. It also provided a vital source of power for Kinnock to 
set about his project of change. In particular, a group of supportive union leaders would be 
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vital if Kinnock was to win the backing of conference by ensuring that the union block vote 
was behind him. However, as is shown in the next chapter, it took the defeat of the Miners' 
Strike to make "new realism" a genuinely dominant force within the trade unions and thus to 
ensure that Kinnock could rely wholly on the support of enough leaders to win conference 
votes. 
Again, as with much of the material presented in this chapter, the existing literature does not 
identify the significance of this early reforming momentum within the ruc for later change 
within the Labour Party. Only Minkin deals with this early phase of 'new realism' in any detail 
but he, understandably considering the focus of his work, understands the election of the 
'dream ticket' as enhancing broader movement unity within this atmosphere of reform 
(Minkin 1991: 136). This in itself raises some interesting inter-retroactive possibilities with the 
move to 'new realism' at the Congress promoting the election of the 'dream ticket' which in 
tum enhances unity which itself provides a more fertile base for further reform both in the 
Party and the unions which thus consolidates and legitimises the thrust of 'new realism' and 
Kinnock's reforms which enhances Kinnock's and reforming union leaders' power and thus 
enhances movement unity and so on. 
TilE NEW STRATEGIC THINKING 
Eric Shaw (1994) has identified a particular approach to campaigning within the Party which 
he calls the 'New Strategic Paradigm' or the 'New Strategic Thinking' and which he sees as 
becoming a dominant strain of thought within the Party leadership and amongst its strategists 
in the Shadow Communications Agency thus promoting major changes in campaigning 
158 
strategy and Party organisation during the 1980s. Shaw characterises this New Strategic 
Thinking as a 
set of interlinked propositions and maxims about the nature of electoral 
conduct, campaigning and communications (1994: 59). 
Shaw describes the New Strategic Thinking as consisting of five main components: a certain 
electoral model which saw electoral appeal relying upon the projection of a trustworthy Party; 
the active projection of an admired leader and policies consonant with the ideas and values of 
the voter; a shift away from grass-roots campaigning to the use of television to transmit 
campaign messages; an appeal based on emotion and image manipulation rather than rational 
persuasion; an attempt to 'sell' the Party's image and policies to the middle-ground, floating 
voter; and an attempt to set the agenda by increasing the saliency of issues such as health and 
education which were regarded as issues 'belonging' to Labour; (1994: 59-62). 
Hughes and Wintour (1990) also identify, in a less rigid way, the development of a higbly-
professionalised, media-oriented style of campaigning in a chapter they entitle "Glitznost". 
Hughes and Wintour see this approach as being the brain-child of Peter Mandelson and his 
Shadow Communications Agency. As such they regard the New Strategic Thinking as 
developing only after 1985 when Mandelson was appointed Director of Campaigns and 
Communications and when the SCA was established. However, a study of the early days of 
the leadership shows that there were certain developments which caused this aspect of the 
transformation well-before 1985 and also displays that the necessary changes in value that 
would make the New Strategic Thinking appealing were already occurring soon after 
Kinnock's election as leader. This stretching of the temporal line once again introduces 
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more causal processes into our explanation of the transformation and thus complexifies our 
approach. This, however, can only be achieved if author and reader are careful to 
acknowledge that the following arguments do not supersede those of Shaw and Hughes and 
Wintour but instead augments them. In this sense, the following does not claim that the 1983-
4 period was the origin of the New Strategic Thinking but that both 1983-4 and 1987 were 
important points of development in the transformation of Labour's campaigning strategy. 
One ofKinnock's first acts as Leader, in fact on the actual day of his election, was to appoint 
Patricia Hewitt as the press and broadcasting assistant in the Leader's office. As General 
Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties, Hewitt had been credited with managing 
to raise the profile of the pressure group with skill and imagination (The Times, 3 October 
1983). Over the years she was to become one of Kinnock's closest aides, ultimately being 
appointed Policy Director, and becoming very closely identified with the spirit and 
development of all the Kinnockite reforms. Her employment was a clear sign that change in 
media relations was firmly on the new leader's agenda. 
Soon after Hewitt's appointment, Vincent Hanna, a senior BBC political correspondent, acted 
as a go-between for Labour and approached John Gau, who had recently left his job as Head 
of Current Affairs at the corporation, and asked if he would be willing to produce Labour's 
party political broadcasts and generally improve its television image (Interview with Gau 
1994). Gau agreed and in those first two years of Kinnock's leadership Gau, Hewitt and the 
Party's Director of Information, Nick Grant, were to set about energetically providing the 
Party with a new approach to broadcasting that was professional and imaginative and in many 
ways bore a close resemblance to the approach of Mandel son and the SCA. 
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Gau insisted that the party political broadcasts be produced with a decent budget, a fully 
professional crew and an experienced and creative director. Gau also resisted the old style of 
broadcast which was based in a studio with two or three leading figures talking straight to 
camera. Instead he persuaded actors and members of the public to provide endorsements for 
the Party. He also tried to improve the Party's respectability by having businessmen and 
women appear in the broadcasts. But it was a measure of how far Labour's image had 
collapsed that most of the Labour-supporting businesspeople that were found by Gau's 
researcher refused to appear for fear of how it might affect the standing of their firms 
(Interview with Gau 1994). 
With his conditions met Gau's first production focused specifically on Neil Kinnock as a new 
leader with youth, affability and authority on his side. Its triumphant style, emphasis on 
Kinnock and soaring musical score made it an influential forerunner of the famous election 
broadcast of 1987 that was directed, on a much larger budget, by Hugh Hudson and which 
has often been regarded as the zenith of the New Strategic Thinking approach. 
Gau also used an union-owned studio to "train" some of the Shadow Cabinet members in 
television manners. The politicians were advised to have a clear message, never be on the 
defensive and to carefully prepare what they planned to say - advice that is now 
commonplace. Ironically, despite the fact that the leader, in the early days of his office, took a 
deep interest in the new campaign work, Kinnock refused to do the training. This was a 
handicap for, as Gau acknowledges, although the new leader had a good television 
personality, he had a very strong tendency to be verbose and thus confuse his message. As 
Gau puts it, Kinnock "never really cracked" television interviewing (Interview with Gau 
1994). 
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The wish for improved campaigning and a more efficient Party organisation also inspired the 
production of an influential paper by a working group of the Labour Co-ordinating 
Committee (LCC 1983a). The paper spoke of the "real urgency about the need to reform and 
modernise the Party" (LCC 1983a: i). It called for a major shift in attitudes towards taking 
campaigning seriously by using a focused strategy that took a leaf out of the Conservative's 
TV-friendly approach. It stated 
We need to be a missionary organisation rather than a conclave of the 
chosen. Everything we do should reflect that (LCC 1983a: 3). 
Most fundamentally the paper called for the establishment of a new seruor committee 
specifically dedicated to campaigning which would devise a medium-term election strategy 
into which all major Party spokesman would be expected to integrate their activities (LCC 
1983a: 2). It also called for a considerable staff and a full-time campaigns officer to support 
and implement the committee's work. These ideas were reflected in a GMBATU motion 
accepted at the 1983 conference. The motion spoke of 
the urgent need to inject a new professionalism into this crucial aspect 
(campaigning) of Party organisation (Labour Party 1983a: 36). 
The union motion stated that such professionalism could be achieved by a detailed analysis of 
demographic, social and political causes of defeat~ a clear statement of policies~ better 
organisation and use of staff~ and the establishment of a campaign committee to conduct 
centrally directed nation-wide campaigns and which would employ professionals in the field 
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(Labour Party 1983a: 36). In an almost identical vein, a motion from the AVEW-TASS called 
for a review of staffing, an increase in the number of Party agents and the establishment of a 
committee made-up of professional media advisors (Labour Party 1983a: 46). Both motions 
were passed on a show of hands (Labour Party 1983 a: 46; 56). 
In contrast, a motion calling for a more traditional nation-wide campaign based upon grass-
roots activity such as demonstrations, rallies, meetings and leaflets (Labour Party 1983a: 39-
40) was lost by 1,114,000 to 5,599,000 votes (46). A sign of the extent of the shift towards 
support for a more professional style of campaigning. 
Although the reforms of staff structures and roles would take two years before they were fully 
implemented, Kinnock took-up the idea of the campaign committee and persuaded the 
October NEC to agree to its establishment as the Campaign Strategy Committee (NEC 2, 26 
October 1983: 8-9). 
The CSC was charged by the executive with the running of all Labour's campaigns, the 
development of campaign strategies and the use of professional skills for media presentation. 
It was also to carry-out a review of the Party's press, publicity, education and campaigning 
organisations. The NEC discussion paper dealing with the establishment of the esc stated 
that the committee would aim to produce 
a campaign strategy designed to rebuild Labour's shattered electoral 
base. Without such a strategy there can be no effective campaigning. 
With the European elections next June, the need to organise is 
imperative. The need for urgent action also applies to the local 
elections next May and in our readiness to effectively fight any by-
elections that might occur (Labour Weekly, 28 October 1983; NEC 
Proposal SEC/291I 0/83). 
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However, unlike the Shadow Communications Agency, which was established three and a half 
years later, this was not a body of professional spin doctors and public relations experts. The 
CSC was made up of the most heavyweight political figures in the Party and the broader 
labour movement. Drawing on the trade unions, the Shadow Cabinet, and the NEC itself, the 
Committee included, amongst others, Moss Evans, David Basnett, Terry Duffy, Roy 
Hattersley, Gerald Kaufinan, David Blunkett, Tom Sawyer and, of course, Kinnock himself 
(The Times, 3 November 1983). 
From the wide-ranging brief and the drafting of such powerful figures on to the body, it was 
clear that the CSC was far more than just another NEe sub-committee. Combined with the 
fact that Healey and Shore, the old war-horses of the moderate wing, were left off the 
Committee in favour of far more junior members of the front bench such as Robin Cook and 
Michael Meacher - it seems that Klnnock was not only keen to gain heavyweight Party and 
trade union backing for his new style but he was also providing an effective movement-wide 
base for his professionalisation of the Party's campaigning that was distinct from the uncertain 
and potentially unstable NEC and from the moderates in the Shadow Cabinet who did not 
trust Kinnock as leader. The committee was also structured in such a way so that no one 
section - NEC, Shadow Cabinet or trade union - could gain a majority on its own and use the 
committee for its own purposes. 
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A further cause, aspect and effect of the new campaigning styles was the Chesterfield by-
election. Like the approach supposedly devised solely by Mandelson, the Chesterfield 
campaign was run along very centralised lines being primarily controlled by a by-election unit 
which had just been established at Walworth Road. Although the candidate was hardly a firm 
supporter of the new leadership (it was, in fact, Tony Benn who had lost his Bristol seat due 
to boundary changes), the unit immediately implemented a new campaigning approach. The 
old strategy, devised by Morgan Phillips, through which Labour attempted to set the agenda 
by holding morning press conferences, was dropped. In response to the recognition that the 
majority of people now received most of their news information through radio and television, 
the emphasis was shifted from providing press stories to the construction of picture and sound 
"bites" which would be more appealing to the broadcasters than a row of talking heads sitting 
behind a desk (The Guardian, 7 February 1984~ The Times, 27 January 1984). This strategy 
also had the added advantage of relying on a medium that was legally obliged to provide, at 
least a semblance of, balanced coverage. This compared with a tabloid press, sections of 
which either worked closely with Conservative Central Office campaigns or struggled with 
each other in an effort to portray the Labour Party in an ever more unfavourable light no 
matter how bizarre and slanderous. 
The triumphant moment in this presentation of a new image through skilful media 
manipulation came when Benn was captured in the full and manipulated glare of the media's 
attention singing along to Denis Healey's accompaniment on a piano in the corner of a 
Chesterfield pub. Not only did the scene cry out for copy praising 'harmonious unity' but the 
atmosphere genuinely seemed to radiate bonhomie and folksy warmth. As Benn noted in his 
diary, they even managed to sing "here we are again, happy as can be, all good pals and jolly 
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good company" (Benn 1992: 337). It was a 'PR coup' of which any stalwart of the Shadow 
Communications Agency could have been proud. 
The widening gap between more traditionalist campaigners and those committed to the New 
Strategic Thinking was also already in evidence during this episode. When it was reported that 
Peter Tatchell (see chapter one) had been told to stay away from Chesterfield. Tony Benn 
immediately quashed the story by announcing that Tatchell was welcome and that he had 
never been told to steer clear of the constituency (The Times, 14 February 1984). Tony Benn 
commented in his diary: 
If I had let that story go unanswered, they would have played the old 
trick - we'll give you a good press if you repudiate your own people. 
. Once the press realise they cannot divide 
you from your own Party, then they stop trying (Benn 1992: 335). 
Benn's approach. was clearly that of success through defiance of an irredeemably hostile 
media, whereas the presiding approach of the New Strategic Thinking was success through 
seduction and manipulation of the press, television and radio. 
The difference in these approaches was highlighted once again immediately after the Tatchell 
event, when Benn, who was angry about the BBC's Newsnight coverage of the by-election, 
described the programme's reporter, Vincent Hanna, as the "SOP candidate for Chesterfield" 
who wanted the Liberal! Alliance candidate to win. Although the issue developed into little 
more than a personal confrontation between Benn and Hanna a week later, Benn reported that 
Walworth Road, and Joyce Gould (director of the by-election unit) in particular, were "sunk 
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in gloom" because Benn had broken "an unspoken alliance between Vincent Hanna and the 
Party officials" (Benn 1992: 335) - an alliance which it seemed had already borne fruit with 
the introduction of John Gau to the Party organisation. Such informal understandings and 
contacts were to become crucial to the campaign staff's ability to put spin on certain events 
and to have their agenda heard but they were hardly the stuff of Tony Benn's approach. 
However, the development of this New Strategic Thinking was only able to win backing and 
influence because it was constructed alongside and in articulation with other developments in 
the values of the Party. A particularly important development in this respect was that which 
occurred in relation to the vote-maximisation value which had a long, established place in the 
Party. This value was the sense that one of Labour's prime goals must be to increase votes 
and thus win power. This value, akin to the electoralism identified by Miliband, Anderson, 
Coates and others (see chapter two), began to take on a particularly active form following the 
defeat of 1983. 
The general election campaign had been a painful experience for many members who had 
faced hostility and embarrassment while canvassing (Interview with Matheson 1994; Interview 
with O'Mara 1994). This humiliation sponsored a sense that Labour must get its campaigning 
act together and actively seek votes by "preaching to the unconverted" as Robin Cook put it 
(Cook 1983). Immediately after the election, this active vote maximisation value underwent a 
process of negative identity construction and influenced a number of leading figures. 
The 'constitutive outside' of this value was the attitude in the Party that Labour only had to 
wait to 'take its turn' in government. Robin Cook wrote: 
It may be a trifle unfair to blame the late Robert MacKenzie for the 
failings of Labour's national campaign but, at bottom, the indifference 
of both its luminaries and activists rested on the assumption that there 
is a pendulum in the political affairs of men. The alternation of 
governments throughout the 1960s and '70's, perfectly symbolized by 
the visual image of the Swingometer, led too many to believe that the 
first law of electoral support was "what goes down, must come up 
again (Cook 1983). 
Kinnock also saw his role as combating such a view: 
I'd started a long time before I was leader .. , saying to people, notably 
those who had been my associates on the left and centre left, "wake-up 
to the realities that we face and stop trying to kid yourself that we are 
going to get 'our tum' in the Parliamentary swing door". Because a lot 
of their attitudes - including those of very reasonable people -
emanated from their assumption that the Tories would win, then 
Labour would get elected next time, then the Tories would be elected 
next time. Of course, it was nonsense. We'd only had one very short 
experience of that in the sixties and seventies ... I just thought that was 
sloppy, innocent, ill-befitting anybody who described themselves as a 
socialist (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
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However, the development of this active vote-maximisation value demanded a strategy for its 
fulfilment. It was in satisfying this demand that the New Strategic Thinking became 
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increasingly influentiaI. However, the articulation between the strategy and the value was far 
from immediate. The main reason for this was that an alternative strategy existed. 
The alternative was commonly known as the 'mass party approach'. It suggested that Labour 
had to build a solid base of support and activists through a combination of internal 
democratisation, forging links with politically active groups and individuals outside the Party 
and campaigning based on a forthright vision. This notion had become particularly popular 
within the Lee and was to be a recurrent theme within the soft left. The idea drew a great 
deal upon the Lee's origins in 'new agenda' values and its related interest in the single-issue 
politics that began to flourish outside the Party in the 1970s (see chapter five and chapter 
seven). An influential pamphlet on the issue, published by the Lee in 1981 stated that 
If the Labour Party is not to remain on the sidelines ... it has to 
acknowledge that these (single issue campaigns) are political struggles 
and act on this. For it is not only the single issue group itself which 
often refuses to see its own political nature. The Labour Party is so 
accustomed to defining politics in terms of party meetings and fighting 
elections that it fails to see the politics going on all around it. Along 
with changes to make our representatives more accountable, we have 
also to become part of all this other politics, we have to become a 
campaigning party and become part of the campaigns which involve so 
many people already (Lee 1981: 10). 
The pamphlet called for a number of specific reforms and changes to facilitate the 
construction of this mass party which would draw in supporters behind Labour. These 
demands included: the forging of closer links between CLPs and "single issue groups"~ 
the establishment of workplace branches~ an increase in the size of the CLP section on 
the NEC~ an increase in the womens section on the NEC and changes to the way it was 
elected~ limitation on the powers of patronage held by the leader~ the use of an electoral . 
college for election of the leader~ CLPs to have a bigger share of votes at conference~ 
and affiliated organisations to have a block vote at conference (8-22). All of these 
reforms were clearly designed to enhance the power and vitality of the grass-roots 
members in the CLPs and to make the Party more attractive to new agenda groups and 
campaigners outside the Party. 
Throughout the 1980s the mass party idea remained potent especially within the soft 
left strand although its nature and demands changed quite radically in response to a 
series of developments (see chapters six and seven). An article in Tribune by Trevor 
Fisher, a member of the LCC Executive in the late 1980s, written six years after the 
mass party pamphlet but referring directly to it, stated that 
Among many socialists, the idea of building alliances as a way 
forward is growing in importance ... People like Bernie Grant 
have been arguing in favour of alliances with disadvantaged 
groups like blacks, women and gays (Fisher 1987). 
However, in line with the mass party strategy, Fisher asserted that such links had to be 
forged alongside a democratisation of the Party's structures and their re-building in areas 
where the Party was weak on the ground. 13 
1~e distinction between this mass party approach of the soft left and that of the Bennite wing might 
not be immediately clear. In fact, one could very well regard this as a goal of that wing· :T. '" .1' 
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The existence of this alternative strategy for the fulfilment of the active vote-maximisation 
value augments the view of those existing analyses which argue that the transformation was 
purely a rational or common-sense process. It upholds and strengthens Shaw's view that any 
decisions about campaigning are never self-evident and are always mediated by other factors. 
It indicates that we cannot understand the transformation as being caused solely by rational 
calculation, for if there are competing strategies which argue strongly that they will also 
enhance votes then we must look to other causal factors to explain why the final approach 
which chosen was chosen. In some sense this is what much of this thesis is about: the 
identification of the other multiple causes, beyond those identified by the existing literature, 
which allowed change to happen in the way it did. 
and to an extent there certainly was an early closeness and cross-fertilisation. illustrated in particular by the 
initial co-operation during Livingstone's administration of the GLC within which the mass party approach 
reached the high-point of its influence. The council used its access to large resources to back single-issue and 
community groups and thus hoped to create firmer links between Labour and the type of politics identified by 
the mass Party pamphlet of 1981 (for a supportive analysis typical of this approach see Wainwright 1987). 
But, as this thesis will show, the distinction between the Beonites and the soft left mass party idealists 
gradually became one of emphasis in three main ways. Firstly, the soft left perspective, increasingly accepting, 
as it was, ofthe notion that new means had to be adopted to achieve radical goals (see chapters five and nine), 
were less emphatic about the need to build popular alliances around rigid policy positions such as support for 
unilateral ism and renationalisation and implacable opposition to the EEC, the market and council house sales. 
This led to acceptance of the New Strategic Thinking approach alongside the mass party approach (see chapter 
six and seven). Secondly, an increasing number on the soft left, felt that any broadening of the Parly's base 
would have to include a reform of trade union power through the adoption of OMOV and reduction of the 
block vote. A move which many on the radical wing firmly opposed andlor felt was the wrong method for 
dcmocratising the Party (see chapter six). And thirdly, many on the soft left had a greater trust in the ability or 
willingness of Kinnock to implement the mass party approach (see, for example, Williamson 1986 and chapter 
Six). 
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The other factors in this case were a series of complex and multiple events over the coming 
years which ensured that the mass party approach gradually withered as an option while the 
New Strategic Thinking strengthened its articulation to the active vote-maximisation value 
and thus enhanced its influence (see chapters five, six and seven) 
However, at this early stage, we can see that both these strategies brought with them values 
which made them particularly attractive. The New Strategic Thinking, as Shaw has pointed 
out, drew directly on the personnel and ideas of the advertising industry and as such it 
developed a value of hard-nosed professionalism, a lack of sentimentality, and a no-nonsense 
business-like approach. This appealed to a number of leading Labour figures, especially the 
younger generation, who were clearly humiliated by the party's amateurism and anachronistic 
style during the 1983 election in the face of the Tories' highly effective campaigning and 
media manipulation. Robin Cook, who was to become one of the most influential political 
figures on campaigning styles and strategies captured the no-nonsense, business-like aspect of 
this value well when he stated that Thatcher's success had made Labour realise that winning 
power was a task that would take a whole Parliament and thus triumphantly declared that "the 
next general election began last Tuesday", the day on which the CSC first met (Cook 1983). 
While the mass party approach appealed to many within the emerging soft left because while it 
was a clear strategic answer to the active vote maximisation value, it also possessed strong 
elements of a commitment to building popular, grass-roots movements for fundamental 
change. In short, the mass party approach still possessed a radical, possibly revolutionary, 
value. And as is detailed in chapter five, many on the soft left came from a background that 
prized such a value. . 
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Thus the active vote-maximisation value implied that Labour actually had to tum outwards 
and actively seek votes. This shift inter-retroacted with the maxims of the New Strategic 
Thinking and, to a lesser extent, the mass party approach. The two strategies offered a style 
and a method of actively seeking votes and thus enhanced the cogency of the shift in the vote-
maximisation value itself, in that the New Strategic Thinking and mass party approach 
transformed the shift from a wish to a practical reality. While the shift in the vote-
maximisation value itself provided the ground upon which the new strategies could take root 
and appear exceptionally salient. An inter-retroaction is clear. The single-mindedness and 
business-like approach of the New Strategic Thinking, in particular, made active vote-
maximisation an unquestioned goal for one influential section of the leadership; this was due, 
no doubt, in part to the fact that the new thinking was transplanted from the world of 
advertising where the end, i.e. selling the product, is never questioned. While such 
enhancement of the importance and potency of active vote-maximisation in tum made the new 
strategies evermore central and influential themselves. As a result, the New Strategic Thinking 
and (in a more limited way) the mass party approach, became extremely closely articulated to 
active vote maximisation in the minds of the core leadership, other leading figures and 
gradually in the minds of many Party members. In effect these developments are exemplars of 
the constant and inseparable processes of symbiotic, causal modification (mentioned in 
chapter two) that occurs between factors linked by articulation. (A link that seems also to 
have been made in the minds of some analysts by identifying active vote maximisation as 
synonymous with the New Strategic Thinking to the point where one follows as a simple, 
rational and common sense consequence of the other - see chapter three.) 
All of this thus displays, firstly, that the modernisation of Labour's campaigns and 
organisation, which was such a central feature of the transformation began to develop in a 
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period well-before 1985 or 1987 and hence is more complex in its development than was 
originally thought. Secondly, it shows that a wide range of causes· from the personal 
appointments made by Kinnock to subtle shifts in the most fundamental values of the Party -
existed to construct the shift towards new campaigning styles and structures. Finally, it has 
shown how the inter-retroactive processes implied by negative identity construction and 
articulation can be brought into our analysis to complexify the explanation of the 
transformation. 
POLICY INITIATIVES 
It has been outlined how the leadership contest launched a series of policy reform debates that 
were to influence the Party throughout its transformation. Consideration of such reform 
intensified in the weeks following Kinnock's election with a number of areas being publicly 
earmarked for change and an actual reform process being begun in others. Alongside 
Kinnock's comments about his own private agenda, these moves indicate that the core 
leadership planned policy reform from its very earliest days. The extent of these plans is also 
upheld by the establishment of a new policy-making process very early in the tenure of the 
Kinnnockite leadership. 
Considering the fact that the abandonment of unilateralism is usually seen as the most radical 
achievement of the Policy Review in 1989, it is interesting, in the context of this chapter, to 
observe the fact that on the day before he was elected leader, Kinnock was already showing 
his softening on the' defence policy. The man who would be leader in only a few hours was 
alone in abstaining in the pre-conference NEC vote on a motion which stated 
that unilateral disarmament by Britain is essential if we are to reclaim 
our national independence and thus acquire the political influence to 
lessen international tension, build a nuclear free zone in Europe, 
strengthen the non-proliferation treaty and ultimately achieve nuclear 
disarmament world-wide (Labour Party 1983a: 150). 
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Despite Kinnock's attempts to have the TGWU proposal remitted, the NEC backed it by 
fourteen votes to eleven (NEC 15,2 October 1983: 5; The Times, 3 October 1983) and the 
motion was ultimately passed by the conference on a show of hands (Labour Party 1983a: 
163). 
However, once he had power Kinnock and his core leadership were in a stronger position to 
make the running on policy reform. 
One of the earliest initiatives was taken by Roy Hattersley who, in a speech to the EETPU 
conference, said that policy areas as wide-ranging as the EEC, defence and home ownership 
could face reform (The Guardian, 9 November 1983; The Times, 9 November 1983). 
By December, only within a month of these interventions, the new leadership was proposing 
ways to unify the policy-making process while also wresting it out of the direct control of 
either the NEC or Shadow Cabinet. A paper drafted by Geoff Bish, head of research at 
Walworth Road, called for the winding-up of the NEC policy committees and their 
replacement by a series of Joint Policy Committees made up of six NEC members, six Shadow 
Cabinet members and selected trade unionists (Bish 1983). The paper also proposed that the 
NEC delegated its overall control of policy to a joint policy co-ordinating committee. 
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Interestingly, considering Hattersley's speech, Bish suggested that the areas the committees 
should review as a matter of priority were council house sales and the EEC (issues which had 
already been matters of concern during the leadership contest). 
These were not minor, uncertain moves. The radical wing realised their importance and in the 
first of many clashes with the new leader condemned these early decisions as attempts to 
divert power from the NEC and towards new bodies made up of moderates. On the 11 th 
November, Tribune devoted a disapproving lead story to this shift and described it as "an 
erosion of accountability to conference" (Tribune, 11 November 1983). One prominent, local 
activist, a firm supporter of Benn interpreted the two moves on policy and campaigning as a 
direct attack on the power of the Bennites at the grassroots whose main voice at national level 
was the NEC and conference: 
... the left were still very much in control in the CLPs and local 
government. So it was clear that Kinnock and his acolytes would do 
what they could to neutralise this influence through organisational and 
mechanical means ... it was quite clear that the changes were 
engineered to remove and nullify any of the force the (local) parties had 
(Interview with King 1994). 
However, these criticisms remained a low grumble as the Party basked in its own and the 
media's warmth towards the new leader. The proposal on . Joint Policy Committees was 
approved by the NEC by mid-December (NEC 4, 14 December 1983: 9). Come early January 
Kinnock's confidence was boosted by new polls and announced 
our recovery in the opinion polls and in council by-elections has been 
substantial - even spectacular in some cases (Kinnock 1984a). 
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The polls were indeed showing that Labour had improved its share of the vote, and by mid-
February a Marplan poll gave Labour a lead of 1% (The Times, 22 February 1984)- slim but 
substantial considering this was the first time the Party had shown any lead since the Falklands 
conflict. 
Buoyed by this, the core leadership intensified the moves towards policy reform that the 
deputy leader had signalled at the EETPU conference. Aware that his project, "Operation 
Destroy Illusions" as he privately called it (Interview with Kinnock 1994a) had to be launched 
with the utmost sensitivity for fear of causing a backlash, Kinnock set about reassuring the 
Party membership on some issues while simultaneously marking other policies for future 
change. In late January, Kinnock announced that he might have to revise the pledge to bring 
unemployment under a million in five years but that he was committed to repealing the 
Government's trade union legislation. And he made more tentative steps towards altering the 
defence policy by stating that he might keep Cruise missiles, as leader of a Labour 
government, if he felt there was a real chance of them being negotiated away in a deal over 
Soviet SS-20 missiles. And although he confirmed that the scrapping of Polaris would remain 
as policy, he stated that cuts in conventional forces were difficult while the Party adhered to a 
non-nuclear policy (The Guardian, 23 January 1984; The Times, 23 January 1984). 
The possibility of a major review of policy was hinted at, in a deliberately low-key way, when 
"Party sources" suggested to the press that commitments to repeal great swathes of Tory 
legislation would over-burden a Labour-led Parliament and leave a Kinnock government with 
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no time for its own positive legislation (The Times 7 February, 1984). Such comments, of 
course, meant that the most complex and ambitious aspects of Tory legislation which Labour 
had planned to repeal - such as that on public ownership, education and local authorities -
might not be totally reversed, consequently implying that Labour's stance on some of these 
issues would have to be moderated; issues that were, of course, very close to the heart of 
many Party members. Kinnock himself has acknowledged this early, tentative attempt to 
launch a reform process: 
To some extent it (early policy reform proposals) was a continuation of 
the view I'd expressed in 80 and 81 about this word 'restoration' of 
public expenditure. The argument that I offered several times in public 
was that if what we said about Thatcher and Thatcherism was true -
that it was as destructive as we said it was ... the resulting realities had 
to be recognised and dealt with. The destruction of the wealth-creating 
base limited our room for manoeuvre and our ability to afford social 
advances. Now, of course, in the meantime I'd said things in interviews 
and elsewhere that sustained the idea of public enterprise and public 
ownership but all the time trying to suggest that we had to recognise 
the size of the bale of cloth that we were going to be presented with 
both in terms of resources and time. I wanted Labour people to stop 
taking what I call the 'magic wand view of politics' which was, to say 
the least, for socialists - who, above all, are supposed to be rationalists 
- eccentric. So it was all part of an argument that I'd been making for 
quite a long time (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
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Later in February, Kinnock moved further from the old policy on the EEC than he had in the 
leadership contest by shifting away from the idea of withdrawal to the aim of reforming the 
Community from within (Kinnock 1984b). This was followed two days later by the low-key 
launching of a moderate alternative budget by Roy Hattersley at his Birmingham-Sparkbrook 
GMC. This deliberately avoided any grand financial commitments and called only for a 
moderate increase in borrowing and spending (The Guardian, 22 February 1984; The Times, 
22 February 1984). 
The policy debates of the leadership contest were now becoming actual policy initiatives. 
Although, at this stage, they were still tentative initiatives they indicate the depth of the core 
leadership's commitment to reform and are themselves a cause, aspect and effect of 
transformation. While their status as an aspect of the transformation is obvious (once we refer 
back to the considerations on a non-epiphenomenal conception of transformation in chapter 
three). the policy debates' roles as causes and effects should be clarified. They exist as effects 
in the sense that: they resulted from the agenda set by the leadership contest; they developed 
directly out of Kinnock's own personal project and vision; they were made possible by the 
trauma of the 1983 defeat; and they were raised to public attention because of the 
expectations of the new leadership to make the Party more electable and modem. On the 
other hand, the early policy debates are also causes because they helped establish the 
processes of opposition and support to the leadership that were ultimately to allow further 
change; they established Kinnock's leadership, in its own eyes and in the eyes of others, as a 
policy-reforming leadership; and they set the tone and agenda for future policy reform (see 
chapter nine). 
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With regards to existing literature, it is clear that the analysis above greatly augments previous 
analyses. None of the existing literature studies the important policy developments in the 
months immediately following Kinnock's election as leader. As a result, they miss important 
causes of change and vital indicators which show that the transformation began far earlier, in 
far more diverse circumstances than is usually presented. 
Nevertheless, the disputes that were to flare-up in March over the Miners' Strike, the rates 
rebellion and Militant and which were to last for a year and a half meant that these policy 
initiatives were halted and the site of transformation shifted more immediately to the value 
rather than the doctrine of the Party. 
CONCLUSION 
The first five months of Kinnock's leadership point clearly to two important augmentations of 
existing explanations of how and why Labour underwent its great transformation of the 
1980s. Firstly, many of the ideas, themes and features of that transformation had already 
begun development or been launched in some form in those early days. The groundwork was 
being laid for significant reforms on the policies of home-ownership, defence, EEC 
membership and, most significantly, the shadow chancellor had outlined a very moderate 
approach to public borrowing and spending. Furthermore, signs had been given that the repeal 
of Tory legislation might have to be moderated - a move that would clearly have major 
consequences for Labour's stance on public ownership, industrial relations, education and 
local authority structures and powers. The founding of the joint policy committees provide an 
early indication of Kinnock's intention to go for major reform on policy by by-passing the 
uncertain NEC and a suspicious Shadow Cabinet. These last two points suggest that a major 
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overhaul of policy was a distinct possibility in the medium-term future. While the early 
. establishment of the CSC and the by-election unit at Walworth Road combined with the work 
of John Gau, Patricia Hewitt and Nick Grant and the way in which the Chesterfield campaign 
was run indicate that, even at this very early stage, major moves were being made to centralise 
and professionalise the Party's campaigning. 
The second implication of this evidence combined with the new interview evidence presented 
above suggests that Kinnock himself and a small coterie of his closest supporters that included 
Charles Clarke and Roy Hattersley hoped for such a major overhaul from the very earliest 
days of the new leadership. These two aspects negate the suggestion that the centrepiece of 
the process of transformation was the changing attitude of Kinnock and his closest supporters 
themselves. This idea is particularly pronounced in Hughes and Wintour (1990) who see the 
1987 election defeat as the catalyst in Kinnock's reform programme. This, of course, is not to 
say that the process was not gradual and, at times, painful and tortuous. Because Kinnock and 
a few others had a clear vision of what they wanted does not mean that others shared that 
view at such an early stage. It also means that the shift towards change was not a sudden 
cathartic moment, for Kinnock it had its roots in a gradual shift and estrangement from the 
radical wing prior to his election; for a great mass of the Party membership it was a similarly 
gradual process that occurred throughout the 1980s but was particularly pronounced between 
1983 and 1989. As this observation suggests and as will continue to be displayed below, the 
transformation was a much more complex inter-retroaction of diverse and uneven elements 
than has previously been suspected. 
This chapter also casts further light on existing analyses in another way. Referring back to the 
various causes outlined in chapter three, we can see those causes already coming in to play. 
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The personal factors, identified as so important by analysts of this period, were clearly already 
present and interactive. These factors existed in the form of Kinnock, Hattersley and other 
members of the core leadership, such as Charles Clarke, who had been placed in positions of 
power either by election or appointment and who were personally committed to reform. As 
such we see a central aspect of the transformation developing, at this point, out of the 
personal drive and agenda of Kinnock and the core leadership themselves in the form of 
cautious policy pronouncements and energetic organisational and campaigning reform. 
However, we have seen already that this had implications for institutional causes in that 
Kinnock, from an extremely early stage, encouraged a shift away from the NEC, and 
moderate political elements in the Shadow Cabinet, by establishing the Joint Policy 
Committees and the Campaign Strategy Committee. Furthermore, these factors are overlaid 
by the unfolding of certain contingent-political developments, in particular the growing 
hostility of the Bennite wing towards Kinnock's approach and, as is explored below, the 
developing importance of the soft left approach. 
But this is not to deny the causal role, alongside all of these factors, of ideological elements: 
the history of electoralism has already begun to weigh heavily through the increasing potency 
of a particularly active version of the vote-maximisation value, which exists in an inter-
retroactive relationship with the New Strategic Thinking and the mass party approach. This 
inter-retroaction has been particularly implied by the use of the concept of articulation in 
relation to those elements. We can also see the implications of inter-retroaction provided by 
the negative identity construction of the active vote maximisation value in relation to the 
'constitutive outside' of a fatalistic "our tum will come" approach to labour's problems. 
182 
Furthermore, within this context, this analysis has established the prime 'fuzzy concept' of 
value as a key element in our explanation of the transformation. 
Thus only six months after Kinnock's elections there is already a high quantity of 
developments and factors contributing towards the process of transformation. This alone 
enhances complexity and further indicates how a sole or sole set or originls for the 
transformation cannot be placed as late as 1987 or even 1985. However, we have already 
identified one inter-retroaction in the form of the relationship between the new strategic 
thinking and the vote-maximisation value, we can now add to this. This inter-retroaction is 
itself inter-retroacting with another. The establishment of new bodies and projects, such as the 
Joint Policy Committees, the Walworth Road by-election unit, Gau's broadcasting initiative, 
and the Campaign Strategy Committee empowered individuals committed to the active vote-
maximisation value, and to a lesser extent, the new strategic thinking by introducing those 
individuals into the bodies and projects and by briefing those bodies and projects along those 
lines. As such, the very establishment of these bodies and projects enhanced the potency and 
power of the active vote-maximisation value and the New Strategic Thinking, which in tum 
enhanced the standing of those individuals committed to the active vote-maximisation value 
and the New Strategic Thinking which, of course, enhanced the potency of these values and 
maxims. The enhancement of these two latter factors ensured that their own inter-retroaction 
was that much more intense and potent. 
However, as was mentioned above, we must avoid falling into the trap of assuming that an 
inter-retroaction is always a process of mutual enhancement. Clearly, at least at this stage, 
these inter-retroactions were confined largely to various sections of the leadership. As the 
troubles of 1984 and 1985 showed, other processes of development were underway, which 
183 
themselves inter-retroacted with processes in the wider Party and movement to create not 
only mutual enhancement but also deep schisms and disarticulations. These will be explored in 
more detail in the following chapter. 
Complexity has been deepened considerably in this chapter. The variety of causes, aspects and 
effects of the transformation has been widened by the stretching of the temporal and spatial 
line. Inter-retroaction has been displayed as active between specific events, between the 
different spheres of the political, personal, ideological and institutional, and inter-retroactive 
links between the grander themes represented in each chapter has begun to be constructed 
with bracketed chapter referrals suggesting that the early days of the leadership were causes 
and effects of changes in Party structure, the disputes of 1984-1985, new agenda issues, the 
leadership challenge following the 1987 election and policy reform. We have also begun to 
observe the constant symbiotic, causal modifications of articulation and negative identity 
construction. 
In effect the construction of a complex inter-retroactive context for the transformation of the 
Labour Party in the 1980s has begun with its identification of multiple causes, aspects and 
effects and its implicit but strategic failure to identify all such causes, aspects and effects. 
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THE MINERS, MILITANT AND THE RATES 
The popular view of the 1984-1985 period in Labour's transformation is that of a "wasted 
year" (see, for example, Hughes & Wintour 1990). The intense internecine strife which 
characterised the Miners' Strike, the rates rebellion and the Militant affair means that these 
factors are usually seen as events which distracted the Party from developing its policies and 
concentrating upon the presentation of a more moderate and united face to the electorate. 
However, as will be shown below, this analysis fails to see that it was the disputes and defeats 
of this period that transformed many views and values within Labour and simultaneously 
shifted the contingent political balance of the Party. As has been mentioned above, most 
analysts have located the real period of transformation as the two years after the 1987 
election, specifically the Policy Review. But compared to the first half of the 1980s, the Policy 
Review was an incredibly smooth process inspiring little genuine opposition - even the 
abandonment of the unilateralist defence policy in 1989 was accepted in resignation rather 
than fought as the betrayal of a fundamental socialist creed (see chapter nine). For such an 
easy shift to have occurred, something must. have happened since the massive ideological 
conflicts of the early 1980s to end the rivalry within the Party. That 'something' was, in large 
part, the transformatory disputes of 1984 and 1985 - without those the Policy Review could 
not have happened. 
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By arguing this point, we effect a further stretching of both the temporal and spatial line of 
cause bringing into play a number of factors not usually considered as directly relevant to the 
transformation of the Party. This move towards complexity is further enhanced by the fact 
that this period, in which debate and self-questioning was at a peak, led to a considerable 
degree of multiplication thus introducing even more factors into our explanation of Labour's 
transformation. (For the sake of clarity, multiplication is the process whereby the analyst 
engaged in the search for complexity displays how more categories, are required than has 
been usually accepted by existing literature, for the explanation of a particular phenomena.) 
Furthermore, a striking effect of the disputes that beset that Party during 1984 and 1985 was 
the transformation they brought about within the realm of value and thus we are also able to 
introduce this particularly salient "fuzzy category" . 
The chapter introduces further fresh empirical and analytical points which also have their 
origins in the search for complexity. 
New evidence is provided which supports the view that the Party and the movement as a 
whole were split over the Miners' Strike. This contrasts with the analysis presented by the 
radical wing of the Party and by Heffernan and Marqusee (1992: 49) that the strike enjoyed 
almost unanimous support throughout the Party and the movement and that only the Party 
leadership were lukewarm about the dispute. Such evidence upholds a more complex situation 
whereby there was a multiplication of attitudes towards the strike and towards direct action 
as a strategy in this period rather than a much simpler polarisation between leadership and 
membership. 
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Evidence is also presented which emphasises that the soft left grouping within the Party, 
which began to develop more fully at this time, grew as much out of a dissatisfaction with 
Kinnock's attitude to the Miners' Strike as with Scargill's leadership of the strike. This 
contrasts strongly with Hughes and Wintour (1990) and Heffernan and Marqusee (1992) and 
Smith (1992a) who portray the development of the soft left in terms of a mass renunciation of 
Bennism and rapid accommodation with Kinnock. This is part of an overall approach to the 
soft left in this chapter which shows them to be a far more diverse, fragmented and gradually 
emerging force than is assumed in the existing literature. In essence, the soft left, which is 
generally shown to be fundamentally based upon cold, rational calculation about the need to 
win votes or advance careers in previous analyses (see section on realignment in chapter 
three), is presented here as a more complex development with deep roots and multiple origins. 
It is also in this chapter that the complex development of values really begins to occur. 
Evidence is presented to show that Kinnock made particularly powerful use of the 'defend the 
people' value and, most importantly, he made far more effective use of this value than the 
radical wing and the supporters of direct action. In this context it is argued that during this 
period, an important shift occurred whereby increasing numbers in the Party began to accept 
an articulation between the 'defend the people' value and Kinnock's own particularly active 
interpretation of the vote maximisation value. It is argued, in particular, that Kinnock's policy 
on the rates rebellion - the 'dented shield' - was a cause, aspect and effect of this articulation 
and of a disarticulation of the 'defend the people' value from the direct action strategy. 
Specific evidence for this comes from an analysis of Kinnock's 1985 conference speech, 
Where it is shown that the efficacy of the central part of this speech comes from its powerful 
Use of the 'defend the people' value. Nowhere in the existing literature is this approach taken 
or is this whole period given the importance it is given here. In particular, it is shown that the 
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complex confluence of articulations and disarticulations of values and strategies that occurred 
during the 1984-1985 period not only promoted further transformation but gave that 
transformation its shape. 
Evidence is also presented which suggests that the forthright attack on Militant, launched by 
Kinnock, had its origins amongst figures on the soft left of the Party. This contrasts with the 
existing literature and with belief at the time, which assumed the assault originated either with 
the core leadership or with the moderate wing of the Party. In fact, new evidence is presented 
which shows that views on the issue of Militant, prior to Kinnock's decision, were quite 
diverse and multiple and that even in the moderate wing, there were a number of figures who 
Were wary of such a powerful assault. 
Finally, it is also asserted that the central 'alliance' between the soft left and the moderates 
Which the existing literature has argued was the cornerstone of Kinnock's power and the 
success of his reform process was more complex than is usually accepted. It is shown that, in 
fact, there existed a more variable and fragile 'dual association' on the NEe and throughout 
the Party between figures on the soft left and the core leadership and between moderates and 
the core leadership. In fact, the relationship between the soft left and the moderates is shown 
to be acrimonious and competitive resulting from a number of causes. This observation is new 
and is important because it enhances the complexity of the transformation as it happened at 
the core of the Party, and it allows us to understand further complex dynamics that occurred 
later (see, in particular, chapters eight and nine). 
Overall, this chapter shows how transformation in the Party developed out of a highly 
complex confluence of factors involving the articulation and disarticulation of values and 
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strategies, and the development of convoluted interactions between fragmented and hybrid 
bodies of Party members and leading figures. Maybe, most importantly, it shows that 
transformation is not a simple process of the victory of one grouping and the defeat of another 
(all too often transformation is presented as the simple victory of Kinnock's vision - Hughes 
and Wintour 1990 and Heffernan and Marqusee 1992 are the clearest exponents of this view) 
but that the modes of resistance to change and the very battles themselves fundamentally 
shape the transformation itself This approach directly results from an emphasis upon 
complexity which is inherently suspicious of straightforward and simple explanations and 
always searches for further causes and processes of change. 
TRANSFORMING THE 'DEFEND THE PEOPLE' VALUE 
A value which underwent major transformation in this troubled period was that which held 
that one of Labour's broad roles must be to defend the rights and welfare of the most 
vulnerable and the most exploited. This value is clearly present throughout the Labour Party's 
history and in its ideological precepts. It is a largely self-evident feature of the Party's 
development, being a value to which most, even all, Party members would adhere. As such 
little purpose would be served by discovering historical examples of this value as an active 
element. Instead the existence of the 'defend the people' value will be displayed implicitly 
within the analysis of the debates and transformation that occurred between 1983 and 1989. 
A powerful stream of thought within the Party since the mid-1970s had been the radical-
Bennite view that the direct action strategy (see chapter one) was the most effective way of 
fulfilling this 'defend the people' value. However, the collapse of the Miners' Strike started a 
process of disarticulation of the direct action strategy from the value. While the rates rebellion 
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and ultimately the Liverpool-Militant affair not only enhanced this disarticulation but also 
started are-articulation of the 'defend the people' value to Kinnock's own preferred approach 
of active vote maximisation. 
This process began on 5th and 6th March 1984 when the Yorkshire and Scottish NUM 
Executives called for strike action in their areas in response to Government plans to step-up a 
pit closure plan (The Guardian, 7 March 1984; The Times. 6 & 7 March 1984) . Two days 
later the NUM National Executive gave the cue for an all-out nation-wide strike by backing 
the two regional executives and calling for other regions to join the dispute. Despite South 
Wales, Cumbria, Midlands and other regions voting against the strike (The Guardian, 16 
March 1984, 17 March 1984; The Times, 16 March 1984) mass picketing had closed the 
greatest majority of pits by the last week of March after regional and national union leaders 
called on their members not to cross picket lines (The Times, 23 March 1984). However, 
backed by an High Court ban on secondary picketing, the police embarked on a year long 
campaign of aggressive attacks on picket-lines and a deliberate policy of escorting those who 
wished to work into the mines whatever the cost in terms of public order and injury. By the 
end of the month, the strike was well underway with most pits closed and transport, rail, 
shipping and steel union leaderships planning to block all movements of coal (The Guardian, 
30 March 1984; The Times, 30 March 1984). 
It is an indication of the strength of commitment to the 'defend the people' value that the 
miners battle to protect their jobs, families and communities from the Government's closure 
plan inspired such a huge response of solidarity and sympathy from Labour members whatever 
their broader political views. 
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Ken Hulme, a member of the LCC and it Organisation Secretary in the late eighties, expressed 
the feeling for the miners in a way that recalls Drucker's comments about ethos arising directly 
out of the experiences of the working class (Drucker 1979: 21-22): 
... there was a tremendous wave of emotion - you got people 
(supporting the miners) who were not by any means raving 
headbangers '" it certainly got me, for example ... it really was a 
cultural thing - somebody coming from a working-class background, 
having gone to a secondary modem, there was just this complete 
identification with what the mining communities were actually saying, a 
tremendous emotional involvement - I felt it, others did as well 
(Interview with Hulme 1994). 
As a result, many members were involved in some aspect of solidarity work such as fund-
raising, producing posters and leaflets and organising speaking tours (Interviews with the 
following: Gilby 1994~ Hulme 1994~ Matheson 1994~ Mortimer 1994). The NEC also voiced 
its constant support for the strike, passing a monthly resolution giving unqualified backing to 
the NUM. Most dramatically, the April NEC unanimously called on CLPs to raise SOp a week 
from each member for the strike fund (NEC 8, 25 April 1984: 5). 
Although close to retirement, Jim Mortimer, the Party General Secretary, tirelessly toured the 
country speaking for the miners at numerous meetings: 
It is, without doubt, the most uplifting experience I had whilst I was at 
Walworth Road and one of the most uplifting experiences of my whole 
life. The response was beyond words. If you ever need proof that this 
sleeping giant could come to life it was in the Miners' Strike. I 
remember speaking at packed meetings in the heart of Tory 
constituencies~ going to Labour Parties and finding that they were 
organising all sorts of events for the miners, collections outside big 
supermarkets and everywhere people saying what a good response 
there was (Interview with Mortimer 1994). 
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Bill Gilby, a member of the Executive of the Scottish Party and Chair of the LCC in the mid-
eighties, remembers a similar level of support with his local Labour Party playing a 
particularly important role by using a printing press they had purchased to produce leaflets 
and posters in support of the strike for the whole of the East Central region of Scotland 
Onterview with Gilby 1994). Another activist in Tooting remembers Labour Party members 
collecting food and money "week after week after week" (Interview with Matheson 1994). 
However, this strong, emotional support for the defence of the mining communities was 
tempered for many in the Party by doubts about the way in which the strike was being led. 
Rather romantically, Heffernan and Marqusee see the these doubts as afflicting only the higher 
echelons of the Party causing a division "between the entire base of the movement on the one 
hand and a small leadership clique on the other" (1992: 49) with the former providing 
unqualified support while the latter evolved from equivocation to outright treachery. 
Such an analysis, however, is not even applicable to the NUM let alone the Party. As was 
mentioned in chapter four, Scargill-Ioyalist Peter Heathfield had only just seen off a very 
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strong challenge by the moderate John Walsh for the post of General Secretary. As was to 
prove important during the strike, Walsh had called not only for "negotiation not 
confrontation" but also for a national ballot before any further industrial action was 
considered (The Guardian, 2S January 1984~ The Times, 23 January 1984). The strike call had 
also been preceded by three strike ballots since 1982 all of which had been defeated (The 
Guardian, 9 January 1984~ The Times, 4 January 1984). 
Within the Party itself there was a genuine fear that Scargill's failure to call a national ballot 
was not only undemocratic and regarded by many members of the public as a sign of the 
autocracy of the trade union movement but that it was a tactical error that gave the media and 
the Government their most effective propaganda coup before the strike was really underway. 
Indeed a consistent feature of the strike was the extremely hostile media response. The failure 
to call a national ballot, violence on picket lines, secondary picketing and the apparent split in 
the NUM became the topics that pre-occupied the media and thus made the strike evermore 
complex and difficult to pursue successfully (Campbell 1985). Important causes and problems 
of the strike - a planned assault by the right on the miners as potent symbols and militant 
cadres of the labour movement, and the confused responses of threatened communities caught 
between the fear of growing dole queues, a union leadership demanding uncompromising 
direct action, and the promise of generous redundancy payments - were barely given any 
consideration by the media. 
More fundamentally it was also felt that the holding of a national ballot, which many believed 
would have opted for strike action, could have united the miners~ whilst failure to hold one 
only exacerbated the splits by angering those miners who wanted to work but felt they were 
being forced into a strike by undemocratic means (Interviews with the following: Gilby 1994; 
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Hulme 1994; Matheson 1994). These doubts were accentuated by the establishment of the 
National Working Miners Committee which opposed the strike -largely on the grounds that it 
was called without a ballot and was based upon the undemocratic tactic of mass picketing -
and drew much of its support from the Nottinghamshire pits (The Guardian, 18 August 1984; 
The Times, 18 August 1984). The Committee formed the base for the Union of Democratic 
Mineworkers which broke away from the NUM after the strike. 
As Ken Hulme commented, there was a "gut-sense" in his constituency that Scargill's 
approach was "strategically wrong" and that many members were supporting the miners 
despite Scargill not because of him (Interview with Hulme 1994). 
Heffernan and Marqusee are right that "those who wished to see the miners defeated 
hammered away at the union's refusal to hold a national ballot" (1992: 51) but this is hardly 
the whole story. Many in the Party, from grassroots through to the leadership, were 
increasingly disillusioned with the strike not just because the failure to hold a ballot was 
undemocratic but also because it increased the chances that Thatcher would win this most 
vital battle in her crusade against the labour movement by detrimentally affecting public 
support for the miners and splitting the NUM. 
However, while the Strike was underway doubts about its leadership were usually expressed 
in private due to the strong sense of the need to maintain solidarity in the face of extreme 
hostility from the Government and the media (Interview with Matheson 1994). But as it 
became clear towards the end of 1984 that the Strike was likely to be lost and as more and 
more strikers returned to work, the criticism of the NUM leadership came out into the open. 
The ambivalent feelings towards the strike are most clearly expressed by the interventions of 
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the Labour Co-ordinating Committee and Tribune newspaper. Both of these organisations 
were associated with the radical wing of the party in the early eighties and both gave firm 
support to the strike. In no sense did either the LCC or Tribune attack the NUM with the glee 
of a' new 'right-wing' convert. Both presented balanced and, to an extent mournful, 
assessments. 
In the Spring of 1985, the LCC published a document that proved a popular summing-up for 
many of the ambiguous feelings about the Strike. It attacked the NUM leadership for failing to 
hold a ballot, for failing to convince all of its members that strike action was necessary, for 
refusing to condemn the more extreme violence and intimidation perpetrated by some strikers, 
for the defensive nature of the union leadership's arguments about the future of the industry, 
and finally for Scargill's tendency to deteriorate into hollow rhetoric (LCC 1985: 2-3). While 
Nigel Williamson, in his 1985 New Year editorial for Tribune - which was to become one of 
the key documents of the 'realignment' (as the contingent political aspect of the transformation 
was being called at this time) - attacked the radical wing of the Party arguing that 
Calls for a general strike, if not irresponsible, are at best a distraction 
from the real issues for it is not a demand that has any basis in reality. It 
cannot be delivered and there are those who, knowing that, raise the 
demand only to be able to cry "betrayal" when it does not happen 
(Williamson 1985). 
This troubled sense began the dislocation of the 'defend the people' value from the direct 
action strategy. For it was the strength of commitment to the miners cause that encouraged 
many to rethink the strategy adopted by Scargill and supported by Benn: if the strategy was 
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seen to fail in achieving the goal of defending the people then contemplation of a new 
approach became a sign of commitment to that goal rather than retreat from it. The 
condemnation of the direct action strategy that followed the Strike arose not out of a sudden 
rush for votes or careers, as is implied by Heffernan and Marqusee and by the cries of "sell-
out" uttered by the radical wing, but the result of a deep disappointment in defeat. This can be 
seen particularly by the fact, ignored by the radical wing, that those leading the rethink were 
often equally critical of Kinnock and the moderates in the Party for failing to adequately 
defend the miners. 
This criticism focused on the fact that Kinnock's own response had been uncertain and 
faltering. By mid-April the leader was increasingly arguing that a ballot should have been used 
and issued ever more confident denunciations of picket-line violence whilst also affirming his 
support for the strike in the evasive sense that he supported the miners' case i.e. their 
arguments about threatened communities and the economic value of keeping pits open (LCC 
1985: 3; The Times, 26 June 1984; The Times, 1 October 1984; ). This strategy was also 
bolstered by the attempts of Stan Orme, the Shadow Energy Spokesman, to act as a peace-
broker between the NUM and the NCB by hawking a series of compromise plans. 
Criticism of Kinnock's ambiguity was vocal. He faced attack from Tribune and conflict in the 
PLP over his refusal to accept NUM invitations to speak at a series of rallies or appear on a 
picket line (The Guardian, 8 November 1984; The Times, 8 November 1984; Tribune, 23 
November 1984). Not until 30 November when the strike was past its peak did Kinnock 
appear on a platform with ScargiU at a rally for the miners. And it was only when the strike 
was in its final days that the Leader first stood on a carefully-chosen, peaceful picket line in 
Islwyn (The Times, 4 January 1985). Kinnock also faced derision after stating during a trip to 
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the Soviet Union that the Soviet press had overstated the deprivation of the mining 
communities and that most in Britain were appalled by the violence of the pickets (The 
Guardian, 24 November 1984; The Times, 24 November 1984). 
In his Working To Win editorial, quoted above, Williamson responded to Kinnock's 
behaviour: 
The so-called "new realism" which sought to minimise the importance 
of collective action has done us no favours. Many of its foremost 
proponents have disgracefully made little or no effort to put the miners' 
case to their members ... , Neil Kinnock may have only himself to blame 
for some of his difficulties. He should not have allowed his reservations 
about the conduct of the dispute to obscure his commitment to the 
strikers' cause (Williamson 1985). 
Similarly, the LCC reflected the views of many members criticising what it regarded as an 
utterly inadequate response by the leadership: 
... the Parliamentary leadership acted as if supporting the case (for the 
miners and for coal -AL) could in some way be separated from the 
process of struggle - warts and all. ". The results of the leadership 
distancing itself from the daily work of the dispute, combined with 
errors by the NUM, allowed the Tories to set the agenda and put 
Labour on the defensive ... Labour spent more time stating what they 
did not support rather than positively setting an alternative agenda. .., 
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Giving ground to the Tories in a vain hope of attracting the middle 
ground can only appear to the public for what it is - equivocation and 
crisis management (LCC 1985: 3). 
Another influential contribution to the 'realignment' process, as it was being called at the time, 
also recognised that the strike was constructing a genuine 'soft left' stream which was neither 
of the radical nor the moderate wings. Patrick Seyd's New Socialist Article, 'Bennism Without 
Benn', acknowledged that many, once on the Bennite wing, were now critical of the way Benn 
had unconditionally supported Scargill. But it equally recognised that 
Few of the new left are happy with Kinnock's performance over a wide 
range of issues but especially over the Miners' Strike (Seyd 1985). 
Seyd went on to state that many on the soft left now hoped to 
detach him (Kinnock) from the embrace of the Parliamentary right, and 
(knew) that to do so they must offer him a more solid base on the left 
(Seyd 1985). 
As such, not only did the Strike provide the event that began the process of dislocation of the 
direct action strategy from the 'defend the people' value but the radicals response of claiming 
betrayal and sell-out proved a particularly weak tactic, precisely because those who were 
rethinking strategy felt themselves to be motivated by the strength of their commitment to the 
miners' cause rather than by a plan to turn their back upon it. In this context it would have 
made more sense for radicals to argue for alternative strategies that maintained an extra-
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parliamentary and grass-roots element but avoided the moralism and hysteria of personal 
condemnation. Such a strategy, of course, did exist in the form of the mass party approach -
unfortunately the radical wing seemed unaware of this and thus allowed even this element of 
radicalism on the soft left to whither neglected of adequate support from them. 
The radical wing, along with most analysts of the period, similarly failed to notice that the 
disillusion with the Strike's leadership also extended very widely throughout the trade union 
movement (Interview with Edmonds 1994). This inevitably gave an enormous boost to the 
"new realists" whose already well-established claim that the direct action strategy was 
ineffective was largely proved. As was mentioned in chapter four, these new realists were 
keen to give Kinnock a free hand in terms of reforming the Party's policy, campaigning 
structures and certain aspects of its organisation. As such the Strike's collapse enhanced 
Kinnock's power by providing him with increasingly powerful allies in the unions who were 
willing to give him the block votes he needed to push reform through conference. 
Unlike the radical wing, Kinnock seemed aware of the value that was motivating a rethink. 
Prior to his more famous use of the dislocation between the 'defend the people' value and the 
direct action strategy in his 1985 conference speech with regards to Militant (see below), he 
took a similar approach to the Miners' Strike, commenting in his 1984 conference speech 
that: 
The People who need the support and safe-guard of trade unionism and 
of public services, cannot afford to be part of any political 'charge of 
the Light Brigade', There is no glory in defeat for them~ there is nothing 
but extra miserable burdens of insecurity and insufficiency, In those 
circumstances, it is they - the poorest, the weakest and the most needy 
- who are the martyrs (Labour Party 1984b: 103). 
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Kinnock saw clearly that he could stir antipathy to the direct action strategy by claiming that 
the strategy betrayed the defence of the people. But while the Strike had begun this process of 
disarticulation upon which Kinnock capitalised, it was the rates rebellion that deepened this 
disarticulation and took it further by starting a process of re-articulating the C defend the 
people' value to Kinnock's active version of the vote maximisation value. It should also be 
restated here that this approach contrasts with the existing literature on this period. Previous 
analyses have tended to play down the importance of this period for the transformation while 
also avoiding any actual detailed analysis of the disputes of 1984 and 1985 (the only exception 
to this being Heffernan and Marqusee, 1991 but they take a particularly simplified approach as 
outlined above). Taking a more complex approach encourages us to see the origins of 
transformation at all points and in many different processes, hence we can identify vital causes 
occurring during this period and in forms, such as the articulation of values, not previously 
observed. 
The issue of the rates became a source of dispute and transformation in the Party when the 
Government pledged itself to introduce strict controls over the financial commitments of 
"high-spending" councils, predominantly Labour-run, by introducing legislation allowing the 
Secretary of State for the Environment to set a ceiling for the rates of individual councils -
before their 1985/1986 budgets were agreed. The legislation allowed the Government to 
impose penalties if the caps were disobeyed by withdrawing large sums from central 
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government grants to local authorities. This move coincided with battles inside and outside 
Parliament over the planned abolition of six Metropolitan County Councils and the Greater 
London Council. 
The first council to take an early, forthright stand against the Tory plans was Liverpool City 
Council. While Labour had reached its June '83 electoral nadir in most of the rest of England, 
Liverpool was recording increasing support for the defeated Party. Not only did the voters of 
this city, which faced the most devastating effects of Thatcherite policies, provide Labour 
with a 2.4% swing in its favour in the General Election but they had already given the local 
Party a majority on the City Council for the first time in ten years a few weeks before (Crick 
1986: 215). But Liverpool was to be ruled by no ordinary Labour Party. The Labour Group 
elected in the local elections was dominated by supporters of the Militant newspaper and 
members of its associated Trotskyist group, the Revolutionary Socialist League. Furthermore 
it had now come to power on a manifesto promising an ambitious programme of 
reconstruction and inevitably high-spending (Crick 1986: 236) in a period when the 
Government had planned to destroy such politics for good. 
The council decided to defy the Government and the law by adopting the protest tactic of 
setting an unbalanced budget which would maintain spending commitments while failing to 
raise rates (The Times, 25 January 1984). Kinnock responded by unequivocally condemning 
the council's plans. The NEC backed the leader's stance passing a motion opposing illegal 
opposition to the rate-cap although, rather ambiguously, it simultaneously accepted that such 
opposition was in the spirit of conference policy (NEC 9, 9 May 1984: 4-5). 
I 
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However, events seemed to show that Kinnock was out of line with much of his Party when 
councils facing rate-capping and abolition agreed, at a conference of local authorities in 
Labour's flagship City of Sheffield, to adopt a tactic of non-compliance with Government 
restrictions (The Guardian, 7 July 1984; The Times, 7 July 1984). Local polls throughout the 
country boosted the councils' stand, regularly showing majority opposition to rate-capping 
and abolition (Fielding & Seyd 1984). 
A bigger boost came when the 1984 Conference voted on a show of hands (Labour Party 
1984b: 142) to support councils "forced to break the law" (Labour Party 1984b: 130) despite 
the fact that the NEC had recommended that the motion be remitted. These events seemed to 
show clearly that many activists in the Party, in late 1984, were still attached to the 
articulation between the 'defend the people' value and the direct action strategy, 
However, Kinnock continued to oppose the illegal stance maintaining the line he had 
established at the Local Government Conference of 1984, when he used the slogan "better a 
dented shield than no shield at all" (Interview with Clarke 1994). This stance was summarised 
in an NEC motion backing Kinnock which stated that 
... it is essential for Labour councillors to retain their powers in order 
to give maximum protection for local services and for those who work 
in them (NEC 10,26 June 1985: 4). 
The "dented shield" strategy allowed a certain articulation between Kinnock's own opposition 
to non-compliance and the 'defend the people' value by implying that since a likely response 
to non-compliance was the disqualification of councillors and the appointment of government 
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commissioners, then the radical strategy, in the medium-term, would only leave the vulnerable 
open to total attack~ better that councillors stayed in control and did what they could to 
ameliorate the ill-effects of rate-capping by legal means. The 'dented shield' approach had an 
unmistakably provisional feel to it. A sense that councillors would use that 'dented shield' as 
an alternative to non-compliance until some other source of aid arrived. This other source of 
aid was bluntly identified by one councillor when he stated: 
The only way out of this is to return a Labour government (quoted in 
Smith & Wheen 1985). 
This, of course, meant that if the "dented shield" approach was accepted it would also imply 
an articulation of the 'defend the people' value to active vote maximisation if Labour were to 
be re-elected. 
Kinnock's articulation gained a greater resonance amongst the rates rebels as it became clearer 
that the Government had no intention of backing-down. The higher the possibility of 
disqualification and the appointment of commissioners, so the direct action approach of non-
compliance seemed less valid as an attempt to defend the people and the more Kinnock's line 
became appealing. 
In addition to the Government's intransigence was the fact that Liverpool's situation was to an 
extent unique. Other councils did not possess the degree of radical unity within the Labour 
Group that Liverpool enjoyed and they certainly did not receive the union backing that 
Hatton's rebels had won aided by Militant activists in the unions themselves. Many councils 
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threatened with rate-capping were actually involved in troubled industrial disputes with their 
trades unions and, in some cases such as Hackney, with their tenants' groups (Wolmar 1984). 
These problems combined with threats of legal action from a Government increasingly free of 
its more important battle with the miners, and lobbying by those who had always favoured 
other tactics led to the increasing popularity of the tactic of postponing setting a rate until the 
Government agreed to negotiate over a series of grievances caused by rate-capping. This 
contrasted with the original non-compliance strategy of refusing to set any rate until the 
Government completely abandoned its policy. The new tactic also appealed as a way of 
maintaining unity amongst rebel councils~ there had already been widespread rumours that 
Lewisham had been considering derogation (The New Statesman, 12 October 1984) - the 
process whereby a rate-capped council could re-negotiate a rate with the Government, 
supposedly satisfactory to both. Of course, if any authority opted for derogation it would 
provide the Government with a powerful propaganda weapon enabling them to portray 
resistant councils as unreasonable. 
Kinnock's stance began to gain gradual ground. As both cause and effect of the weakening of 
the rebellion, a soft left response developed between the non-compliance strategy and the 
'dented shield' approach which was not dissimilar to that which emerged after the Miners' 
Strike and which criticised both Kinnock and Scargill. This approach maintained the 
confrontational, campaigning value of non-compliance but articulated it with the pragmatism 
of the 'dented shield'. It took the form of a recognition that non-compliance was either, at 
best, only one possible strategy and, at worst, a form of political suicide. Instead, it was felt 
that what was needed was a buoyant popular campaign that drew imaginatively on the good-
will of many rate-payers to force the Government to change course. In many ways it bore a 
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close resemblance to, and was no doubt in part inspired by, the popular and broad-based 
opposition proposed by the mass party approach. Frances Morrell and Steve Bundred, both 
members of the rate-capped ILEA, wrote that 
non-compliance alone is an incomplete, and ultimately an inadequate 
strategy. If such an action is elevated into an end in itself, we will shift 
the focus of debate onto ground of Mrs Thatcher's own choosing. . .. 
Most of us when we think of campaigning, naturally think in terms of a 
strike or industrial action. But a campaign to defend public services 
needs to be tactically distinguished from a campaign to defend an 
industry. ... What follows from this perception is a new kind of mass 
campaigning by both Labour councils and Labour opposition groups . 
... This campaign should aim to mobilise active popular support against 
government plans, as Liverpool has done, as (in different ways) the 
Greater London Council and ILEA have done, and as non-party 
organisations like CND have done (Morrell & Bundred 1984). 
While Stuart Weir, a Labour Party journalist and activist increasingly helping to shape the soft 
left approach, wrote that 
the kind of vigorous and imaginative campaign which is within our 
power could possibly stop the rate-capping proposals; and at least it 
should seriously damage and discredit a government which is very 
vulnerable on issues oflocal democracy (Weir 1984). 
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But Weir went on to argue that such a campaign could not mean non-compliance as the 
conditions of a solid backing by the council's unions, workforce and electors did not exist 
outside of Liverpool. As a result, in a telling comment that specifically evoked the emotion 
attached to the defend the people issue alongside the more rational question of an articulated 
strategy, he stated: 
Why... should the defiant Labour groups which are most likely to 
contemplate direct action put at risk, at this stage of the game, all they 
have fought to protect. ... My heart is with the Liverpool councillors. 
But my head tells me direct action should be a last resort, not the first 
(Weir 1984). 
The problems and doubts about non-compliance had their effect. On the 7th January, the 
Local Government Committee explicitly called on councils to renegotiate rather than directly 
confront the Government when it came to the setting of their budgets in March (The Times, 8 
January 1985). Although Liverpool and some London councils decided to continue with non-
compliance, the request persuaded most councils to opt for renegotiation. Most significantly, 
the GLC - the council that had done most to make the mass party approach a reality, and had 
presented an alternative focus for those on the left who found certain aspects of the Militant 
group in Liverpool less than attractive - opted to set a legal budget (The Guardian, 11 March 
1985; The Times, 11 March 1985). More significantly still, the GLC vote in favour of the 
legal budget was supported by Ken Livingstone, the new hero of the radical wing and 
emerging soft left. 
206 
The collapse of the unified rates rebellion was both cause and effect of the continuing 
dislocation of the direct action strategy from the 'defend the people' value. Unlike the Miners' 
Strike, the rebellion had been more explicitly and significantly about strategies which could 
fulfil that value. Also, unlike the Strike, the rates rebellion debate had been less muted during 
the actual dispute itself Kinnock, for example, had felt able to take a clearer and firmer line 
on the issue. These characteristics of the rates rebellion were no doubt in part caused by the 
emerging dislo~ation resulting from the strike. But the rebellion's characteristics also 
exacerbated this dislocation - a clear process of inter-retroaction. 
However, with only Liverpool and Lambeth councils left to fight on with the old rates 
rebellion tactic, the issue became inseparable from the role of Militant which immediately 
provided the inter-retroactive context within which a whole variety of other issues were to be 
complexly linked to the transformation of this particular value. 
Liverpool finally set a rate in mid-June, however it was not high enough to cover the spending 
commitments outlined in the budget. It was hoped that by doing this that some of the legal 
heat would be taken off of the council while the campaigning stand would be maintained. The 
leaders announced that the City would run out of money by the end of the year. Hatton and 
his comrades were gambling that as Liverpool headed ever closer towards total chaos the 
Government would be forced to step in and hand yet another propaganda coup to the council 
(Crick 1986: 260). The precedent, of course, existed in the form of Patrick Jenkin's aid deal 
but this was a government no longer troubled by the Miners' Strike or facing a united front 
from the local authorities. 
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Therefore, in order to up the stakes - and possibly because of advice they received that it was 
a legal requirement (Crick 1986: 260) - the Liverpool leaders decided to issue 31,000 
redundancy notices to its workforce on 5th September. The move, they stressed was technical 
and tactical and that all those receiving the notices would not actually face redundancy and 
would be re-employed after a ninety day period. But the leaders had seriously misjudged the 
effect that the move would have on its own workforce and throughout the labour movement 
and the country. Many council employees reacted with horror and the previously unified union 
support for the council's stand fractured. The NUT and the head teachers union tried to stop 
the redundancies in court and NALGO picketed council meetings whilst refusing to deliver 
the notices. This latter refusal meant that GMBATU shop stewards, who supported the move, 
had to take taxis around the City delivering the notices themselves. The collapse of support 
for the council leadership was unequivocally confirmed when a planned strike against 
Government policies was abandoned after the NUT, NUPE and NALGO voted against 
industrial action (The Guardian, 21 September 1985; 25 September 1985; The Times, 21 
September 1985; 25 September 1985). 
Despite an NEC meeting which carried a motion backing the "courage and determination" of 
the council by just one vote (NEC mins., 25 September 1985: 5) in the lead-up to conference 
the leader displayed that he sensed the Liverpool Militants had made their most serious 
mistake by confidently stating on TV-AM that he wanted a purge of Militant in Liverpool but 
that to do so required proof of membership and a new machinery to carry out investigations 
and expulsions (The Guardian, 30 September 1985; The Times, 30 September 1985). 
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The predicted showdown with Militant at the Conference in October exceeded anyone's 
expectations. In his leadership address - a speech which more than any other, came to 
symbolise the transformation of the 1980s - Kinnock appealed directly to the dislocation that 
was occurring between the direct action strategy and the 'defend the people' value. He stated: 
... implausible promises don't win victories. I'll tell you what happens 
with impossible promises. You start with far-fetched resolutions. They 
are then pickled into a rigid dogma ... and you end in the grotesque 
chaos of a Labour council hiring taxis to scuttle round a city handing 
out redundancy notices to its own workers ( applause). I am telling you, 
you can't play politics with peoples' jobs and with people's services or 
with their homes (applause and some boos). The people will not, 
cannot abide posturing ... We have got to win. Not for our sakes, but 
really, truly, to deliver the British people from evil. Let's do it. (Labour 
Party 1985b: 128-129). 
The enormous effect this speech had upon the delegates at the conference was a confirmation 
of the dislocation of the direct action strategy from the 'defend the people' value. It was also 
a sign of the gradual acceptance of the active vote-maximisation value as an alternative 
strategy for the defence of the people. Because of this disarticulation and re-articulation, the 
existence of a new strand in the Party was confirmed - the soft left. Bryan Gould, who was 
rapidly becoming a highly influential thinker for this strand, summed-up feelings about these 
changes in value when he stated: 
-{" 
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'" by appearing to abandon any real contention for parliamentary 
power, Labour not only concedes the next - and every successive -
general election; we also give up the only weapon which could be used, 
in the lifetime of this Parliament to defend our people. The one 
constraint which would force Mrs. Thatcher to moderate her policies 
would be the fear that Labour looked likely to win the next general 
election (Gould 1985a). 
The development of this soft left was one of the most significant factors of the transformation. 
However to explain fully the influence - on the soft left and the Party as a whole - of the 
Militant debacle and the 1985 speech as factors within a complex inter-retroactive context, we 
must first study more fully the origins of this soft left and then return to the Liverpool 
Militants and the 1985 conference in relation to this other causal line. 
TilE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOFT LEFT: DIVERSITY AND 
l\IUL TIPLICITY 
Despite the powerful effect ofKinnock's 1985 conference speech, the soft left did not develop 
out of a cathartic moment following the collapse of the strike and the rates rebellion. The 
process was gradual, drawing upon a variety of events and streams of thought within the soft 
left itself In effect, this and further sections (see chapter 8), will show how the soft left was 
never one cohesive body possessing a shared outlook and a high capacity for common action. 
We can see this gradualism and complexity most clearly when we study the origins of the 
most organised section of the soft left - the Lee. Like the soft left, the Lee has been 
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portrayed as a group of activists that played a central role on the radical wing of the Party in 
the late seventies and early eighties but then - rapidly disillusioned by the failures of the mid-
eighties and/or the attraction of power - shifted to a more centrist position losing its activist 
base, becoming dominated by ambitious careerists who happily played an echo-chamber role 
for Neil Kinnock. This interpretation has been most firmly developed by Heffernan and 
Marqusee (1992: 166-184). However, the origins and development of the LCC attest to a far 
more subtle and complex history that reflect the subtleties and complexities of the whole soft 
left phenomena. 
Firstly, there are the hybrid origins of the group itself. Founded in 1978 it brought together an 
interesting mix of Labour figures for its "launch committee" including supporters of Tony 
Benn such as Francis Cripps and Frances Morrell but also firm non-Bennites such as Bryan 
Gould and Jeff Rooker (Labour Activist, October 1978). The main speakers at its first public 
meeting at the 1978 conference were Alan Fisher, General Secretary of NUPE, and, 
surprisingly Peter Shore (Interview with Haworth 1995; Interview with Stanley 1994). 
Alongside this mix, there was also a group of radical activists, such as Jon Lansman, who 
were to become close to Benn, but at the time were not part of his network of supporters -
this group also included a number of CLPD activists (Interview with Stanley 1994; Interview 
with Hulme 1994). In addition, in the five years following its establishment, a number of ex-
Communist Party members with euro-communist leanings, disillusioned by the internecine 
warfare that had broken out in that Party, joined Labour and became involved in the LCC 
(Interview with Haworth 1995; Interview with Hulme 1994). One of those ex-CP members, 
Ken Hulme, actually went on to become the LCC's Organisation Secretary in the late 1980s 
and as he has commented, ex-CP members were both anti-Trotskyite and hostile to the direct 
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action approach of Benn and Scargill having come from a tradition that placed strong 
emphasis upon alliances and broad fronts to defeat capitalism (Interview with Hulme 1994). 
Furthermore, the LCC from its earliest days, developed ideologically out of an articulation 
between two separate political traditions. The first was a commitment to the traditional 
principles of a radical Labour socialism, which displayed itself in support for the Alternative 
Economic Strategy (Labour Activist, February 1980) and Clause Four (Labour Activist, 
October 1978). The second was an allegiance to the more recent, new agenda issues such as 
anti-racism and worn ens rights, which displayed itself in the desire, as expressed in the group's 
launch statement, 
to work closely with and increase the political effectiveness of the 
various pressure and campaigning groups which now operate alongside 
and outside the Labour Party. ... They offer so much to the Party, 
particularly if their initiatives could be co-ordinated in a joint 
programme (Labour Activist, October 1978). 
This dual commitment to Labour's traditions in the form of Clause Four and to working with 
and co-ordinating the new pressure groups were, in fact, enshrined in the 'Objects' of the 
LCC's constitution (LCC Constitution 1983). 
In addition to this, many of those involved in the LCC in its early days were usually not only 
active in Labour but also in broader bodies which operated outside the Party. Groups such as 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Institute for Workers Control, Labour Action for 
Peace, the Socialist Health Association, and the Socialist Educational Association. This 
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overlap of personnel between Labour members and pressure group members further enhanced 
the new agenda aspect of the LCC. As Alan Haworth has commented: 
If you were a self-respecting Labour activist in the late 70's you didn't 
restrict yourself to one particular group, you sought to embrace the lot. 
If you saw people's CVs when they were seeking parliamentary 
candidacies and the like, it was de rigeur to be a member of everything 
from Anti-Apartheid to Amnesty International (Interview with 
Haworth 1995). 
So despite the claim by a Solidarity Group publication that the LCC was "believed to be the 
brain-child of Tony Benn" (Labour Solidarity, May 1981), the group was in truth always 
much more than just a support network for the leading figure of the Labour left. Nigel 
Stanley, the group's Organisation Secretary in the early 1980s, has described the LCe as 
initially a rather broad, vaguely left Fabian Society ... , It was a fairly 
rich tapestry of people and because it didn't have, and on the whole, 
resisted infiltration by disciplined Trotskyist groups, it developed away 
from being a terribly clear faction with a very clear series of demands, it 
was a richer organisation. Various people came in and left at various 
stages but it was always a coalition of different forces and individuals 
and approaches (Interview with Stanley 1994). 
Consequently, even within the LCC, the organised heart of what was to become the 'soft left', 
there was no point in its history when it was peopled by individuals motivated primarily by a 
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desire to see Tony Benn crowned leader. The group drew in far more diverse strands and 
articulated issues and strategies that could not be reduced to one particular goal. As such the 
Lee's input into the realignment was more complex than as a body that defected in whole or 
part from the Benn wing. Many Lee members had begun to inhabit a new space between the 
radical and the moderate wings before 1985. In particular this can be seen by the fact that, 
despite the group's support for Tony Benn's deputy leadership bid in 1981, the issue had 
seriously divided the Lee. In addition, as was pointed out in chapter four, there were already 
people on the executive who were arguing for OMOV, a reform that was vehemently opposed 
by many of Benn's supporters (Interview with Stanley 1994). 
As such, the defeat of the miners and the rates rebels allowed these different trends within the 
Lee and the soft left as a whole, to become more pertinent, either weakening the belief 
various individuals on the soft left had in the direct action strategy or weakening the position 
of those within the soft left who still supported direct action. In fact, it was at this time that 
certain members of the Lee Executive, such as Barry Winter (Winter 1984) and Judy Walker 
(Walker 1984), resigned over the gradual shift in direction away from the radical strategy. 
Winter, an active member of the radical-leaning group, Independent Labour Publications, 
wrote in his resignation letter: 
Those who I identify as the current leadership of the Lee ... have a 
political approach with which I am increasingly at odds. The Lee has 
been set on a political course that is deeply pragmatic and eclectic for 
all its talk about campaigning and mass politics (Winter 1984). 
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However, while the strike and the rates rebellion encouraged such shifts within the soft left, 
no issue played a bigger role in forging links between the LCC and Kinnock, and 
simultaneously breaking links between the LCC and the radicals, than the Militant purge. Thus 
it was within the heat of the Militant battle, with its multiple positioning of various 
constitutive outsides, that the soft left and the LCC constructed its most cohesive identity. 
The LCC In the early eighties was overwhelmingly a grass-roots organisation made-up of 
Party members active in, and to an extent obsessed by (Interview with Gilby 1994), the 
minutiae of local parties and local government. In just over a year from its launch, the LCe 
had already picked-up the support of forty-two CLPs and had 600 members (Labour Activist, 
February 1980) and this rose steadily to over 900 by 1985 (LCC membership list) with the 
greatest concentrations being in London, Scotland and, to a lesser degree, the Midlands (LCe 
Annual Report 1983). It was in the constituencies and boroughs of these areas that LCC 
supporters, inspired by the radical democratic principles of post-1968 socialism and the new 
agenda ideals of anti-racism, womens rights and the peace movement, found themselves in 
opposition to the Militant Tendency, the supporters of which were gaining increasing 
influence in a number of CLPs throughout the country but were particularly strong in London, 
Scotland and Liverpool. The tendency preached a brand of workerist politics and Leninist 
organisation that was anathema to the more libertarian and less orthodox members of the 
Lee. Peter Hain, who was far from being on the pro-Kinnock stream in the LCC, condemned 
Militant on the grounds that they were 
reactionary on racism, on women's rights, on Ireland and industrial 
democracy. They are old-fashioned statists - running the town hall in an 
elitist fashion and learning nothing from the new tide of democratic 
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socialism sweeping through local Labour councils like Greater London 
or Sheffield (Tribune, 13 December 1985). 
The local battles the Lee had with Militant are recounted as almost legendary struggles by 
Lee activists now. The feature that remains most prominent for many of them are the 
unsubstantiated stories of violence that accompanied the battles and obviously heightened the 
intensity and hatred between the two groups. There are many anecdotes ranging from 
threatening behaviour and actual physical assault to the attempted electrocution of anti-
Militants at a conference by the wiring-up of a duplicator to the mains (Interviews with the 
following: Haworth 1995; Hulme 1994; Matheson 1994; Stanley 1994). In Spring of 1984, 
Democratic Left (the Kinnock-supporting wing of the National Organisation of Labour 
Students) actually produced a public report blaming Militant for the suspension of the NOLS 
conference in April following an outbreak of fighting on the conference floor (Democratic 
Left 1984). 
As a result, the majority in the Lee had a very hostile attitude to Militant believing that the 
entryists were a serious problem to which a solution had to be found (Interviews with the 
following: Gilby 1994; Haworth 1994; Barron 1994; Hulme 1994). A large number of 
members, following their harsh experiences in local parties, took a particularly hardline hoping 
for an all-out attack on the Trotskyite group. This attitude was particularly strong amongst 
the LeC's most active supporters forming a strong anti-Militant majority on the group's 
executive. However, within the group there was a broader spectrum of views about the 
response to Militant alongside those who took the most aggressive hardline. This spectrum 
was thrown strongly into relief after Kinnock's 1985 conference speech. There were those 
who wanted to take-on Militant but were wary of throwing in their lot too closely with 
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Kinnock, as well as those who felt understandably squeamish about a leadership-inspired 
attack on any section of the Party. 
Alan Haworth, a senior figure within the Lee, remembered that 
there were certainly leading members of the Lee who had gone on the 
media and been at least ambivalent, if not codedly critical of Kinnock's 
attack. ... And I remember how angry some people were about that 
including me (Interview with Haworth 1995). 
While others in the LCe and on the soft left recognised the seriousness of the Militant 
problem but were shocked by Kinnock's strategy. Alan Matheson, an activist in Tooting eLP, 
commented on Kinnock's 1985 speech: 
I was tom in two by it. I completely agreed with what he was saying, I 
thought it was brilliant that at last we had a leader who was going to 
stand up to Militant and tell them where to stuff their redundancy 
notice by taxi and all the other crap that was getting us into trouble. 
The way he did it though was appalling, it was as though the new 
politics was just airy-fairy nonsense that he'd been putting-on and that 
we were still a Party run by macho men and that the one who could 
shout the loudest was the one who was going to win. I went to a 
meeting shortly after organised by the LeC women's group and it just 
became a mourning session - we felt betrayed and completely knocked-
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back that somebody could do the right thing in such an appalling way 
(Interview with Matheson 1994). 
However, despite these differences within the Lee, the general sense that Militant must be 
dealt with in some way was not a view shared throughout the Party. And this opposition had 
helped provide the soft left and the Lee with a firmer identity in opposition to its detractors. 
Objections to the soft left view came, to a limited extent, at least initially, from some 
individuals on the moderate wing but a more robust and active response was launched by the 
Bennites. 
This initial reticence on the part of some moderates was noted by the soft left. Bryan Gould 
commented that he felt making the Party electable 
meant getting rid of what was really a life-threatening condition in the 
Party due to the entryism of people like Militant and so on. The oddity 
is that it was people from the soft left like me who saw this most 
clearly and were prepared to do something about it. Whereas those on 
the right were cowed by this issue, they complained about it as victims 
but they didn't see themselves as taking the initiative (Interview with 
Gould 1994). 
Even Kinnock recognised resistance to his plans from the moderates, he comments: 
I think there were two reasons (for the moderates' resistance). One is 
the memory they had of the appalling divisions in the Labour Party in 
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the 1950s and their memories were scarred by that. ... The second thing 
is that this is a very liberal and tolerant Party. It doesn't like picking 
fights especially with youngsters because it thinks people "grow out" of 
things (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
Ken Hulme, a veteran Militant-fighter, met similar wariness from figures such as Terry 
Ashton, Diane Hayter and Frank Dobson (Interview with Hulme 1994) who feared that the 
Party may have looked divided if Militant were challenged. However, this initial wariness 
probably reflected a certain lack of confidence on the moderate wing of the Party about their 
ability to withstand a backlash from the left~ once the expulsion process was fully underway 
the moderate wing rallied behind Kinnock and gave their wholehearted support. 
However, another side to the argument was provided by many of Tony Benn's supporters who 
felt a confrontation was engineered by the core leadership to please the moderates and the 
media and to provide Kinnock with an excuse to destroy the power of the radical wing 
(Interview with King 1994~ Interview with Mullin 1994). Chris Mullin argued that 
(Militant) was a tiny little organisation that never was what it was 
cracked up to be in size or influence (Interview with Mullin 1994). 
But there were also those close to the radical wing and active within the Party establishment 
who shared a view similar to the cautious stance of those on the moderate wing in that they 
saw Militant as a problem but one that had to be approached gently. Jim Mortimer, for 
example, stated: 
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I was in no doubt at all that Militant was in breach of the constitution 
... but I shared the view of Ron Heywood that Militant also attracted a 
lot of younger people who wanted to be militant with a small 'm' ... that 
in time these people would become normal left-wing members of the 
Labour Party (Interview with Mortimer 1994). 
Even an NEC motion which prevented the expulsion of Brychan Davies, a suspected Militant 
member from Rhondda, displayed some sympathy for this view stating that 
... it was not in the interests of the Party to deal with such an issue 
(expulsion) on the basis of one young member in one constituency 
(NEC 3, 28 November 1984: 10). 
Thus the conflict with Militant had introduced a plurality of views into the Party which were 
not congruent with any traditional left-right or radical-moderate spectrum. A classic example, 
in fact, of complex multiplication. This contrasts with the existing literature and with views 
common at the time which tended to regard the attack on Militant as developed solely within 
the core leadership and within the ranks of the moderate wing (Hughes and Wintour 1990: 9-
10~ Heffernan and Marqusee 1992: 69~ 261; Shaw 1994: 35-36). 
As such, Kinnock's forthright attack on the Trotskyite group at the 1985 conference was an 
extremely significant point in the development of the soft left and by implication the broader 
Party. The speech gave powerful backing to the bellicose stance of the majority of the LCC 
and its soft left supporters. This vindication boosted the confidence of this group, enhanced its 
support for Kinnock himself (see below) and, perhaps most significantly, constructed a 
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moment for the Lee and soft left within which its identity, based as it was both on a 
confrontation with Militant and those who disapproved of an aggressive attack on that group, 
was given a concrete reality. They were no longer one loose group with a particular view, 
they were now, suddenly, the mainstream allied unexpectedly with a leader about whom they 
previously had held serious reservations. Such a moment clearly defined and confirmed the 
direction and role of the Lee and the soft left for a considerable time to come. 
Unsurprisingly, the LeC leadership opted to give its wholehearted backing to Kinnock. In an 
editorial entitled "The Blunt Choice!" which appeared on the front-page of the LCe's 
conference newsletter, it was stated that 
Whatever people may feel about Neil Kinnock's Tuesday speech, all the 
different elements on the left cannot duck deciding whether they are 
going to 'fight' the leadership along with Militant, or whether they 
adopt an alternative strategy. Those who decide to 'fight' Kinnock are 
saying they don't care about winning the next election; they are opting 
for self-indulgence - the kind of self-indulgence which would be a real 
betrayal of the working class people we have the privilege and the duty 
to represent; they will also be quite cynically seeking to recruit for their 
own sectarian purposes rather than build the Party (Labour Activist, 
Bournemouth '85 edition: 1). 
However, as was mentioned above, the speech suddenly and briefly threw the differences 
about the response to Militant within the Lee into relief Alan Haworth, a member of the 
LCC Executive and an officer of the PLP, commented that "it was a moment to make your 
, 
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mind up inside the Lee" about where you stood in relation to the future of the Party. A 
number of Lee activists organised a spontaneous meeting after Kinnock's speech and 
managed by word of mouth to have every Lee member and activist who was at 
Boumemouth in attendance: 
I remember the meeting itself was very dramatic and on balance was in 
favour of giving support to Kinnock and his attack on Militant but it 
wasn't without trauma ... I think it was the only Lee meeting I'd ever 
been at where feelings ran so high that people were close to tears. In 
the month after this dramatic event an overwhelming number of Lee 
members rallied behind Kinnock's attack on Militant (Interview with 
Haworth 1995). 
Other soft left members, outside the Lee, felt Kinnock had finally given a lead to the Party. 
Maureen O'Mara, a constituency activist and trade union womens officer, not active in the 
Lee but increasingly disillusioned with the radical wing of the Party, felt 
... it was leadership. I thought it was what the leader had to do because 
when he took on Militant, it meant the rest of us were able to do it. ... 
He handed it to conference in a split second, it was very brave of him 
to do it, because if conference had not responded in the way it did, 
Kinnock would have lost but he suddenly gave people a lot of courage 
(Interview with O'Mara 1994). 
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Thus the 1985 conference speech was a significant, rather than a cathartic, moment in what 
was the gradual development of a soft left identity. Streams of thought unsympathetic to the 
radical wing, especially its direct action strategy, had always existed as a proto-soft left. Many 
of those who espoused such streams of thought had found their voice in the heterogeneous 
mix of the Lee since 1978 - a mix which also included those in full support of the radical 
wing and its direct action strategy. However, the defeats of Miners' Strike, the rates rebellion 
and the Liverpool Militant affair which were, by far, the most ambitious applications of the 
direct action strategy, effectively disarticulated the strategy from the deeply-held 'defend the 
people' value. Due to the way in which these events unfolded and due to the skilful 
interventions of Kinnock, a re-articulation was also begun by which active vote maximisation 
was increasingly regarded as the only appropriate method for the fulfilment of the 'defend the 
people' value. The existence of strands within the soft left which were already hostile to direct 
action and, in particular, to Militant, enhanced the efficacy of the disarticulations and re-
articulations and were themselves buoyed by these same processes. This last retroaction 
reached its high-point with the leader's speech at the 1985 conference. 
However, changes in value cannot alone explain the importance of this period for the 
transformation. Modifications of values were in a close inter-retroaction with changes in the 
contingent-political circumstances of the Party. 
TilE CONTINGENT POLITICAL TRANSFORl\fATION 
As was outlined in chapter three, most analysts of this period identify the key feature of the 
realignment as the development of an alliance in the NEe, the conference and in the broader 
Party between the new soft left and the right following the disputes of 1984 and 1985 
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(Hughes and Wintour 1990: 9~ Smith 1992a: 9~ Shaw 1988: xi~ Shaw 1994: 161-162~ JeftTey 
1993: 115 -126). 
However, while it is undoubtedly the case that the moderates and members of the soft left did 
begin to vote along broadly similar lines after 1985, to describe this simply as an 'alliance' 
between the two streams is misleading and once again evades some of the complexities of the 
Issue. 
A straightforward 'alliance' between soft left and moderates was unlikely for three reasons. 
Firstly, those who were active on the soft left had been involved for many years in a battIe 
with the moderates who dominated so many of Labour's local authorities. Hierarchical, 
conservative and corporatist, these local authorities were regarded as the opposition by a 
group like the burgeoning Lce which was committed to democratic and networking ideals. 
The battles with this old local Labour establishment were a defining experience for many who 
were active within the LCe. It showed them a wing of the Party that was unresponsive to the 
demands not only of the voters but also to the grassroots of the Party itself. Alan Haworth 
was involved in the famous move in Newham North East Labour Party to deselect Reg 
Prentice in 1975 - a member of the Labour Cabinet. Haworth acknowledges that this was only 
a small part of a battle extending over six years to "tackle the more pervasive problem of the 
right-wing hegemony and the freemasons lodge" on Newham council (Interview with 
Haworth 1995). Such battles - repeated wherever the LCC was active - threw into relief the 
strong cultural and social differences between the old moderate wing of the Party and the new 
soft left. Nigel Stanley explains it as follows: 
... there was a generational difference, there were few people ... who 
were younger than forty who would describe themselves as being on 
the right. The soft left was interested in what you might call post-60's 
issues like feminism and anti-racism which the old right didn't really 
understand. Right-wing trade union chairs saw nothing wrong with 
calling women 10ve' and 'dear' and 'darling' - they weren't being 
deliberately offensive, they just didn't understand that no-one under 
forty would ever do that (Interview with Stanley 1994). 
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In fact the soft left's more intense conflict with Militant developed directly out of the battle 
with the moderates. As Ken Hulme comments: 
A lot of what we objected to about what Militant had done in 
Liverpool was based on what the right had done in Liverpool. The soft 
left critique of Militant wasn't just a critique of Militant's politics but 
their style of action and Tammany Hall politics ... We used to argue 
that Militant built itselfup in Liverpool on the right-wing machine, they 
were two sides of the same coin and operated in the same direction 
(Interview with Hulme 1994). 
These differences and disputes rankled and remained well into the 1980s and although specific 
policy differences lessened, the personal, social and cultural distinctions still acted as a barrier 
to the formation of any alliance. Even as late as 1987, antagonistic in-fighting was still being 
waged between moderates and soft left members (see chapter eight and nine). 
225 
Secondly, and more practically, a strict alliance could not be forged for the simple reason that 
the conditions and facilities necessary for the negotiation of such a pact did not exist. While 
similar voting patterns could be established on the NEC, this could not ensure power for 
Kinnock, since NEC decisions only had weight if upheld by the trade unions and not 
challenged in the wider Party and at conference. But the moderates held no real position of 
influence within the CLPs and had only limited influence in the trade unions - all the big block 
votes were in the hands of soft left leaning leaders such as Todd and Edmonds. As such it was 
the soft left alone which played a much more important role in bringing unions and Party 
behind Kinnock - an alliance with the moderates in this broader context was not even worth 
considering. As Nigel Stanley stated: 
One of the problems was "who are the right?". The right were a series 
of vested interests and individuals with entrenched positions of power. 
... Solidarity (had) wound down, it was very hard finding any evidence 
of Solidarity in the constituencies - it had a network of right-wing trade 
unionists but it wasn't a constituency based pressure group .... So the 
soft left couldn't go to, even if it wanted to, the central committee of 
the right and have an argument with it (Interview with Stanley 1994). 
Thirdly, leaving aside the fact that on some fundamental policies, especially unilateral ism, the 
moderates and soft left supporters remained at odds in 1985, there was still one major factor 
that distinguished them from one another - Militant. As was mentioned above while the soft 
left, especially those in the LCC were very keen for an all-out showdown with Militant, some 
moderates were extremely wary. 
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In truth, the contingent political situation to which the 1984-1985 period gave rise was not a 
direct alliance between moderates and soft left but a more complex dual informal association 
between soft left and core leadership and between moderates and core leadership. This is 
important, firstly, because it highlights that the existing analysis is a simplification and. 
secondly, because it means that as we trace events as they develop through the 1980s. our 
attention is now drawn to a series of contingent political dynamics that have tended to be 
ignored. These dynamics are: the highly antagonistic relationship between soft left and 
moderates; the troubled and variable association between the core leadership and the 
moderates; and the troubled and variable association between the core leadership and the soft 
left. Recognition of these dynamics allows us to notice and explain tensions and events that 
have otherwise been overlooked. Most specifically it highlights Kinnock's own ambiguous 
position within the Party and also explains the importance of the months following the 1987 
election when the dual association came close to collapse and the leader almost faced a 
serious challenge to his position. This is dealt with in more detail in chapters eight and nine. 
The lack of any genuine alliance between soft left and moderates also extends the category of 
causes we can bring into our explanation of the transformation. The consequence of the 
notion that such an alliance existed and was central to the ability of Kinnock to achieve , 
change, is to shift the spatial focus towards personal causes. In Hughes and Wintour (1990) 
and Heffernan and Marqusee (1992), the alliance thesis suggests that transformation was the 
result of conscious and rational decisions by leadership figures who personally constructed a 
contingent-political situation favourable to change. However, as the preceding and following 
analysis shows, there were a wide variety of other factors involved in the gradual 
transformation of the Party which were institutional and ideological in form as well as 
personal and contingent-political. In addition, the inter-retroaction that is implicit to this thesis 
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suggests that one form of cause does not precede another. In the alliance thesis, any 
ideological or institutional changes are regarded largely as the effects of the personal ~nd 
contingent-political causes. In Hughes and Wintour, in particular, the personal even seems to 
precede the contingent-political. However, the analysis that has already been developed in this 
thesis hopefully has displayed that all these factors are inseparably woven together and that 
any attempt to identify one factor as preceding another will fail since one can certainly find an 
example in which the secondary factor preceded the primary at some point. In this sense the 
rejection of the more straightforward alliance thesis allows for study of the Party's 
transformation as a whole rather than a study of how the leadership's transformation occurred 
and acted as a (literal) precedent affecting the broader Party. Such a rejection is clearly a 
necessary precondition to avoid an epiphenomenal analysis and thus to produce the complex 
analysis proposed in chapters one and two. Furthermore, the identification of a dual 
association rather than a single alliance is clearly a multiplication of the positions (in this case 
contingent political positions) held within the Party - a factor which is itself a contribution 
towards enhanced complexity. 
KINNOCK ESTABLISHED AS LEADER 
A further outcome of the 1984-1985 disputes was the establishment of Kinnock as a leader 
with a definite identity as a forthright reformer who was, at least for the present, 
unchallengable. Changes to values, in ways favoured by Kinnock, a more secure political 
balance on the NEC, and a serious decline in the credibility of Kinnock's most vociferous 
opponents - the radical wing - all contributed to this. But it was the specific decision to 
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challenge Militant in such a public and aggressive manner at the 1985 conference that 
confirmed this identity. 
As was indicated above, his speech aroused strong feelings of support for Kinnock amongst 
many on the conference floor. Kevin Barron, who resigned from the Campaign Group soon 
after the conference, felt the leader was "courageous because he dared to say things that 
others wouldn't" (Interview with Barron 1994). While John Edmonds commented: 
I think (the 1985 speech) united the Party and made many of the 
divisions on that side of the Party". appear irrelevant ". Kinnock put 
himself in charge of the rest against Militant and their supporters and 
that's what created unity (Interview with Edmonds 1994). 
In this sense the 1985 speech was an interesting aspect of a negative identity construction. 
While many in the soft left stream had already positioned Militant as a constitutive outside 
during the early 1980s, Kinnock, by acknowledging openly that the Trotskyite group was an 
enemy, allied himself very effectively with the soft left without directly endorsing their views 
and identity and without coming to any formal agreement with them. 
It also seems that to a certain extent the declaration of war on Militant was a turning-point for 
Kinnock himself. It was the first time he felt able to express his wholehearted opposition to 
the tendency at conference. His election in 1983 and the strike in 1984 had prevented him 
doing this previously. It was also the first real opportunity he had to put his highly aggressive 
style of leadership into effect and take an unequivocal stance on an issue after the ambiguities 
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and compromises thrown-up by the Miners' Strike and the rates rebellion. He expressed his 
uncompromising, and more personally characteristic, attitude to Militant when he commented: 
What was different about Militant ... was that they weren't in the 
business of growing up at all. They were instigated by, organised by, 
controlled by people who were my age and older, whose intention was 
full entryism - the use of the mass Party for sectarian ends. So they had 
to be dealt with. Of course it means doctrinaire division - and that is 
not the instinct of the Labour Party because they are such a decent 
bunch of people. So you've got to be a bit of a bastard in order to 
understand that you are locked in a very fundamental sectarian 
difference and if you don't win then the Labour Party will change its 
nature. I was absolutely certain it wasn't going to be allowed to do that 
(Interview with Kinnock 1994a). 
Thus the strengthened role of Kinnock had an energising effect on himself and on many Party 
members especially those active on the soft left. However, his new-found confidence brought 
with it a tendency to authoritarianism and intolerance that alienated many, damaged the Party 
and almost lost him support and his post as leader. This is dealt with more fully in chapter 
eight. 
It should also be mentioned that, as one would expect of an inter-retroactive process, the 
Militant debacle also had major effects elsewhere throughout the Party. These are detailed and 
studied in the following chapters of this thesis. In particular, the important influence the 
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Militant issue had upon the institutional structure of the Party and its increasing centralisation 
is explored in chapter six. 
CONCLUSION 
As with all the other topics covered in this thesis, the events of the 1984-1985 period played a 
multiple and complex role in the transformation of the Party. Ideological factors and value 
were transformed with new strategies being articulated to the 'defend the people' value. 
Contingent political factors began to undergo major change with the establishment of the dual 
association between the moderate wing and the core leadership and the soft left stream and 
the core leadership. Personal factors were involved with Kinnock's own identity as a tough, 
aggressive, reforming leader being well-established following the 1985 conference. 
Inter-retroactive dynamics also became integral to these different factors. It is, of course, 
observable in the negative identity construction that developed during the soft left's battles 
with the moderate dominance of local authorities and in the same stream's conflict with 
Militant activity in local politics. However, most significant as has been pointed out, was 
Kinnock's establishment of a tacit alliance with soft left forces through his very public 
acknowledgement of Militant as an 'outside'. Of course, this acknowledgement also helped 
define Kinnock's own identity and self-perceived identity through a process of negative 
construction. In addition, the intense process of disarticulation and re-articulation of various 
values and strategies that occurred between 1984 and 1985 also imply processes of inter-
retroaction. 
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The 1984 - 1985 was a period in which a large number of additional causal processes involved 
in the transformation can be identified. It is a period of extreme fecundity in terms of changes 
in all spheres of the Party and yet the detail of the period has largely been ignored by analysts. 
If we cease to regard this short period as the "wasted year" and instead recognise the mass of 
changes that were occurring across the whole Party, we not only explain more about Labou'r 
but also greatly enhance the complexity of analysis. 
